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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of union-management behavior during a union organiza­
tion drive. This phase of union-management relations has not been the sub­
ject of formal economic analysis. An examination of the behavior of the 
participants in such an effort raises a fundamental question regarding the 
extent to which rational behavior,^ as reflected, for example, in the con­
sideration given to economic cost and revenue data, tends to dominate the 
decisions made. 
The investigation of the organization effort to follow results in the 
development of a new method for analyzing the participants' behavior. The 
model contributes to the understanding of a neglected area in union-manage­
ment relations, and serves as a vehicle for a more complete comprehension 
of other aspects of union-management interaction where conflict is in­
volved . 
Methodology 
In order to conduct the examination of behavior during an organization 
drive, an important union organization effort is investigated, and serves 
as the basis for the development of the model. The case selected is the 
Steel Workers' Organization Committee's, (hereafter called the SWOC), at­
tempt to organize the steel industry from 1936 through the latter part of 
1942. 
The SWOC organization drive is particularly valuable for the develop­
ment of a meaningful theoretical model for several reasons. First, it was 
^Additional clarification of the definition of rational behavior as 
used in this study is given on pages 6 and 7. 
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a drive of considerable significance in the history of the labor movement. 
Walter Galenson notes that, 
. . .  i f  t h e r e  i s  a n y  s i n g l e  s e r i e s  o f  e v e n t s  i n  c h e  l a b o r  h i s ­
tory of this period which may be characterized as of momentous 
import, it is the organization of the steel industry. (1, p. 75). 
Philip Taft has also alluded to the importance of the SWOC effort in an in­
direct manner when he observed of the CIO unions generally that, 
their successful organizing of many thousands of hitherto unor­
ganized workers is an achievement that will rank high in the 
permanent records of labor. (2). 
Second, the effort involved formidable opponents. The SWOC, as shall 
be shown, had a considerable amount of money and manpower at its command to 
bring the union to the steel industry. The steel industry also proved to 
have strong resources at its disposal with which to resist the organization 
drive. Robert R. R. Brooks observed during the organization effort that: 
For forty years, steel has assumed the leadership of the anti­
union movement. As steel had gone, the nation had followed. 
If steel could be captured for unionism, resistance elsewhere 
might be broken. (3, p. 244). 
Third, the firms in the steel industry, facing similar economic condi­
tions, reacted to the organization drive in two distinctly different ways. 
One group of firms recognized the union promptly and peacefully while an­
other group resisted the union's efforts with violence. These two types of 
behavioral reactions, taken as representative, reveal the alternatives open 
to firms when confronting an organizing effort. 
Finally, the decisions made by the firms in the steel industry to rec­
ognize or to resist the union's attempts reflect considerations that may be 
described as both rational, in that cost and revenue considerations played 
a dominant role in the decision process, and irrational or non-rational in 
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that such fundamental data did not appear to influence behavior. For exam­
ple, John DoHard, in discussing the union and the firms that chose to re­
sist the organization drive has stated that , undoubtedly, irrational 
aggression was present on both sides." (4, p. 113). To the extent that 
the behavior thus demonstrated was dominated by rational and irrational or 
non-rational characteristics, and to the extent that this is representative 
of influences affecting union and management behavior during such a drive, 
the selected case is of specific value to the economist in his effort to 
understand such behavioral conflict. 
The case method used in this study is ex post. Some thirty-one years 
have gone by since the beginning of the SWOC effort. The historical record 
may now be viewed more dispassionately and objectively than might have been 
possible when the event was taking place. The economist may take advantage 
of the accounts of the organization attempt in an effort to discern with 
greater clarity those forces that influence behavior in such an endeavor. 
This is not to say, however, that such an approach is without important 
disadvantages. The most important of the disadvantages is that the histor­
ical record may be biased and incomplete. Such shor-tcomings should not un­
duly detract from the merit of ex post investigations. The analysis of 
historical data provides the economist with what is perhaps his only vehi­
cle for determining the degree to which economic models of behavior fit the 
facts. Additionally, such analyses permit the scholar to better understand 
contemporary and future events of a similar nature. 
Procedure and Limitations 
In order to conduct the investigation in a rigorous fashion, this 
study: (1) will review the history of the SWOC organization drive in the 
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steel industry; (2) will make an institutional analysis of the organization 
effort with the object of delineating all the important influences bearing 
on the effort; (3) will examine available data on the immediate cost of the 
organization campaign and will determine, to the extent possible, whether 
such an organization effort could be described as economically rational; 
rnd (4) will develop a theoretical analysis of the behavior demonstrated 
during the drive in order to better understand such behavior. 
This study does not pretend to be an exhaustive examination of all the 
historical records of the SWOC organization effort in the steel industry. 
The writer has summarized the principal events between 1936 and 1942, em­
phasizing the institutional factors that appear to have played a decisive 
role in the endeavor. This compendium serves as a basis for a methodical 
institutional and theoretical analysis of a union organization drive. 
Available data do not permit making an authoritative estimate of the 
immediate cost of the organization effort. Evidence will be developed to 
show that it is inherently difficult, if not impossible, to establish the 
exact cost of any union organization attempt. Enough evidence exists, how­
ever, to make an approximation of the cost and thus permit a qualified an­
swer to the question as to whether such an organization effort is economi­
cally rational. 
Finally, the theoretical model developed from this study is seen as 
applying specifically to the organization phase of union-management rela­
tions. No effort is made to app.ly_J:he model to other aspects of union-
management behavior. It may be that the model would prove useful in exam­
ining other areas of the relationship, but such an extension is not the im­
mediate concern of this study. 
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Definition of Terms 
The writer has no intention of assigning new or particularly unique 
definitions to terms used in the study. The writer does use terms, how­
ever, that in his experience are subject to misunderstanding or misinter­
pretation. It is useful to clarify their meaning prior to the analysis. 
The term "rational behavior" as it is used to describe activities in 
economic models is subject to such misunderstanding. Rational behavior has 
been described by Kenneth Arrow (5, p. 137) as being "... maximization of 
some sort. ..." Abraham Kaplan notes that, 
rational behavior, that is to say, is characterized as the selec­
tion of the strategy which minimizes the maximum loss each player 
can sustain. (6, p. 84). 
Thomas C. Schelling has observed of rational behavior that it is not only 
intelligent, but is 
. . o motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a cal­
culation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally 
consistent value system. (7, p. 4). 
Schelling also notes that rational behavior is ". . , a calculating, 
value -- maximizing strategy of decision . . . (7, p. 17). Oskar 
Morgenstern defines individual rational behavior as that act of 
. . . judging quantitatively any situation in wh".ch he may be 
placed so that with his information he can assure himself of 
the maximum gain or utility. (8), 
These representative examples of definitions of rational behavior in­
dicate the general meaning of such behavior in contemporary economic analy­
sis. Upon examination it is seen that there are several elements involved 
in these definitions. There is a direct association between rational be­
havior and a maximizing or minimizing process. This is a common associa­
tion, for in economic theory generally. 
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everyone is presumably maximizing something -- land owners, 
labor, and capital maximize income; consumers maximize util­
ity; and (at least in welfare economics) the society as a 
whole maximizes aggregate satisfactions. This economy-wide 
effprt to maximize is presumably greatly facilitated by per­
fect knowledge, perfect rationality, perfect mobility, and 
appropriate rules of the game. (9, p. 53). 
It is also seen from the above definitions that rational behavior is taken 
to mean the conscious calculation of the merits of an activity, the quanti­
tative judgment of any situation, and there is the requirement that such a 
calculation or judgment be based on an explicit and consistent value sys­
tem. The inclusion of all of these elements into a definition of rational 
behavior would be valid on the basis of the above evidnece, but a more spe­
cific one is preferred. In addition, it is useful to distinguish between 
rational behavior as it applies to the firm and rational behavior on the 
part of the union. 
Rational behavior by the firm is defined for this study as meaning a 
conscious quantitative evaluation of economic data done with the intent of 
maximizing or minimizing some stated objective function. The objective 
function to be so maximized or minimized is assumed to mean in this study 
either the maximization of profit, sales, or revenue, or the minimization 
of loss or dollar cost. The identification of the objective function with 
money is not unusual when speaking of firms. John von Neuman and Osicar 
Mbrgenstern make a similar association in game theory when they note that, 
". . .we ascribe to all players an exclusively monetary profit motive." 
(10, p. 47). 
The union is a non-profit organization. The definition of rational 
behavior by the firm would be inaccurate and misleading if it were applied 
to the union. It has been emphasized by Arthur M. Ross (infra p. 125) that 
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the institutional needs of growth and survival are of great importance to 
the union. These needs constitute the appropriate objective function of 
the union. It is thus reasonable to define rational behavior by the union 
as being that behavior which is primarily concerned with and directed 
toward the growth and survival of the union. 
Irrational or non-rational behavior is a term frequently used in the 
analysis. It is also subject to misunderstanding. To a large extent, ir­
rational or non-rational behavior could mean just the converse of rational 
behavior. For example, Schelling notes of irrational behavior that it 
. . . can imply a disorderly and inconsistent value system, 
faulty calculation, an inability to receive messages or to com­
municate efficiently; it can imply random or haphazard influ­
ences in the reaching of decisions or the transmission of them, 
or in the receipt or conveyance of information; and it sometimes 
merely reflects the collective nature of a decision among indi­
viduals who do not have identical value systems and whose organi­
zational arrangements and communication systems do not cause them 
to act like a single entity. (7, p. 16). 
Perhaps an even more rigorous definition of irrational behavior could be 
derived from the composite definition of rational behavior presented above. 
That is to say, irrational or non-rational behavior could be said to exist 
whenever the individual's or institution's behavior fails to incorporate 
all of the elements associated with rational behavior. On that basis, an 
absence of maximization, minimization, conscious calculation, quantitative 
judgment, or lack of an explicit and consistent value system, either singly 
or in combination would indicate that some irrational or non-rational char­
acteristics were present in the behavior. In a general sense, such a defin­
ition is appropriate for this study. There is a need, however, for greater 
specificity in the definition. Again, a distinction is drawn between the 
firm and the union. 
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Irrational or non-rational behavior by the firm is defined for this 
study as a lack of conscious quantitative evaluation of economic data, or a 
lack of intent to maximize or to minimize some stated objective function. 
Again, the objective function to be affected is either the maximization of 
profit, sales, or revenue, or the minimization of loss or dollar cost. 
Irrational or non-rational behavior by the union is defined as that 
behavior not primarily concerned with and directed toward the growth and 
survival of the union. 
The foregoing definitions of rational and irrational or non-rational 
behavior for firms and unions clarify the meaning of the two terms most 
likely to be misunderstood. Other terms will be defined as they occur in 
the analysis since it is not anticipated that they will be as subject to 
misinterpretation. 
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Evaluation of a Related Analytical Technique 
It has been noted that union-management behavior during an organiza­
tion drive has not been the subject of formal economic analysis. This is 
not to say that there are no models that deal with some aspects of such be­
havior. The organization drive is, after all, a situation involving coop­
eration and conflict. Some firms cooperate with the union by recognizing 
it with a minimum of difficulty. Other firms choose to resist the union's 
efforts by engaging in conflict with the union. 
There is one prominent body of analysis that specifically deals with 
behavior in situations of conflict, and that is the theory of games. It 
will be demonstrated, however, that there are at least three, and possibly 
four characteristics of the theory of games that make it inadequate for use 
in the understanding of conflict behavior in the organization phase of 
union-management relations. 
First, the theory of games is a normative theory. That is, the theory 
either explicitly or implicitly describes a pattern of behavior that should 
be followed in order to minimize maximum losses or maximize minimum gains. 
It is not at all clear that the theory explains what does in fact occur 
during conflict situations or, more specifically, the sort of behavior 
found in union organization efforts. Support for this view is given by 
Professors Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff (11, p.;520) when they observe of 
game theory that "it is concerned with the procedure and principles by 
which plays should be selected," (Emphasis mine.) Martin Shubik makes a 
similar observation when he notes of two-person games that the theory 
"... provides a normative theory as to how to play." (12, p. 18). 
Shubik states elsewhere that. 
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it is the belief of students and advocates of game theory and 
decision theory that individuals should consciously attempt at 
least to consider their problems in terms of alternative 
strategies. Although it is recognized that exhaustive search 
of alternative strategies is more or less impossible, politi­
cal, diplomatic, and military decision making may be assisted 
and possibly improved by the formal structuring of alternative 
paths of action. (13, p. 29). 
Morgenstern (8) also alludes to the normative nature of game theory when he 
observes, 
I shall now state what the fundamental problem is: We wish to 
know how the individual, pursuing his maximum interest, should 
behave on all types of markets. (Emphasis mine.) 
Support for the view that game theory is, therefore, not necessarily 
concerned with what does or has occurred in conflict situations is given in 
the following observations. Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie have 
stated of game theory that "the solutions, however, fall short of per­
suasiveness when applied to real-choice situations." (14, p. 47). 
Schelling has also noted of game theory that "whether the resulting theory 
provides good or poor insight into actual behavior is, I repeat, a matter 
for subsequent judgment." (7, p. 4). Finally, Shubik notes of game theory 
chat "it is not easy to show that the models are relevant, and it is even 
less easy to establish that they are right." (13, p. 70). It is thus evi­
dent that game theory does establish behavioral rules that should be fol­
lowed in conflict situations, and that it does not necessarily describe 
what does happen or what has happened in actual conflict situations, 
A second shortcoming inherent in the application of game theory to the 
organization phase of union-management relations concerns the behavioral 
assumptions required by the theory. Game theory fundamentally assumes ra­
tional behavior by the participants in the conflict. Shubik substantiates 
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this point when he notes that, 
much of the work in political and economic theory and in the 
theory of games has been based on the concept of the rational 
utilitarian individual. He is often implicitly or explicitly 
assumed to be confronted with known alternatives which he can 
evaluate, for he possesses a fully known, infinitely sensitive 
preference system. His roles as social, psychological, poetic, 
or heroic man are often completely suppressed in the abstrac­
tion. (13, p. 59). 
Additional clarification as to the meaning of rational behavior as used in 
the theory of games may be obtained from the variety of such definitions 
quoted in the section on definitions in this study. It is noted that each 
of those definitions was made by scholars who were speaking of game theory. 
The assumption of rational behavior made by game theory would not be 
particularly critical as long as such an assumption could be safely made 
about union-management behavior during an organization effort. Kaplan 
(6, p. 83) notes, for example, that, 
games are analyzed because the pattern of rational behavior 
that they exhibit is the same as that manifested in social 
action, insofar as the latter does in fact invoIve ration­
ality. (Emphasis mine.) 
It is thus observed that if irrational or non-rational behavior is evident 
in the actions of the parties to an organization drive, game theory is not 
in and of itself, an adequate vehicle for analysis. 
To the extent that game theorists see their rational participant as 
engaging in maximizing and/or minimizing behavior, it is further noted that 
such an assumption is not regarded to be in every way appropriate for anal­
yzing union-management relations. Kenneth E. Boulding has observed that 
labor economists, in their efforts to formulate a model of union behavior, 
". . . have not found the principle of maximization particularly useful." 
(15, p. 35). The study of the actual behavior of labor unions indicates 
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that it is not meaningful to assume "... that they wish to maximize some 
objective maximand. . (15, p. 36). 
A third characteristic of game theory that makes it unsatisfactory as 
a device for analyzing the union organization effort is its static nature. 
John von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern, in discussing the nature of game 
theory, observe that, ". . . our theory is thoroughly static." (10, p. 44) 
They also note that "a static theory deals with equilibria." (10, p. 45). 
Shubik noted sometime later that "much of game theory has been presented in 
a basically static framework." (13, p. 29). 
The union organization drive is a dynamic effort. The resulting con­
flict or lack of conflict is continuously affected by the dynamics of the 
participant interaction that takes place. That is to say, a study of the 
organization drive must be concerned with disequilibria. The analysis must 
focus on situations in which there is change and where such change causes 
movements far away from an equilibrium. The game theorist is not unaware 
of the dynamics involved in conflict behavior. 
Political and social behavior are best studied in the context 
of ongoing processes. For this reason, extreme care must be 
exercised when going from the study of the normalized form of 
a game to the dynamics of the process it is purported to por­
tray. (13, pp. 29, 30). 
It is seen, therefore, that in order to have a more complete understanding 
of the union organization effort, a model that can adequately cope with 
disequilibria is needed. 
There is a possible fourth characteristic of game theory that hinders 
its usefulness in analyzing the conflict involved in a union organization 
drive. It will be shown that the conflict that results from the union or­
ganization drive studied is best described as a situation of total war. 
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That is, both the union and management were goal-oriented and virtually all 
the considerations as to tactics were dominated by this goal orientation. 
This is frequently the case in a union organization drive. The union has 
only one acceptable goal -- the organization of the labor force. The firm 
that does resist has at best two goals both of which are unacceptable to 
the union. The firm may attempt to institute a company union or it may try 
to remain outside the union fold. These respective goals are in obvious 
conflict. Schelling (7, p. 15) notes of his use of game theory that, 
the theory degenerates at one extreme if there is no scope for 
mutual accommodation, no common interest at all even in avoid­
ing mutual disaster; it degenerates at the other extreme if 
there is no conflict at all and no problem in identifying and 
reaching common goals. (Emphasis mine.) 
It is observed too that if there is total cooperation, game theory does not 
apply. That is, it does not specifically apply where the participants have 
what may be called a common goal. When firms do recognize the union, there 
is some apparent agreement in goal selection though it may well be for dif­
ferent reasons. 
It has been shown throughout the discussion above that the stated in­
adequacies of game theory are recognized by the game theorist. The game 
theorist has also observed that the theory does not in fact have a neces­
sary and universal application to all the variety of behavior in conflict. 
It is observed, for example, that, 
. . . many examples of political, social, or other human be­
havior do not fit easily into the current framework of game 
theory and call for more modifications or other approaches. 
(13, p. 10). 
The game theorist also points out that the assumptions of game theory are 
"... not adequate in political science and in general when we wish to 
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examine decision making." (13, p. 57). 
It is apparent that game theory is not without shortcomings at this 
stage of its development. The normative nature of the theory, the require­
ment of rational behavior, the static nature of the theory, and its possi­
ble lack of usefulness in examining complete goal conflict, limit its use­
fulness. Behavior in a union organization effort, as will be shown, is not 
necessarily governed by what should be, nor is it necessarily rational in 
the game theory sense, and it is definitely dynamic. A formal analysis of 
union-management behavior during an organization drive must, therefore, 
allow for more deviations from some "standard of behavior" than game theory 
can permit. The scholar is reminded that, 
the complexity, machinery, pomp, and apparent high scientific 
powers of game theory, computer techniques, simulation, and 
gaming are no substitute for substantive knowledge. Further­
more, there is a danger that a false sense of accuracy and 
precision will lead to a misemphasis in the study of politi­
cal, sociological, or psychological problems. (13, p. 69). 
Behavior during a union organization drive is seen then as a neglected 
area of study. An analysis of behavior during such an effort contributes 
to an understanding of union-management relations. While the ex post 
method used in this study has the stated deficiencies, it is apparent that 
this approach can serve as a meaningful vehicle for the development of a 
new framework for analysis. The new approach thus developed will avoid at 
least some of the shortcomings of the game theory method. 
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CHAPTER II. THE HISTORY OF THE STEEL ORGANIZATION EFFORT^ 
The AFL-CIO Schism of the 1930's 
The split within the structure of the American Federation of Labor is 
one of the factors intimately related to the organization effort in the 
steel industry during the 1930's. It is of value to examine this division 
because it reveals the depth of the determination of some of the union of­
ficers discussed in the current study to institute industrial unionism in 
basic industries. 
The American Federation of Labor had been troubled for many years with 
unrest over the issue of industrial unionism. The issue came seriously to 
the forefront in the early 1930's. John L. Lewis was the acknowledged 
leader of the proponents of industrial unionism. 
In 1934, the issue of industrial unionism was brought before the con­
vention of the AFL meeting in San Francisco. The industrial union forces 
wanted the AFL to support the industrial union form of organization. There 
were fourteen resolutions concerned with industrial unionism introduced at 
the convention (24, pp. 581, 582). The resolutions were referred to the 
Committee on Resolutions for their consideration. The Committee in turn 
reported out a resolution that could be interpreted as being favorable to 
either the industrial union forces or the craft union interests (18, pp. 
206, 207). The convention voted unanimously to accept it. 
The 1935 convention of the AFL in Atlantic City resulted in the indus-
number of sources were relied upon for this review of the union or­
ganization effort in the steel industry. The principal sources were 1; 16; 
17; 18; 19; 3; 20; 21; 22; and 23. 
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trial union dispute gaining additional attention. The industrial union 
forces felt that there had not been sufficient progress by the AFL and its 
Executive Council in instituting the industrial union form of organization. 
Resolutions protesting the lack of progress were introduced at the conven­
tion by the industrial union group. Again the Committee on Resolutions was 
handed the problem, and this time the Committee submitted two reports to 
the convention. The majority report supported the craft union group and 
urged the convention to uphold the craft union structure. The minority re­
port, which was signed by six members of the Committee including John L. 
Lewis, C. P. Howard, and David Dubinsky, called for unrestricted industrial 
unionism. The majority report was accepted by the convention. 
On November 9, 1935, a conference called by Lewis met to form the Com­
mittee for Industrial Organization. Representatives of the following 
unions attended: the United Mine Workers, (John L. Lewis); the Interna­
tional Typographical Union, (Charles P. Howard); the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers, (Sidney Hillman); the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 
(David Dubinsky); the United Textile Workers, (Thomas F. McMahon); the 
Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers' Union, (Max Zaritsky); the Oil Workers, 
(Harvey C. Fremming); and the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, (Thomas H. 
Brown). (1, pp. 3, 4). The Committee for Industrial Organization selected 
Lewis as president, C. P. Howard as secretary, and John Brophy as director. 
On November 23, 1935, Lewis resigned as one of the vice presidents of 
the AFL. On this same day the president of the AFL, William Green, sent 
each member of the CIO a letter warning against the continuance of the Com­
mittee since it was, in his eyes, forming a dual union. While Green was 
not entirely unsympathetic with the cause of industrial unionism, he was 
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compelled to support the historic position of the Gompers group. In the 
minds of the Cômpers group . . to foster dual unionism was perhaps the 
one unforgivable sin in a labor organization, and the only fit punishment 
was ruthless suppression." (16, p. 8). Both Lewis and Howard replied that 
it was not the intent of the CIO to upset the AFL organization. 
The members of the CIO were by no means unanimous with respect to how 
deep they wanted the breach between the CIO and the AFL to be. At least 
three of the original members of the CIO wanted to be extremely cautious in 
any industrial union organization attempts. Sidney Hillman, who generally 
supported Lewis' position, "... urged that the CIO confine its organizing 
efforts to the automobile and rubber industries, and stay out of steel and 
radios." (1, p. 9), David Dubinsky and C. P. Howard also urged caution. 
Lewis, however, 
. . . was filled with a sense of urgency, believing that the 
time was ripe for extension of organization into the mass 
production industries, fired, no doubt, by the success with 
which the Miners' Union had used the favorable political cli­
mate swiftly to organize the coal mining industry in 1932. 
(Is p. 6), 
It is apparent that this difference of opinion did not seriously inhibit 
the industrial union cause. 
The founders of the CIO were held together in the initial 
stages by the conviction that the crying need of the time 
was organization of the mass production industries, and that 
this could be achieved only through industrial unionism. 
All considerations of tactics were subordinated to this cen­
tral purpose, and even such strong men as Hillman and Dubin­
sky were willing to bow to Lewis' judgment because they re­
garded him as an ideal instrument for effectuating a basic 
trade union purpose which they well realized could not be 
accomplished on their own. (1, p. 9). (Emphasis mine.) 
In January of 1936, the Executive Council of the AFL met. The CIO had 
already begun to publicize the cause of industrial unionism. The Executive 
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Council saw this as a threat that had to be met with some sort of disci­
plinary action. William Green noted that the constitution of the AFL did 
not give overt authority to the Executive Council to discipline affiliates 
through a suspension procedure, and that a two-thirds vote of the conven­
tion was needed to revoke an affiliate's charter. Seemingly frustrated by 
the constitutional limitations, the Council merely issued still another 
statement calling for the dissolution of the CIO. A committee was ap­
pointed to meet with the CIO unions to present the views of the Executive 
Council. 
The CIO leaders met on February 21, 1936, and replied to the January 
statement of the AFL to the effect that they did not intend to act as a 
dual body. They also indicated their willingness to meet with the commit­
tee appointed by the Executive Council. The CIO leaders, however, wrote a 
letter to Green at this meeting. In the letter the CIO agreed to pledge 
$500,000 and the services of trained organizers for the organization of the 
steel industry if the AFL would raise an additional $1,000,000 for this 
purpose. 
When the AFL Executive Council met again on May 5, its attorney argued 
that the Council could adopt rules governing suspension procedures since 
the constitution was silent on the matter. In addition, two letters were 
sent to the CIO. One letter to Lewis and other CIO representatives asked 
them to meet with the previously mentioned AFL committee. The other letter 
was sent to the chief executive officer of every CIO union, saying that the 
CIO was regarded as a dual union by the AFL and the CIO should, therefore, 
disband. Two weeks were given for a reply. 
The AFL committee met with representatives of the CIO on May 19 at 
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which time the AFL group presented a demand that the CIO dissolve. The re­
ply was not long in coming for on May 28, the CIO unions indicated that 
they would not quit the CIO. 
Green made an additional effort to meet with the CIO when he invited 
each CIO union to meet on an individual basis with the Executive Council 
beginning July 8. Because the response to this invitation was not good, it 
was proposed that the Executive Council bring formal charges against the 
CIO and use such charges as the basis for a trial. The CIO unions were 
thus summoned to appear before the Executive Council on August 3, to answer 
the charges. Lewis quickly challenged the constitutionality of the trial. 
None of the CIO unions appeared on the trial date and the trial was 
held in their absence. The next day the Executive Council adopted a reso­
lution finding ten CIO unions guilty of dualism. The Council ordered 
either their withdrawal from the CIO by September 5, 1936, or their suspen­
sion from the AFL. 
The CIO leaders met on August 10 and decided that they would not dis­
band. They also decided to regard the action of the Executive Council as 
the equivalent of a decision by the convention and stopped paying their per 
capita tax to the AFL. 
In a meeting on November 9, the CIO took one of the first open steps 
toward establishment of a rival federation. Having decided that compromise 
with the AFL committee was out of the question, Lewis persuaded the CIO to 
admit two more unions to the CIO, neither of which had a former affiliation 
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with the AFL.^ The breach within the labor movement was formalized at the 
November 16 convention of the AFL when that body supported the suspension 
action of the Executive Council. 
On March 9, 1937, the CIO met and adopted a resolution that authorized 
the issuance of certificates of affiliation to interested unions. In 
October, 1937, the first national conference of the CIO national union of­
ficers was held at Atlantic City. A message was sent to the AFL meeting in 
Denver requesting that unity conferences be resumed. 
On October 2 5 ,  1937, representatives of the two groups met. Philip 
Murray was not present at the initial meeting, and no announcement of prog­
ress was to be made until the next day at which time he was expected to be 
present. The CIO group did not show up the next day. It appears that 
Lewis . . torpedoed the negotiations." (1, p„ 42). "Lewis, it must be 
recalled, was not at all convinced that unity was a desirable objective." 
( 1 ) .  
The breach became final when the AFL convention, meeting in December, 
1937, granted the Executive Council authority to revoke the charters of the 
CIO affiliates. They did so in January of 1938. The schism, so long in 
coming, was formalized by the CIO on November 14, 1938, when it adopted its 
own constitution at its first constitutional convention. 
It has been shown that John L. Lewis was determined to expand the in­
dustrial union form of union organization into other sectors of the econo­
my, The steel industry was the most important of these relatively unorgan-
^The two unions were the United Electrical and Radio Workers and the 
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, (1, p. 26). 
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ized sectors, as far as Lewis was concerned. An associate of Lewis sup­
ported this view when he observed that. 
Steel was the key to understanding Lewis' policy; the mine 
workers would never be safe until steel was unionized, which 
he was determined to do at any cost. Organization of the 
other mass-production industries was a by-product of steel. 
Thus Lewis and UMW, intent on steel, were driven to create 
the CIO, because there was no other way to get the job in 
steel done, (20, p. 249). 
Lewis was willing to accept this division in the ranks of organized labor 
in order to achieve his goal: the organization of steel. 
The Influence of the Amalgamated Association 
of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers 
John L. Lewis was the key figure in the struggle to unionize the steel 
industry. Lewis set up the machinery for the formation of the Steel 
Workers' Organization Committee in April, May, and June of 1936. The SWOC 
was the first group to bring viable and durable industrial unionism to the 
steel industry. The SWOC was not, however, the first union to organize 
workers in steel. The Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin 
Workers, chartered in 1876, was the most prominent AFL affiliate in steel 
prior to the formation of the SWOC. Mike Tighe was the president of the 
Amalgamated at the time of the SWOC effort. The SWOC ultimately absorbed 
the Amalgamated. It is shown below that the Amalgamated can be directly 
associated with some of the poor union conditions in steel at the time of 
the SWOC effort. 
The Amalgamated maintained a relatively good position in steel in the 
late 19th century. It had, however, appealed primarily to the highly 
skilled workers in the steel industry. Although eligible, common laborers 
were rarely admitted to local lodges (16, p. 97). Also, the Amalgamated 
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was not concerned with the conditions of non-union members (16). 
One of the first important labor disputes involving the Amalgamated 
was the Homestead strike of 1892. By 1891, the Amalgamated had a member­
ship of 24,068 and "... was the strongest trade union in the entire his­
tory of the American labour movement." (17, pp. 495, 496). Prior to 1891-
1892, the Amalgamated had experienced good relations with the leading firm 
in the industry, the Carnegie Brothers and Company. However, when H. C. 
Frick became chairman of the company in 1889, relations began to deterior­
ate. 
Early in 1892, the union and the company began negotiations for a new 
wage scale. Within a short time the company presented its proposed scale 
calling for a reduction and making the reduction retroactive to January of 
that year. By the end of May, the company presented an ultimatum that 
either the reduced scale would be accepted by the end of June or ". . . 
they would treat with the men as individuals." (17, p. 496). As the dead­
line approached, the company raised their offer by $1 per ton and the union 
lowered their demands by $1 per ton, but the respective offers were still 
far apart and no agreement was reached. The strike began on June 29, 1892. 
While the negotiations were still in progress, H. C. Frick had made 
arrangements with the Pinkerton detective agency to furnish men to serve as 
guards during the anticipated strike. The Pinkerton guards were taken to 
the Homestead works on July 6 and there encountered the striking workers. 
A battle ensued in which the Pinkerton agents were finally driven off and 
quiet was restored. The state militia, having been called to Homestead, 
remained for a few months even though there was ". . .no more disorder of 
any sort." (17, p. 497). 
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The Homestead strike spread to other mills in Pittsburgh and in 
Duquesne where formerly non-union workers joined the union and went on, 
strike. The strike was finally broken by the companies and the workers re­
turned to their jobs as non-union men. 
The effects of the strike on the Amalgamated were severe. The union 
lost its position in the Homestead works. The strike failure also resulted 
in the "... elimination of unionism in most of the mills in the Pitts­
burgh region." (17). The Homestead strike was significant in its effect 
on the union movement as a whole as well as on the Amalgamated because the 
steel union "... lost its control over important segments of the indus­
try, and the labor movement as a whole had brought home to it the power of 
the modern corporation," (18, p. 80), 
The changing economic conditions and structure of the steel industry 
during the 1890's also contributed to weakening the hold of the Amalga­
mated, The corporate merger movement was taking place, culminating in 1901 
with the formation of the United States Steel Corporation, Formation of a 
company of this size had a considerable structural impact on unionism with­
in the industry. The merger movement, epitomized by U. S. Steel, acceler­
ated the development of new processes and techniques for steel production 
which caused ", , , the substitution of unskilled laborers for skilled 
mechanics," (16, p. 101), The Amalgamated had generally ignored the un­
skilled worker and thus was faced with the fact that it no longer had the 
support of a vast number of workers in the industry. 
In its 1901 convention, the Amalgamated took formal note of the merger 
move and its union consequences. It was decided that all the mills of a 
particular company would be viewed as one unit and that if trouble devel­
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oped in one mill, all the mills would be struck. This agreement was nec­
essary because, 
. , , unless the union treated all of the mills in a combine 
as a single unit, there was nothing to prevent the combine 
from defeating the union by shifting work from union to non­
union plants with no inconvenience to itself. (16). 
The steel industry, particularly the newly formed U. S. Steel Corporation, 
while not desiring labor difficulty until all its financing was complete, 
did recognize that the Amalgamated was especially vulnerable to attack. 
They realized that time was on the side of the employer, that 
if the union were unable to establish itself before the United 
States Steel had solidified its financial position by disposing 
of its large block of securities, it would be virtually ban­
ished from the industry. (16, p, 102). 
In the early months of 1901, bargaining that was taking place between 
the union and the American Steel Hoop Company and the American Sheet Steel 
Company broke down and a strike order was issued. Through the summer of 
1901, the strike spread to other steel companies including the United 
States Steel Corporation, By the middle of August, the strike began to 
fail and by early September it was broken. Again, the Amalgamated suf­
fered seriously. 
The union suffered a loss of 14 mills. The sympathetic strike 
was surrendered. Moreover, the union agreed neither to seek 
to extend its influence nor even to welcome workers joining on 
their own initiative. The right of discharge for union activ­
ities was given to the Companies, and union men had to agree 
to work alongside of non-union men. (16, p. 107). 
The strike also had the effect of solidifying anti-union sentiment in the 
steel industry and resulted in steel's development of new anti-union 
policies. 
As early as 1902, the steel industry, led by the United States Steel 
Corporation, began to develop new programs and policies for employees that 
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would hinder further union efforts. In 1902, for example, a profit sharing 
plan was introduced. This was followed by an extensive employee safety 
program, accident relief payments, a pension system, and a variety of other 
employee benefit programs. Indeed, "the United States Steel Corporation 
led the country in industrial safety and stood in the front ranks of wel­
fare, work for employees," (16, p. 139). 
The Amalgamated, in the meantime, continued to experience additional 
setbacks. It was defeated in a strike with the American Steel Hoop Company 
in 1904, and lost all its mills in 1909 that it had organized in the 
American Sheet and Tin Plate Company. By 1910, U. S. Steel and Bethlehem 
were no longer unionized. No serious attempts were made by the union to 
organize them until the World War I period. The Amalgamated's "membership 
had fallen to 6,880 in 1913 and even during the stimulus of war production 
rose only to 19,002 in 1917." (3, p. 35). This period of union weakness 
had an effect on the leaders of the Amalgamated for they had "... been 
stamped with the caution and defeatism which became their identifying char­
acteristic for the following twenty years." (3). 
In the spring of 1918, William Z. Foster, a delegate to the AFL con­
vention representing the Chicago Federation of Labor, proposed that joint 
organization campaigns be set up for an attempt on the steel industry. A 
cooperative plan was constructed in which a number of unions would partici­
pate. A National Committee for the Organizing of the Iron and Steel Indus­
try was formed to handle the organization process and assign new members to 
their appropriate craft union. 
The effort got underway in August, 1918, and initially was very suc­
cessful. 
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The men literally stampeded to the unions in Gary, Hammond, 
Indiana Harbor, and South Chicago. The United States Steel 
Corporation confirmed it by an announcement of the basic 
eight-hour day, commencing October 1. 
At the end of September, the Calumet district was virtually 
organized. The Pittsburgh district was next to be organ­
ized. On October 11 the Bethlehem Steel Company acknowledged 
the triumphant eastward march of unionism by granting the 
basic eight-hour day. The campaign was uniformly success­
ful. (16; p. 462). 
The formation of the National Committee and its resulting immediate success 
is indeed interesting in view of what was to come. "The committee took 
over Mike Tighe's skeleton union, and put the skeleton into the closet, ex­
actly as was done seventeen years later by the CIO." (25, p. 67). 
In May of 1919, the Amalgamated's president, Mike Tighe, demonstrated 
a desire to separate himself and his union from the rest of the organizers. 
He first requested a conference with Elbert H. Gary, executive head of 
U. S. Steel, and indicated to Foster that he ". . . reserved freedom of 
action." (16, p. 463). The National Committee was preparing to attempt 
negotiations with the steel industry at this time. The industry had re­
plied by increasing the rate at which union men were fired and by indicat­
ing that they would not negotiate. The National Committee issued a strike 
call for September 22. When the strike took place "... every steel pro­
ducing region was affected and nearly every mill was wholly or partially 
shut down." (16, p. 465). By October, it was increasingly apparent that 
the strike was weakening as men returned to work. By the end of November, 
the strike was virtually broken. 
Thugs, spies, coal and iron police, mounted constabulary, the 
complete suppression of all the basic civil liberties, the 
riding down of women and children and an hysterical publicity 
campaign successfully broke the strike in a little over three 
months, (19, p. 169). 
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On January 5, 1920, the Amalgamated requested the National Committee to 
abandon the strike. The Committee agreed to do so three days later. While 
the National Committee apparently wanted to continue organizing efforts, 
Mike Tighe did not. "Now that the strike had failed, he wanted tranquil­
lity to enable his members to hold their jobs." (16, p. 468). He took the 
Amalgamated out of the National Committee on January 27, 1920. The Amal­
gamated entered a period of inactivity. 
Publicity given by the 1919 strike concerning working conditions in 
steel did result in some improvements. For example, the basic eight-hour 
day that had been formally granted the workers in steel by the steel indus­
try on October 1, 1918, but not actually instituted, was finally a reality 
in the fall of 1923 (26, pp. 60, 177, 178). Additional fringe benefit pro­
grams for the workers were instituted by the steel companies. These pro­
grams included: 
Employee stock ownership, pension systems, provision of fuel 
and housing at or near cost, lunch stands, cafeterias and 
restaurants, support of employee's cooperative buying, out­
door and indoor recreation facilities, medical and hospital 
facilities, mutual benefit or sickness relief associations, 
group life insurance programs, and so on. (3, p. 43). 
This company interest in welfare programs for their employees contributed 
to the lack of union success in steel in the 1920's. Too, "eight com­
panies, the principal of which was Bethlehem Steel, introduced employee 
representation plans affecting about 89,000 workers." (3). Such plans 
were to play an important role in the planning of strategy by the SWOC in 
the 1930's. 
Union inactivity, the depression beginning in 1929, and the company 
employee programs led to a general weakening of the labor union movement in 
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steel through the 1920's and early 1930's. By 1934 the Amalgamated's mem­
bership was down to , less than nine thousand in an industry of four 
thousand." (27, p. 31). Even the passage of the NIRA failed to stimulate 
Tighe and the Amalgamated. 
It was becoming clear, however, that non-union conditions in steel 
would not be permitted to exist indefinitely despite the fact that "unlike 
Rip Van Winkle, Mike Tighe never woke up." (25, p. 68). 
Coal is a cousin of steel. And John L. Lewis, who knows a 
great deal about the steel industry, because it owns the 
so-called 'captive mines', insisted that steel must be or­
ganized, (25). 
By 1934, the rank and file of the Amalgamated, seemingly aware that 
Tighe was not willing to undertake a new organization effort, began to agi­
tate for reform within the union headquarters and a more aggressive union 
movement. At the April convention of that year, younger members of the 
Amalgamated were successful in submitting a motion to the effect that new 
union demands be presented to the steel companies which, if not granted, 
would bring on another strike. A committee of ten union members was 
elected to present these demands. 
But this rank-and-file committee got nowhere, either with the 
steel trust or with the Amalgamated, which even refused them 
desk space in the union headquarters. (25, p. 69). 
The Roosevelt administration, hoping to avoid a strike, had caused the 
leaders of the steel industry to establish a Steel Labor Board that would 
presumably consider the demands of the rank and file group. Green and 
Tighe called a special meeting, hoping to persuade the workers to accept 
the Board's decision rather than strike. The special meeting finally ac­
cepted the Board's ruling. An attempt by the disenchanted workers to 
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reorganize themselves for further action after the meeting was frustrated 
by their being expelled from the Amalgamated. 
They felt, with reason, that their expulsion was not because 
of any real misconduct but because of the unio^ leaders' 
fear that their activity might disturb peaceful relations 
with the steel companies and jeopardize the old membership's 
slightly privileged status. (20, p. 248). 
The expelled members rejoined the Amalgamated in the summer of 1935, but 
the union was greatly weakened by then. "The Amalgamated had run down to 
8600 members," (25, p. 70). 
The Steel Workers' Organization Committee 
The Steel Workers' Organization Committee was the central coordinating 
body in the CIO effort to organize the steel industry. Its key role re­
quires that incidents leading to its creation be examined, and that its 
structure be outlined. 
The 1934 convention of the AFL resulted in attention being given by 
the Executive Council to conditions in the steel industry. By January, 
1935, William Green, seemingly aware of the need at least to consider an 
industrial union structure in steel, requested that Mike Tighe prepare 
plans for an organization effort. The plans submitted called for an indus­
trial union organization structure and a fund of some $200,000 (1, p. 75). 
Both Lewis and Green supported the industrial union plan before the 
Executive Council, but ran into opposition by the leaders of craft unions 
having jurisdictional interests in the steel industry. Lewis urged, fur­
thermore, that a new international union be set up to represent the steel 
workers. His suggestion raised the question as to what should be done with 
the Amalgamated. Meetings with Tighe indicated that he had no intention of 
letting the Amalgamated be replaced by a new union. 
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The net result of such activity was a resolution authorizing Green to 
begin a joint organizing effort by all the unions involved in the steel in­
dustry. This meant, of course, that the industrial union structure envi­
sioned by Lewis was to be replaced by a collection of craft unions. Al­
though the resolution passed, nothing was done to put it into effect. By 
the time of the 1935 convention of the AFL, Lewis was convinced , that 
the AFL was not going to act." (1, p. 77). The convention accepted the 
resolution of the Executive Council and requested the Amalgamated to devel­
op specific organization plans. The plan was submitted to the Council in 
January, 1936, but "there was very little of a practical nature in the pro­
posal." (1, p. 78). 
Confident that the AFL would not initiate an effective campaign, Lewis 
caused the CIO group to begin constructing a plan for organizing steel in 
1936. The previously mentioned letter from the leaders of the CIO to Green 
sent in February, 1936, indicated that formal planning for organizing steel 
had been done. In that letter the CIO had offered $500,000 toward an or­
ganization fund of $1,500,000 and the services of trained organizers, pro­
vided that the AFL raised the remaining $1,000,000, permitted steel to be 
organized industrially, and furnished new leadership for the steel workers' 
union. 
The AFL rejected this proposal. Green urged that the AFL start such 
an organization campaign in cooperation with the existing Amalgamated. The 
AFL members opposed such a move until an effort could be made along craft 
lines and until all affiliates supported it. Indeed, "many unions did not 
even bother to reply; those that did pledged about $8,000 and a handful of 
organizers." (20, p. 265). It appeared that "the craft unions would 
30 
cheerfully accept members from steel if somebody else would be so kind as 
to do the work of organizing for them." (20). With such a lukewarm reac­
tion from its affiliates, the AFL could make only a vague commitment to the 
organization of steel. 
When the AFL rejected the February offer of the CIO, Lewis wrote Mike 
Tighe on April 13, 1936, and made a similar offer. The letter was sent at 
an opportune time since the young rank and file members of the Amalgamated 
were very concerned about the organization of steel. At the 61st conven­
tion of the Amalgamated held on April 28, 1936, these younger members indi­
cated that they wanted to accept the CIO proposal. They were not success­
ful in their attempt to get the convention to agree to this. However, they 
did obtain a compromise wherein the Amalgamated agreed to support an indus­
trial union structure in steel. 
The Amalgamated assumed that the AFL would support them in this ef­
fort, but Lewis knew that this was unlikely. By June, 1936, the Amalga­
mated Executive Board realized that only the CIO would give them assis­
tance, They then agreed to affiliate with the CIO on the following terms: 
(1) a Steel Workers' Organization Committee would be formed on which only 
two of the eight members could be representatives of the Amalgamated; (2) 
any new unions formed by the effort would technically join the Amalgamated 
and be issued appropriate charters; (3) all dues would be retained by the 
SWOC to finance the organization; and (4) the SWOC, in conjunction with the 
Amalgamated, would have the power to deal with the steel industry and to 
make agreements. 
The association between the SWOC and the old Amalgamated was virtually 
in name only. "The Amalgamated retained in effect only the right to issue 
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charters." (1, p, 83). The conduct of the organization campaign was in 
fact left up to the SWOC and the CIO. 
Philip Murray, the chairman of the SWOC, was a close associate of John 
L. Lewis and vice-president of the United Mine Workers. David J. McDonald 
was given the secretary-treasurer position on the committee. He was 
Murray's assistant in the UMW. The other members were Mike Tighe and J. K. 
Gaither of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers; 
Julius Hochman of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union; Leo 
Krzycki of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union; and P. T. Pagan, John 
Brophy, and Van A. Bittner of the United Mine Workers. 
Actually, the committee as such was never a functioning body; 
it met occasionally to approve the work of the chairman, but 
the latter exercised full executive and administrative power. 
(1, p. 84). 
Since the full committee did not exercise a great amount of power in 
the campaign, it is necessary to go deeper into the structure of the SWOC 
in order to identify those persons who did have more frequent contact with 
the organization effort. As has been seen, Philip Murray was a principal 
director of the effort. He was aided by Vincent Sweeney, Lee Pressman, 
David McDonald, Clinton Golden, Van A. Bittner, Albert Atallah, and Bill 
Mitch. The organizational structure of this group appears on Chart I be­
low.^ Vincent Sweeney, the public relations director of the SWOC, was a 
former Scripps-Howard employee. The legal department was headed by Lee 
Pressman, a Harvard Law School graduate, former general counsel to Harry 
Hopkins and the WPA, and former general counsel to the Resettlement 
^Assembled by the writer. 
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Administration, David McDonald, the secretary-treasurer of the SWOC, was a 
former assistant to Murray in the United Mine Workers. Clinton S. Golden, 
the Pittsburgh regional director of the SWOC, had experience with the 
Machinists' Union, was a former organizer for the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers, and was an ex-member of the National Labor Relations Board. The 
Chicago regional director of the SWOC was Van A. Bittner, an official of 
the United Mine Workers who had had experience with organizational drives 
for the United Mine Workers in virtually every coal producing region in the 
United States, Albert Atallah was the Aliquippa regional director of the 
SWOC, Bill Mitch, the southern district director of the SWOC, was also an 
official in the United Mine Workers Union (28). These men constituted the 
action arm of the SWOC and, in fact, were the SWOC. 
The SWOC was at first heavily dependent on the United Mine Workers for 
their professional organizers. The number of full-time organizers used by 
the SWOC in the steel campaign is an understandably disputed figure. How­
ever, the estimate of 150 shown on Chart I is probably not excessive.^ In­
deed, if all the men actively engaged in organization were counted, parti­
cularly after the initial successes in steel were made, the figure might 
well be even higher. After the organization activity started in steel, the 
UMW organizers were still important, . but the largest number were men 
from steel mills who showed aptitude and enthusiasm in the early days of 
the organization," (20, p. 266). 
^The dispute on this point is illustrated by the fact that Galenson 
(1, p, 84) indicates that Murray intended to have 100 organizers, while 
Brophy (20, p. 266) states that over 200 organizers were involved, and the 
article in Fortune cited above gives the estimate of 150 organizers. 
Additional clarification of this point will be made in Chapter IV. 
Chairman of SWOC 
Philip Murray-
Legal Department Secretary-Treasurer Research Department Public Relations 
Director 
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Regional Director 
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Director 
Regional Director 
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Van A. Bittner Albert Atallah Clinton S. Golden Bill Mitch 
Full Time Organizers 
(150) 
Chart 1. Organization structure of the Steel Workers' Organization Committee 
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The SWOC was a professional organization, headed by men experienced in 
the union movement. The plans for the effort were well made. It was cer­
tainly the most formidable union organizing group that the steel industry 
had ever encountered. 
The Organization Effort in Big Steel 
At its first formal meeting on June 17, 1936, the SWOC announced that 
it represented legitimate and established union interests and wished to 
avoid conflict with the steel industry. The steel industry, was repre­
sented by the American Iron and Steel Institute, replied to this overture 
by publishing a full page advertisement in some 375 newspapers stating that 
it would not recognize the new union interests (1, pp. 85, 86). Despite 
this formal indication of resistance, Murray reported to the second meeting 
of the SWOC on September 29, 1936, that the effort had so far resulted in 
the establishment of 35 subregional offices, the employment of some 158 
full-time organizers, 85 part-time employees, and a membership of 15,306 
(1, p. 86), The membership figure reported is not particularly impressive 
since the Amalgamated membership of 10,000 was included, and since the SWOC 
was confronted by an industry of some 480,000 employees. Still, the figure 
did include some newly organized steel workers. 
The largest steel company confronting the SWOC was the United States 
Steel Corporation with some 222,000 employees (1, p. 87). Indeed, it was 
such a big company that within two years the following report was made. 
In 1938 the ten largest companies accounted for 88 percent of 
the assets of the steel industry. One company, the United 
States Steel Corporation, constituting less than 1 percent of 
the total number of firms, owned 40 percent of the assets, or 
more than two and one-half times those of its nearest rival 
and more than three times those of the 124 smallest presumed 
competitors. (29, p. 125), 
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Clearly, a victory for the SWOC in this company would greatly expedite the 
organization of the remainder of the industry. 
One of the important avenues for the organization of this firm as well 
as the rest of the industry was the existing company union structure. The 
SWOC concentrated initially on encouraging company union independence, par­
ticularly in U. S. Steel. From the beginning, 
Mr. Murray decided to try to win over these organizations as 
such, rather than to seek direct repudiation of the company 
unions by their memberships and then the affiliation of in­
dividuals with the steel-union locals .... (18, p. 224). 
The SWOC also encouraged "... the employee representation plans to press 
economic demands upon the companies and to affiliate with the CIO." (30, 
p. 4). This tactic was a successful one. Within weeks after the inception 
of the organizing campaign some sixty employee representatives, represent­
ing some 45,000 steel employees, endorsed the SWOC and the CIO. In July, 
the Carnegie-Illinois plant in Chicago found that its company union, repre­
senting some 3,000 workers, had also affiliated with the SWOC. This plant 
had the largest company union west of Pittsburgh and was an important U. S. 
Steel subsidiary (18). 
Throughout the fall of 1936, the U. S. Steel Corporation replied to 
this activity by seeking a compromise with the company unions. The Corpor­
ation began to consider wage policy changes and attempted to strengthen the 
loyalty of the company union to the employer. 
Plans were laid for the creation of a central joint committee, 
and on October 19-21, 1936, a conference was held for the pur­
pose of establishing the Pittsburgh District General Council. 
Under this scheme, the council was to consist of two represen­
tatives of each steel plant, and would deal on an inter-plant 
level, something which management had theretofore refused to 
concede. The plan was sent to the several plants for ratifi­
cation. (1, p. 89). 
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The company also sought to adjust wages upward and to prepare to sign one-
year contracts with the company unions. These plans were announced on 
November 6, 1936. Although the proposed contracts and accompanying efforts 
were not accepted to the extent that U. S. Steel desired, some company 
union representatives were receptive to these overtures.^ Of particular 
embarrassment to the company was the fact that the employee council thus 
created elected a CIO man as chairman. Indeed, the company unions contin­
ued to revolt and . . in December, 1936, representatives from forty-two 
plants met in Pittsburgh, formed a C. I. 0. council, and proposed a nation­
al convention." (18). 
In January, 1937, Myron C. Taylor, Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of U, S. Steel, and John L, Lewis began a series of highly secret meetings 
lasting through most of February. These meetings ultimately resulted in an 
agreement between the SWOC and U. S. Steel that was signed on March 2, 
1937. This agreement recognized the SWOC as the bargaining agent for its 
members, agreed not to force other workers to join, provided for a wage in­
crease, and a forty-hour basic week with time and a half for overtime. 
The reasons for the capitulation of U. S. Steel are examined in a 
later chapter. It is sufficient to note here that the agreement had an im­
portant impact on the organization effort. By the end of March, 1937, the 
SWOC stated that it had 200,000 members in some 492 local lodges which re­
presented five subsidiaries of U. S. Steel and forty-six other companies 
(1, p. 96). Then, by the end of May, 91 additional steel plants, including 
^Note that the powerful Pittsburgh Council did not endorse the peace 
moves of U. S. Steel (1, p. 90). 
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Jones and Laughlin, Crucible Steel, and Sharon Steel, signed similar agree­
ments with the SWOC (1, p. 99), The organization effort was impressive so 
far, but did not result in an immediate total victory for the SWOC. Impor-
i 
tant steel firms remained unorganized. 
The Conflict in "Little Steel" 
The group known as Little Steel refused to follow the lead of the 
other steel companies and decided to resist the organization effort. The 
more important firms in this group, selected for specific attention here, 
were Republic Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Inland 
Steel, National Steel, and American Rolling Mills. According to Galenson, 
these companies employed about 186,000 workers. 
The SWOC sent a message to these companies in March, 1937, in which it 
requested an agreement similar to the one that had been executed with U. S. 
Steel. The result was industrial conflict. 
Republic Steel 
The Republic Steel Corporation employed approximately 46,000 workers 
and was headed by Mr. Tom Girdler who had earlier been a superintendent 
and, later, president of the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation. In 
early 1937, Girdler was not only the Chairman of the Board of Republic 
Steel, but had also been elected to the presidency of the powerful American 
Iron and Steel Institute. Girdler was militantly anti-union and had become 
. . . obsessed with the notion that he stood at the bridge 
guarding the liberties of the nation and its businessmen 
against the onrush of a destructive horde. (21, p. 201). 
Girdler was the management leader of the Little Steel group. 
Republic had several plant sites. Those listed below include plants 
where noteworthy violence occurred and also those where little or no union 
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activity was evident. Plants marked with an asterisk (*) will be treated 
in some detail to indicate the general nature of Republic's anti-union 
tactics. 
*(1) Canton, Ohio. 
*(2) Massillon, Ohio. 
*(3) Youngstown, Ohio - Truscon Steel Plant. 
(4) Monroe, Michigan. 
*(5) Chicago, Illinois - South Chicago Works. 
(6) Buffalo, New York. 
(7) Warren, Ohio. 
(8) Niles, Ohio. 
(9) Cleveland, Ohio. 
(10) Gadsden, Alabama.^ 
The SWOC failed to receive any response from Republic Steel in March 
and April of 1937. On May 3, 1937, the SWOC sent another request for a 
meeting to the company and threatened a strike if such a meeting was not 
held. Some indication of Republic's strategy became apparent immediately 
after this latter request by the SWOC. On May 5, Republic closed its 
Canton, Ohio plant which had the largest recognizable number of union mem­
bers. The union men". . . were given to understand that the plant would 
not be reopened until they got rid of the union." (3, p. 136). 
On May 11, a meeting was held between the SWOC and Republic Steel. It 
concluded with the announcement that Republic refused to sign written con-
^Republic owned two subsidiaries in Alabama. The SWOC strike did not 
affect either one of these plants. 
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tracts as a matter of policy. Further, the company insisted that the SWOC 
was in fact demanding a closed shop. With this breakdown in negotiations, 
Republic then closed its Massillon, Ohio plant on May 20. On May 26, the 
SWOC declared a strike against the Republic Steel Corporation. Republic 
immediately began to demonstrate its hostility toward the strike. Repub­
lic's tactics in fighting the strike included a full-scale application of 
the notorious "Mohawk Valley Formula." 
The Mohawk Valley Formula had proved itself to be an effective anti­
union device before Little Steel adopted it. The strategy was devised by 
James Rand of the Remington Rand Corporation in the latter part of 1935 and 
in 1936. Rand used the technique to thwart threatened union trouble at his 
plant in IIion, New York. The workers had heard that Rand was going to 
move his plant to Elmira, New York. They were members of the AFL. The 
workers, unable to conduct satisfactory discussions with Rand, struck the 
Ilion plant and six others belonging to Rand. The combination of tactics 
that Rand adopted to fight the strike proved to be successful by July 13, 
1936. 
This anti-union strategy developed by Rand and used by Republic Steel, 
and Little Steel generally, consisted of the following steps, as described 
by the National Labor Relations Board: 
"First: When a strike is threatened, label the union leaders 
as 'agitators' to discredit them with the public and their 
own followers. In the plant, conduct a forced balloting under 
the direction of foremen in an attempt to ascertain the strength 
of the union and to make possible misrepresentation of the 
strikers as a small minority imposing their will upon the major­
ity. At the same time, disseminate propaganda, by means of 
press releases, advertisements, and the activities of 'mission­
aries' , such propaganda falsely stating the issues involved in 
the strike so that the strikers appear to be making arbitrary 
demands, and the real issues, such as the employer's refusal 
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to bargain collectively, are obscured. Concurrently with 
these moves, by exerting economic pressure through threats to 
move the plant, align the influential members of the commun­
ity into a cohesive group opposed to the strike. Include in 
this group, usually designated a 'Citizens Committee', repre­
sentatives of the bankers, real estate owners, and business 
men, i. e., those most sensitive to any threat of removal of 
the plant because of its effect upon property values and 
purchasing power flowing from payrolls. 
"Second; When the strike is called raise high the banner of 
'law and order', thereby causing the community to mass legal 
and police weapons against a wholly imagined violence and to 
forget that those of its members who are employees have equal 
rights with the other members of the community. 
"Third; Call a 'mass meeting' of the citizens to coordinate 
public sentiment against the strike and to strengthen the 
power of the Citizens Committee, which organization, thus 
supported, will both aid the employer in exerting pressure 
upon the local authorities and itself sponsor vigilante activ­
ities . 
"Fourth; Bring about the formation of a large armed police 
force to intimidate the strikers and to exert a psychological 
effect upon the citizens. This force is built up by utiliz­
ing local police. State Police if the Governor cooperates, 
vigilantes, and special deputies, the deputies being chosen 
if possible from other neighborhoods, so that there will be 
no personal relationships to induce sympathy for the strikers. 
Coach the deputies and vigilantes on the law of unlawful as­
sembly, inciting to riot, disorderly conduct, etc,, so that, 
unhampered by any thought that the strikers may also possess 
some rights, they will be ready and anxious to use their new­
ly acquired authority to the limit. 
"Fifth; And perhaps most important, heighten the demoraliz­
ing effect of the above measures -- all designed to convince 
the strikers that their cause is hopeless -- by a 'back to 
work' movement, operated by a puppet association of so-called 
'loyal employees' secretly organized by the employer. Have 
this association wage a publicity campaign in its own name 
and coordinate such campaign with the work of the 'Mission­
aries' circulating among the strikers and visiting their 
homes. This 'back to work' movement has these results: It 
causes the public to believe that the strikers are in the 
minority and that most of the employees desire to return to 
work, thereby winning sympathy for the employer and an en­
dorsement of his activities to such an extent that the pub­
lic is willing to pay the huge costs, direct and indirect, 
resulting from the heavy forces of police. This 'back to 
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work' movement also enables the employer, when the plant is 
later opened, to operate it with strikebreakers if necessary 
and to continue to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
strikers. In addition, the 'back to work' movement permits 
the employer to keep a constant check on the strength of the 
union through the number of applications received from em­
ployees ready to break ranks and return to work, such number 
being kept secret from the public and the other employees, 
so that the doubts and fears created by such secrecy will in 
turn induce still others to make applications. 
"Sixth; When a sufficient number of applications are on hand, 
fix a date for an opening of the plant through the device of 
having such opening requested by the 'back to work' associa­
tion, Together with the Citizens Committee, prepare for such 
opening by making provision for a peak army of police by rop­
ing off the areas surrounding the plant, by securing arms and 
ammunition, etc. The purpose of the 'opening' of the plant 
is threefold; To see if enough employees are ready to return 
to work; to induce still others to return as a result of the 
demoralizing effect produced by the opening of the plant and 
the return of some of their number; and lastly, even if the 
manoeuvre fails to induce a sufficient number of persons to 
return, to persuade the public through pictures and news re­
leases that the opening was nevertheless successful. 
"Seventh; Stage the 'opening', theatrically throwing open 
the gates at the propitious moment and having the employees 
march into the plant grounds in a massed group protected by 
squads of armed police, so as to give to the opening a dra­
matic and exaggerated quality and thus heighten its demoral­
izing effect. Along with the 'opening' provide a specta­
cle -- speeches, flag raising, and praises for the employees, 
citizens, and local authorities, so that, their vanity 
touched, they will feel responsible for the continued success 
of the scheme and will increase their efforts to induce addi­
tional employees to return to work. 
"Eighths Capitalize on the demoralization of the strikers by 
continuing the show of police force and the pressure of the 
Citizens Committee, both to insure that those employees who 
have returned will continue at work and to force the remain­
ing strikers to capitulate. If necessary, turn the locality 
into a warlike camp through the declaration of a state of 
emergency tantamount to martial law and barricade it from 
the outside world so that nothing may interfere with the 
successful conclusion of the 'Formula', thereby driving home 
to the union leaders the futility of further efforts to hold 
their ranks intact. 
"Ninth; Close the publicity barrage, which day by day dur-
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ing the entire period has increased the demoralization worked 
by all of these measures, on the theme that the plant is in 
full operation and that the strikers were merely a minority 
attempting to interfere with the 'right to work', thus induc­
ing the public to place a moral stamp of approval upon the 
above measures. With this, the campaign is over -- the em­
ployer has broken the strike." (31, pp. 664-666). 
The Mohawk Valley Formula was followed religiously by Republic and the 
rest of Little Steel. The Formula worked. The strikes were broken and the 
SWOC was forced to wait for several years before it gained recognition from 
the group. 
Republic's activity in fighting the strike at Canton was typical of 
its tactics used in other areas. A Citizens' Law and Order League was 
quickly formed to begin a back-to-work movement. The leaders of the League 
were influential businessmen in the community. In this instance the League 
was led by T. K. Harris, involved in real estate; E. A. McCushey, an attor­
ney; Warren Hoffman, a manufacturer; and R. W. Liochot, a banker. Among 
others the League had the support of the Chamber of Commerce, the Inde­
pendent Grocers Association, and the American Legion Club (27, pp. 84, 85). 
The League obtained some 300 men to act as special deputies and Gover­
nor Davey ordered the National Guard to Canton. The back-to-work movement 
then did the following: 
(1) Staged duplicate and triplicate auto caravans in and out 
of the plant to give the impression that the strike was bro­
ken; (2) spread the word through foremen and others that the 
men were to come back or lose their brass identity check; 
or, if taken back, were to undergo a new physical exam --
the bugbear of steel workers after a few weeks of under­
nourishment; (3) arrested the leaders and picket captains 
and demoralized the rank and file. (27). 
The National Guard established the boundaries of a strike zone around the 
plant and would permit no one to enter or leave without a pass. Strikers 
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and non-strikers alike were arrested in mass. The strike began to weaken 
during the summer months. Although the SWOC had not formally called off 
the strike, by October the plant was nearing normal production levels. 
At the Massillon, Ohio plant of Republic Steel, a "back-to-work com­
mittee" was formed on the same day the strike was declared. This group was 
formed . . by 6 Republic employees through whom the company had main­
tained control of the employee representation plan and its successors (3, 
p. 139). In addition, businessmen formed a Law and Order League of 
Massillon which worked closely with Republic in aiding the back-to-work 
movement. After the formation of these two groups. Republic announced that 
the plant would reopen on July 2. 
Both the Law and Order League and the back-to-work committee were 
under the complete control of Republic Steel, and they devoted their ener­
gies toward two goals: (1) convincing the people that if the strikers 
didn't go back to work, the plant would remain closed and Massillon would 
lose its economic base; (2) convincing the town officials that the strikers 
were keeping the plant closed by using violence, and they could only be 
stopped by violence (3). 
The company, with the aid of the two groups mentioned, was successful 
in getting the Ohio National Guard called in to Massillon to preserve 
order. There was no immediate violence, however, and the Guard was to 
withdraw on July 9, 1937. 
When it was made clear that the Guard was to be removed, the Law and 
Order League, Carl Meyers who was a plant superintendent for Republic 
Steel, and General Marlin of the National Guard, began to put pressure on 
the local police chief to employ special police to protect the community 
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against violence. These people threatened to have the police chief, 
Stanley Switter, and the mayor impeached unless the additional men were 
hired to fight the strikers (27, pp. 87, 88). Chief Switter cooperated, 
and by July 11, he swore in 40 Republic employees loyal to the company as a 
special police force. He also, 
. . . accepted from Republic Steel a secret consignment of 
armaments which included three tear-gas guns, ninety tear-
gas shells, three sawed off shotguns and six boxes of shells. 
(27, p. 88). (Emphasis mine.) 
On July 11, these policemen and some additional police from Canton, 
Ohio, stationed themselves by the SWOC picket headquarters. As a picket 
returned to his car and turned on his lights, the police fired on the car 
and the pickets; killing two and wounding 15. The police then entered the 
headquarters of the SWOC and confiscated their records. They also report­
edly raided homes and arrested a total of some 165 people without warrants 
(1, p. 103). Those arrested were held for two days and then released after 
agreeing not to sue for false arrest. In addition, all further picketing 
and public meetings were banned in Massillon. The strike was thus broken. 
Republic's adherence to the Mohawk Valley Formula in handling strikers 
was further evidenced by incidents surrounding the SWOC strike of the 
Republic plant at Youngstown, Ohio. A Mahoning Valley Citizens' Committee, 
led by a local banker with interests in the steel industry, was formed and 
began a back-to-work movement. After a riot on June 9, a group of some 152 -
special deputies was added to the county police force. Ninety-four of 
these deputies were loyal employees of the steel company. In addition, 144 
special police were hired by the city of Youngstown of whom 60 were em­
ployees in the steel industry (1, pp. 103, 104). 
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On June 19, violence broke out on the picket line outside the Republic 
plant. More strikers and deputies arrived at the scene and violence con­
tinued most of the night. The result was that two strikers were killed and 
42 men and women were injured. All but eight of them were strikers. 
The Youngstown Sheet and Tube Corporation plant located in Youngstown 
was also struck. After the riots on June 9 and June 19, this company-
announced its intention to reopen on June 22. The threat of even more vio­
lence was clear and Governor Davey ordered the National Guard to Youngs­
town, declared martial law, and attempted to maintain the status quo until 
Federal mediators were finished. The declaration of martial law was fol­
lowed by an increase in the persecution of the strikers by the Citizens' 
Committee and their followers. The mediation was ended on June 22, and 
Governor Davey ordered the Guard to permit the plants to reopen. While 
some strikers remained on the picket line after the plants reopened, the 
bulk of them returned to work and the strike was effectively broken.^ 
Perhaps the most notorious incident of all the Little Steel episodes, 
the Memorial Day Incident, occurred on May 30, 1937, at the Republic Steel 
plant in Chicago. This plant had been struck on May 26. The strike was 
successful at first and had been without violence. On May 30, however, 
after a meeting of some 2500 strikers, about 400 of them walked toward the 
South Chicago Works plant site where they had decided to establish a mass 
picket line. The strikers were met by a group of some 200 policemen led by 
a Captain Mooney. As the strikers approached the police line, trouble 
^Additional information on the affair in Youngstown will be presented 
when the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company is examined. 
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developed and the police fired on the pickets. The strikers began running 
away as soon as the first shots were fired, but the shooting continued and 
the police exacted a heavy toll. Ten strikers were shot to death, 125 were 
wounded including 35 policemen, but only three of the policemen remained 
hospitalized. The strike was subsequently broken by June 14, 1937, and the 
plant returned to normal production activities.^ 
The issue of union organization was finally resolved beginning on July 
25, 1941. Republic agreed to abide by an NLRB check on the number of SWOC 
members in its plants. The outcome revealed that the SWOC had 28,482 mem­
bers out of a total employment of 40,858 (1, p. 116). Negotiations began 
between the SWOC and Republic in September, 1941. When World War II began, 
negotiation disputes were referred to the National War Labor Board whose 
subsequent directive order determined the disputed points of the contract. 
The contract was finally signed in August, 1942, and the conflict was offi­
cially resolved (1, p. 118). 
The conflict between the SWOC and the Republic Steel Corporation is 
summed up in the table on the following page. 
Bethlehem Steel 
Bethlehem, headed by Eugene Grace, was the largest employer of the 
several companies making up Little Steel. Mr. Grace was opposed to the 
SWOC effort. He is depicted in harsh terms by one writer as:: 
. . . a quiet, devious, and black reactionary. He achieved 
^Testimony at the LaFollette Committee Hearing on this strike indi­
cated that the police had staged a virtually unprovoked attack on the 
strikers. Photographs taken during the violence also substantiate that 
charge, since very few show strikers doing anything more than trying to get 
out of the way of the police. (22, pp. 4635-5171). 
1 
Table 1. Summary table for Republic Steel and the SWOC 
Plant 
Location 
Nature of 
Conflict 
Extent of SWOC 
Infiltration 
Company 
Tactics 
Canton 
Massillon 
Youngstown 
Chicago 
Monroe 
Warren 
Niles 
Cleveland 
Buffalo 
Lockout, strike and 
violence. 
Same as above. 
Strike with violence. 
Strike with violence. 
Strike with violence 
threatened. 
Strike with some 
violence. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Official strike with no 
apparent violence. 
About 90% of plant force 
organized. 
Extensive organization 
of plant force. 
Weak organization of 
plant force. 
Extensive organization 
of plant force. 
Weak organization of 
plant force. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Extensive organization 
of plant force. 
Weak organization of 
plant force. 
Mohawk Valley Formula. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Emphasis placed on use of 
Chicago police, 
Mohawk Valley Formula, 
Same as above. 
Same as above. Specific use 
of Negroes as strikebreakers. 
Same as above. No emphasis oa 
Negroes. 
Strike not actually effective. 
-J 
48 
national notoriety by paying himself, during the worst years 
of the depression, a total of almost $4,000,000 in salary 
and 'bonuses'. He is the General Franco of Little Steel, 
busily engaged in whipping up big industry to support a 
national vigilante movement. After the strike. National 
Labor Relations Board hearings brought out the fact that 
he had paid more than $30,000 to the vigilante in Johnstown 
alone. (25, p. 82). 
Bethlehem employed some 80,000 workers. The plants mentioned as being of 
consequence during the conflict were located in the following cities: 
(1) Johnstown, Pennsylvania -- Cambria Plant. 
(2) Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. 
(3) Lackawanna, New York. 
(4) Rankin, Pennsylvania. 
(5) Lebanon, Pennsylvania. 
(6) Steelton, Pennsylvania. 
(7) Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 
(8) Sparrows Point, Maryland. 
(9) Pottstown, Pennsylvania. 
(10) Leetsdale, Pennsylvania. 
(11) Los Angeles, California. 
Although it was not the apparent intention of the SWOC to strike Beth­
lehem immediately, nevertheless, on May 7, 1937, the SWOC issued an ultima­
tum to Bethlehem calling for a meeting within ten days.^ The company ig­
nored the message and the SWOC strike decision against Bethlehem was forced 
both officially and unofficially on June 11, 1937. On this date, Bethlehem 
^The SWOC had been unable to organize a substantial number of Bethle­
hem's employees prior to the issuance of the ultimatum. At least part of 
the reason was because of the successful resistance of Bethlehem's company 
unions. See Brooks (3, p. 135) and Galenson (1, p. 99). 
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employees on the Conemaugh and Black Like Railroad which served the Cambria 
plant at Johnstown went on strike for a signed contract. The miners in 
Bethlehem's captive coal mines were already on strike. When the railroad 
workers struck, the steel workers at Cambria struck in sympathy. 
The circumstances of the SWOC strike against Bethlehem at Johnstown 
vividly reflect the application of the Mohawk Valley Formula. Shortly 
after the strike was declared, the close alliance between the company and 
some of the leading citizens of Johnstown was revealed. The Johnstown 
Citizens' Committee was formed to head a back-to-work movement. The Com­
mittee consisted of three local merchants, Heckman, Fiig, and Geis; a min­
ister, the Rev. John Stanton; a banker, Francis Martin; and the banker's 
secretary, Lawrence Campbell, who was also in charge of the local Chamber 
of Commerce. 
Mayor Daniel J. Shields also played a prominent role in the back-to-
work movement. The mayor was "a one-time inmate of a federal prison fol­
lowing conviction for attempting to bribe a federal officer." (21, 
p. 204). Mayor Shields received $31,456 from Bethlehem via the Citizens' 
Committee to help finance the back-to-work movement by providing weapons to 
cooperating workers and generally paying for a strikebreaking movement,^ 
The back-to-work movement also had the support of the local press, as 
"... each day the Johnstown papers announced the demise of the walkout." 
(27, p, 81). 
The Citizens' Committee employed the John Price Jones advertising 
agency in New York to construct advertisements supporting the back-to-work 
^For a more detailed documentation see (23, pp. 8197-8746), 
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movement. The movement had the additional support of most of the local 
business community which, for a variety of reasons, was upset by the 
strike. 
Although the SWOC did not have a particularly strong organization 
within the Cambria plant, some 12,000 of the 15,000 workers had gone on 
strike on June 11. On June 20, the SWOC issued a call for a mass meeting 
of all the strikers. It was expected that some 20,000 steel workers and 
miners might attend the meeting. There had been little violence up to this 
time, but there was fear in Johnstown, part real and part created by the 
vigilante groups, that violence might result from such a meeting. The day 
before the meeting was to be held. Governor George H. Earle declared mar­
tial law and sent in the Pennsylvania State Police headed by Captain 
William Clark. The plant was closed for one week and then reopened under 
the supervision of the state police. The troopers limited the number of 
pickets to six. Since the street cars ran virtually to the front door of 
the plant, returning workers were only briefly exposed to the pickets. 
By June 27, the strike was weakening appreciably as the tactics of the 
back-to-work groups began to prove effective. Workers were generally in­
formed that "everyone else" was going back to work so they might as well go 
too. Foremen phoned workers, telling them they would lose their identity 
checks if they didn't report back. By the end of June, the strike was ef­
fectively broken and the SWOC officially called off the strike. 
Following its defeat at the Cambria plant, the SWOC adopted a two-fold 
strategy. It petitioned the NLRB for certification as the bargaining 
agent. At the same time, it adopted a long range organization and educa­
tion program in all of the Bethlehem plants to inform the workers of the 
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benefits of union organization and to train leaders of the proposed union 
locals. On August 16, 1939, the NLRB issued a decision which ordered 
Bethlehem to disband its company unions in ten plants. The company imme­
diately appealed the decision to the Circuit courts. At the same time, the 
SWOC reopened its organization efforts in Bethlehem's eastern plants. The 
SWOC approach was the familiar one used so successfully in U. S. Steel. It 
approached the leaders of the company unions and in late August of 1939, 
. . it was announced that forty-eight employee representatives had al­
ready thrown in their lot with the SWOC." (3, p. 147). The immediate re­
sult of this renewed effort, however, was not overly impressive for the 
SWOC. 
In the fall of 1940, the SWOC tried once again to organize Bethlehem. 
The SWOC called effective strikes at some of the plants with particular 
success at Lackawanna, Johnstown, and Los Angeles over a . refusal of 
the company to discuss grievances with the SWOC." (1, p. 116), Finally, 
the workers at the Lackawanna plant voted in favor of the SWOC at an NLRB 
election on May 15, 1941. During 1942, other Bethlehem plants voted for 
the SWOC including the Johnstown plant and the plant at Bethlehem, Pa. The 
following table summarizes the SWOC campaign in Bethlehem Steel. 
The contractual negotiations between the SWOC and Bethlehem Steel 
started in September, 1941. The United States entered World War II before 
the negotiations were finished. The disputed parts of the contract were 
submitted to the National War Labor Board for determination. After the 
NWLB made its decision, the SWOC and Bethlehem signed the contracts in 
August, 1942 (1, pp. 116-118). 
Table 2. Summary table for Bethlehem Steel and the SWOC 
Plant Nature of Extent of Company 
Location Conflict SWOC Infiltration Tactics 
Johnstown 
Bethlehem 
Lackawanna 
Rankin 
Lebanon 
Steelton 
Harrisburg 
Sparrows 
Point 
Pottstown 
Leetsdale 
Los Angeles 
Strike with minor violence 
in 1937. Effective strike 
in 1940. 
No strike in 1937. 
No strike in 1937. Ef­
fective strike in 1940, 
No strike in 1937. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
No strike in 1937, Ef­
fective strike in 1940. 
Weak organization in 1937, 
Worker education started. 
Same as above. Rapid 
progress in 1937-1942. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Moderate progress with 
worker education in 
1937-1942. 
Same as above. 
Not known. 
Little success with 
worker education in 1937-
1942. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Not known. 
Mohawk Valley Formula. 
Not applicable. 
Not applicable. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
Same as above. 
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Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Frank Purnell headed the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Corporation. At 
the time of the initial SWOC strike, the company employed about 23,000 
workers. Those plant sites belonging to Youngstown Sheet and Tube listed 
below were the scene of SWOC strike activity. 
(1) Youngstown, Ohio - Struthers Plant. 
(2) Indiana Harbor, Indiana. 
(3) Chicago, Illinois - East Chicago Plant. 
On April 28, 1937, the SWOC met with representatives of Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube concerning possible recognition of the union. The company 
noted it was willing to bargain with the SWOC, but it would not sign a 
written contract. Two other meetings proved fruitless, so the SWOC in­
cluded the company in that group of plants against whom they called a 
strike on May 26 (1, pp. 99, 100). 
At first, the strike seemed totally effective against all three of the 
company's plants; however, Youngstown Sheet and Tube had been developing 
plans for fighting the anticipated strike. In Youngstown, Ohio, the com­
pany had begun in March, 1937, to prepare for possible union difficulties. 
The company sponsored dinners at its Struthers plant where it "educated" 
local community leaders concerning the economic contribution that the plant 
made to the city. These community leaders were persuaded to support 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube should the union cause trouble at the plant. 
When the strike was called, the company responded with its prepared ver­
sion of the Mohawk Valley Formula. Ray Thomas, "... a district attorney 
once indicted for graft," (27, p. 83) headed a back-to-work movement. His 
statement sums up his attitude toward the SWOC: "'Give me 200 good, tough, 
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armed men and I'll clean up them sons of bitches on the picket line in no 
time'."^ The back-to-work movement was supported by the Mahoning Valley 
Citizens' Committee, the town's only newspaper, The Vindicator, and a bank 
president, Carl Ullman. The sheriff of Mahoning County was in charge of 
directing the anti-strike activities in Youngstown. 
He improvised armored wagons, pierced with holes for rifles, 
which he flaunted daily along peaceful picket lines. His 
wholesale swearing in of deputies was comparable to Shields' 
enlisting of his own army of armed men. (21, p. 205). 
The nature of the strike situation at Youngstown, Ohio, has been par­
tially presented in this study. It is noteworthy, however, that the strike 
was generally peaceful during its first two weeks. On June 9, trouble did 
start and there was an immediate growth in the special police force and in 
back-to-work activity. It has already been noted that the county police 
force had 152 men added to it of whom 94 were loyal Sheet and Tube and 
Republic Steel workers. In addition, the city employed an extra 60 police­
men who were also "loyal" company employees (1, p. 103). Ralph Elser, the 
county sheriff, obtained unlimited credit from banker Ullman and got 
. .a draft with which he purchased ten thousand dollars' worth of tear 
gas and other equipment." (27). On June 19, the company announced that it 
would reopen its plant on June 22 and urged the workers to return to work. 
It offered aid to those employees who were willing to return to work as 
they would have to cross the picket lines. On this same day, violence 
broke out at the Republic plant in Youngstown and deputies and strikers 
went to the plant. There was violence throughout the night with the pre-
As quoted by the author (27). 
55 
viously mentioned result that two strikers were killed and 42 injured (1, 
p, 104), 
At this point, Governor Davey called in the National Guard with the 
orders to maintain the status quo until Federal mediators in the area could 
complete their investigation. There is evidence to suggest that, with the 
arrival of the Guard, the anti-union forces benefited most substantially 
from the Guard's activities.^ Pickets were limited to six at each gate; 
arrests became widespread (27, p. 84). On June 24, when the mediation 
ended, the Guard was ordered to permit the plants to reopen. While some 
pickets remained on the line, the bulk of the strikers returned to work. 
The strike was effectively broken. 
In Indiana Harbor and in East Chicago, the Youngstown plants were com­
pletely closed by the strike. Applying the same tactics used at Youngs­
town, Ohio, the company weakened the strike. 
It was clear to the SWOC leadership that the strike against Youngstown 
was practically broken by the end of June. The Mohawk Valley Formula had 
proved to be quite effective. By the first of July, the SWOC officially 
called off the strike against the company (3, p. 138). 
The SWOC appealed to the NLRB and charged the company with unfair 
labor practices. In February, 1938, prior to the NLRB hearings on the 
charges, the SWOC and the company began a series of meetings which were to 
last throughout that year. As a result of the meetings, the company agreed 
to rehire some 140 union men that had been fired during the strike. This 
was, however, about all that the meetings did accomplish, and it appeared 
^There is no great dispute about this. See Levinson (21, p. 206). 
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that the company was merely using the meetings as a delaying tactic. By 
1940, the SWOC had managed to establish a grievance procedure that was 
acceptable to the company (3, pp. 145, 146). On July 25, 1941, Youngstown 
agreed to accept the results of an NLRB check of SWOC members in its 
plants. The examination disclosed that the SWOC had 14,800 members out of 
a total work force of 20,133 (1, p. 116). In September, the contract nego­
tiations began, but they were not successfully concluded prior to U. S. 
entry into World War II. So, as was the case with Republic and Bethlehem 
Steel, the National War Labor Board was called upon to decide the disputed 
areas of the contract. In early August, 1942, the SWOC and Youngstown 
finally signed a written contract (1, pp. 117, 118). The following table 
summarizes the SWOC effort in the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Corporation. 
Inland Steel 
L. E. Block headed the Inland Steel Corporation. At the time of the 
conflict. Inland employed 11,000 workers. The company had two plants that 
were the particular targets of the SWOC. These plants were located at 
Indiana Harbor, Indiana, and Chicago Heights, Illinois. 
During the winter of 1936 and 1937, the SWOC had engaged in a strong 
organization effort in Inland Steel and felt it had a majority of the com­
pany's employees as members by March, 1937. When the SWOC requested that 
Inland enter into an agreement similar to that with U. S. Steel, the com­
pany indicated that it was willing to accept many of the SWOC demands, but 
that it would not sign a written contract (27, p. 76). On May 26, Inland 
was included in the SWOC strike call. The company "made no effort to open 
its plants and no violence occurred during the strike against this com­
pany." (3, p. 138). Governor Townsend of Indiana acted as an unofficial 
Table 3, Summary table for Youngstown Sheet and Tube and the SWOC 
Plant 
Location 
Nature of 
Conflict 
Extent of SWOC 
Infiltration 
Company 
Tactics 
Youngstown 
Indiana Harbor 
Strike with violence. 
Same as above. 
Moderate organization 
prior to strike in 1937. 
Strong organization of 
work force prior to 
strike in 1937. 
Mohawk Valley Formula. 
Same as above. 
Chicago Same as above. Same as above. Same as above. 
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mediator between the SWOC and Inland. On July 1, 1937, Inland sent a mes­
sage to Governor Townsend in which it 
. . . agreed to recognize the S. W. 0. C. as the bargaining 
agent for its members. It agreed to reinstate without dis­
crimination those who took part in the strike. And it agreed 
to retain in force wages, hours, grievance machinery, and 
overtime rates almost identical with those in the U. S. Steel 
agreement. (3, p. 144). 
In July, 1941, Inland agreed to an NLRB check of SWOC membership in 
its plants as did Republic and Youngstown Sheet and Tube. The NLRB found 
that the SWOC had a membership of 8700 out of some 11,800 employed by 
Inland and was therefore legally entitled to be the exclusive bargaining 
agent. In September, bargaining began and the disputed points were sub­
mitted to the National War Labor Board. As was the case with the previous­
ly examined companies. Inland signed contracts with the SWOC in August, 
1942 (1, pp. 116-118). 
National Steel 
Ernest T. Weir headed the National Steel Corporation at the time of 
the SWOC effort. National employed about 14,000 men. The company had 
plants located in Detroit, Michigan; Weirton, West Virginia; and Steuben-
ville, Ohio, 
The SWOC had made very little progress in its attempts to organize the 
workers at National. The company had adopted hostile tactics toward the 
SWOC from the beginning of the organization effort in 1936, Organizers 
were beaten and ordered out of town after town where National had plants. 
When the SWOC sought redress in the local courts, the grand juries and 
courts either refused to issue indictments or found in favor of the com­
pany (21, pp. 211-213), 
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In National Steel, an effective combination of the Weirton 
Hatchet Gang, so called by union supporters because of its 
physical assaults upon union men, with a well-oiled company 
union had held unionism at bay since the strike of 1933, 
(3, p. 135). 
Since the union movement had so little success, the SWOC recognized that a 
strike call at National would be ineffective and decided to appeal its case 
directly to the NLRB. The Board began hearings on the alleged violations 
of the Wagner Act in 1937. The Board was denied facilities at Weirton, 
West Virginia, and was driven away by anti-board groups in Steubenville, 
Ohio. Hearings were held at Cumberland, West Virginia, and at Pittsburgh, 
1 
Pennsylvania. The Board found that the company had dominated the lives of 
the employees, had discriminated in hiring, firing, and tenure because of 
union activities, and had generally coerced its employees in the exercise 
of their rights (21, pp. 212, 213). By September, 1942, National Steel 
remained unorganized. 
American Rolling Mills 
American Rolling Mills was headed by Charles Hook, a former president 
of the National Association of Manufacturers. At the time of the SWOC ef­
fort, the company employed about 12,000 workers. 
The SWOC had very little success in organizing the workers of 
American. The company had a long established tradition of company unions, 
employee welfare programs, wages and hours favorable to those won in U. S. 
Steel, and a strong influence in the cities, where plants were located (3, 
p. 148). The SWOC decided, as it had in the case of National, that there 
^A graphic presentation of National's anti-union activities is pre­
sented in (21, pp. 211-213; 3, p. 148). 
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would be no point in calling a strike and appealed its case to the NLRB, 
The company was successful in warding off the SWOC organization during the 
time span covered by this examination. That is, by September, 1942, the 
company was still unorganized. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have set forth essential background information 
prior to the SWOC effort; described the structure of the SWOC; and summar­
ized the organization effort in Big and Little Steel through September of 
1942. The study of the organization effort provides an interesting study 
in conflict behavior. On the one hand, U. S. Steel, the largest of the 
steel producers, submitted rather quickly to the organization effort. With 
its capitulation, several other steel companies also signed agreements with 
the SWOC without any noteworthy violence. By the end of March, 1937, the 
SWOC reported that they had contracts with 142 steel firms, a membership of 
2 375,000, and had organized about 70% of the industry. On the other hand, 
another group of steel producers had decided to resist the organization 
effort in virtually any way they could. After March, 1937, this Little 
Steel group was definitely in the minority with respect to the number of 
^The Jones and Laughlin Steel Company was an exception to this tide of 
peaceful submission that swept the steel industry. It was necessary for 
the SWOC to strike this company for a period of from 36 to 48 hours before 
winning out. The SWOC was, however, quite strongly represented in Jones 
and Laughlin, either by actual membership or through worker sympathy. 
2 Galenson (1, p. 99) feels that this data was exaggerated by the SWOC, 
and that does seem quite likely. It is both a common practice and good 
strategy for a union to do this during an organization attempt. It is dif­
ficult to disprove the SWOC claims, however, since it is highly probable 
that no one knew then or will ever know for sure the actual number of SWOC 
members during the organizing effort. 
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firms and the number of employees involved. They did manage, however, to 
prevent the SWOC from organizing their plants for several years. 
This contrast in management behavior provides an excellent vehicle for 
studying the diverse aspects of union organization efforts. Such a study 
of actual events also helps to clarify the nature of conflict behavior 
generally. The following chapter is an attempt to show analytically why 
the biggest portion of the steel industry felt moved to accept a union, and 
why other producers decided to fight what appears to be, in retrospect, a 
losing battle. 
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CHAPTER III. AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE ORGANIZATION EFFORT 
The Importance of the Steel Industry to the CIO 
Of the several factors causally related to both the success and fail­
ure that the SWOC experienced during the organization effort, the urgent 
need felt by John L. Lewis and others in the CIO to organize steel appears 
to have been of paramount importance. To understand the necessity of or­
ganizing steel, three specific items need to be considered: (1) how steel 
is manufactured; (2) the amount of vertical integration in steel; and (3) 
the role of the captive mines. 
The diagram on the following page portrays the manufacturing process 
in steel. It is primarily an extractive one, involving the direct procure­
ment of both fuel and primary material from the earth. This underlines the 
relationships between the steel and the mining industries. As shall be 
shown, this close relationship between the two industries prompted Lewis' 
action to organize the steel industry in order that he might more fully 
protect the extent of the United Mine Workers existing organization 
strength in the mining industry and to expand that union into the mines 
owned by the steel corporations. 
There are two basic kinds of coal. Anthracite coal or "hard" coal has 
a very high carbon content, a lot of heating power, and burns with a rather 
smokeless flame. Anthracite coal deposits are concentrated in Pennsyl­
vania. It is used primarily for general heating purposes. Bituminous coal 
or "soft" coal has a rather low carbon content, generates a lot of smoke 
when burned, but has a tendency to cake or "coke" when exposed to extreme 
heat. As can be seen on the diagram, coke is used in the manufacturing 
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Diagram 1. The steel manufacturing process 
^Source: (32, Table 2, p. 12). 
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process of steel. When bituminous coal is converted to coke, the result is 
an extremely potent heat source from which all gaseous elements and other 
impurities have been removed. Coke gives off heat with virtually no smoke 
and is a very efficient fuel. Bituminous coal deposits are found in many 
states over the country, but a particularly good source of bituminous coal 
suitable for conversion to coke is found in the Appalachian range. This 
range consists of portions of Ohio, Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, and Alabama. 
Vertical integration of the manufacturing process was widespread in 
the steel industry. This meant that it was not unusual for the steel com­
panies to own and/or control such things as iron ore deposits, coal and 
coke sources, limestone deposits, transportation facilities, local land and 
utility companies, warehouse facilities, and oil field supply stores as 
well as the basic steel production facility consisting of blast furnaces 
and steel and rolling mills. 
Some idea of the extent of mine ownership by the steel industry is re­
vealed by the following tables. Table 4, for U. S. Steel, shows the mine 
property obtained by the firm both as a result of its acquisition of other 
fixrms and those constructed by the corporation. This procedure is followed 
in tables 5-15 which represent mine property owned by 11 other steel com-
1 panies. 
Since U. S. Steel was formed by a merger of a large number of existing 
companies, the properties are associated with the initial owner prior to 
the merger where this is possible. The other tables report the coal and 
^Data for tables 4-15 was obtained from (33, pp. 1-80). 
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Table 4. Coke and coal sources owned by U. S. Steel as of December 31. 
1939 
Coal and coke sources Date acquired 
National Tube Co. 
Coal lands in Fayette County, Pa., Benwood, 1901 
W. Va., and Steubenville, Ohio. 
American Sheet Steel Co. 
Coal lands in Armstrong and Westmoreland Counties, Pa. 1901 
and in Tuscarawas and Belmont Counties, Ohio. 
American Sheet and Tin Plate Co. 
National Mining Co., Allegheny and Washington Counties, 1904 
Pa. 1/3 interest. 
Carnegie Co. 
H. C. Frick Coke Co., Westmoreland and Fayette Counties, Pa. 1901 
National Steel Co. 
Continental Coke Co., Uniontown, Pa. 1901 
Standard Connellsville Coke Co., Pleasant Unity, Pa. 1901 
Coking coal land in Westmoreland County, Pa. 1901 
Coal lands in Panhandle Region of Pittsburgh District 1901 
American Steel Hoop Co. 
National Mining Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. 1/3 interest. 1901 
American Steel and Wire Co. of; N. J. 
Coal lands in Westmoreland County, Pa., Fayette County, Pa., 1901 
and Greene County, Pa. 
American Coke Co., Westmoreland and Fayette Counties, Pa. 1901 
Juniata Coke Co., Dawson, Pa. % interest. 1901 
66 
Table 4 (Continued) 
Coal and coke sources Date acquired 
Puritan Coke Co., Baggaley, Pa. 1901 
Carnegie Steel Co. 
Mingo Coal Co., Washington County, Pa. 1903 
National Mining Co., Allegheny and Washington Counties, 1904 
Pa. 2/3 interest. 
Clairton By-Product Coke Co., Clairton, Pa. 1918 
Federal Steel Co. 
Southwest Connellsville Coke Co., Westmoreland County, Pa. 1901 
Coal lands in Fayette County, Pa. 1901 
U. S. Coal and Coke Co., McDowell County, W. Va. 1901 
Coal lands in Williamson County, 111. and Westmoreland 1901 
County, Pa. 
Union Steel Co. 
River Coal Co., Fayette County, Pa. 1902 
Republic Coke Co., Fayette County, Pa. 1902 
Federal Coke Corp. - originally Sharon Coke Co., 1902 
Masontown, Pa. 
Sharon Coal and Limestone Co., Butler, Mercer and Lawrence 1902 
Counties, Pa. 2/3 interest. 
Pittsburgh and Erie Coal Co. 1931 
McClure Coke Co. 1903 
United Coal and Coke Co. 1903 
Smiley Mines, Smiley Station, Pa. 1904 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Coal and coke sources Date acquired 
Gates Mines, Adah, Pa. 1904 
Chambers Mines, Pleasant Unity, Pa. 1904 
Hecla Coke Co. 1905 
Coking coal properties at Fayette, Green and Washington 1911 
Counties, Pa. 
Washington Coal and Coke Co. 1930 
Clairton Steel Company 
Coal lands in Fayette County, Pa. 1904 
Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Co. 
Coal mines at Pratt City, Ensley, Wylam, Stockton, 1907 
Blossburg, Adger, Johns, Sumter, Blocton, Henry-Ellen, 
Gamble, Alabama and Whitwell and Tracy City, Tenn. 
Coke plants at Pratt City, Ensley, Wylam, Bessemer, 1907 
Johns, Blocton, and Birftiingham, Alabama and Whitwell 
and Victoria, TennV 
Table 5. Coke and coal sources owned by Bethlehem Steel Corporation as of 
December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source Date acquired 
Lehigh Coke Co. 
Bethlehem Mines Corp., Bethlehem, Steelton, Lebanon, 
Hanover, Pa. and McAfee, N. J. 
1917 
1917 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Coal and coke source Date acquired 
Elkins Coal and Coke Co., Preston and Monongalia 1919 
Counties, W. Va. 
Finch Run Coal Co., Marion County, W. Va. 1920 
Jamison Coal and Coke Co., W. Va. 1920 
Ellsworth Collieries Co., Washington County, Pa. 1922 
Slickville Coal Properties 1923 
Undeveloped coal properties at Cambria, Blair and Bedford By 1929 
Counties, Pa. and Kanawha County, W. Va. 
Table 6. Coke and coal sources owned by Republic Steel Corporation as of 
December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source Date acquired 
Coal lands and about 1,000 coke ovens ol Pioneer Mining By 1909 
and Manufacturing Co., Birmingham and Thomas, Ala. 
Martin Coke Works and Connellsville Coal Lands 1908 
Woodside Coke Co. 1910 
Bessemer Coal and Coke Co., Allegheny County, Pa. 1917 
By-Product Coke Works, Youngstown, Ohio 1913 
Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., Buffalo, N. Y. % interest. 1930 
Josephine Furnace and Coke Co., Pa. 1935 
Coal mine and coke ovens at Brownsville, Pa. 1936 
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Table 7. Coke and coal sources owned by Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Corporation as of December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source . Date acquired 
Coke plant, Struthers, Ohio 1915 
Buckeye Coal Co., Nemacolin, Pa. 1913 
Table 8. Coke and coal sources owned by Inland Steel Corporation as of 
December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source Date acquired 
Inland Coal and Washington Co., DeSoto, 111. 1904 
By-Product Coke Plant, Indiana Harbor, Ind. 1913 
Inland Collieries Co., Allegheny, Pa. 1917 
Indianola Coal Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. 1917 
C. W. & F. Mining Co., Williamson County, 111. 1918 
Stover Coal Co., Fayette County, W, Va. 1920 
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Table 9. Coke and coal sources owned by American Rolling Mill Corporation 
as of December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source Date acquired 
Portsmouth Solvay By-Product Coke Plant, Ohio % interest 1917 
Coal mines at Marting, W. Va. By 1919 
Coal mining property at Nellis, W. Va. and Rush, Ky. 1920 
Armco Coal Mining Corporation, Marting, W. Va.® 1930 
Nellis Coal Corporation, Nellis, W. Va.® 1933 
^Dissolved in 1938. 
Table 10. Coke and coal sources owned by Colorado Fuel and Iron Corpora­
tion as of December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source Date acquired 
Grand River Coal and Coke Co. 1892 
Coal lands in Colorado and New Mexico By 1919 
Colorado Industrial Co., coal and iron lands in Colorado, 1903 
Wyoming and New Mexico 
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Table 11. Coke and coal sources owned by Jones and Laughlin Steel 
Corporation as of December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source Date acquired 
Vesta Coal Co., Washington County, Pa. Prior to 1902 
Shannopin Coal Co., Greene County, Pa. 1921 
Table 12. Coke and coal sources owned by National Steel Corporation as of 
December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source Date acquired 
Weirton Coal Co., Pa. and W. Va. Prior to 1929 
Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., Buffalo, N. Y. 1930 
Table 13. Coke and coal sources owned by Pittsburgh Steel Corporation as 
of December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source Date acquired 
Monessen Coal and Coke Co., Monessen, Pa. By 1909 
Coal lands in Fayette and Green Counties, Pa. 1918, 1919 
Coke plant at Republic, Pa. 1938 
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Table 14. Coke and coal sources owned by Wheeling Steel Corporation as of 
December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source 
Consumers Mining Co., Harmarville, Pa. 
Emperor Coa1 Co., Kentucky 
Date acquired 
Prior to 1919 
1933 
Table 15. Coke and coal sources owned by Sharon Steel Corporation as of 
December 31, 1939 
Coal and coke source Date acquired 
The Sharon Steel Corporation did not own any coal or coke sources until 
1946, This is outside the time period under consideration herein. 
coke sources added to the respective corporations without regard to their 
original owner. 
The information presented is based on the 12 largest steel corpora­
tions as of 1950. It was impossible to construct a table for every steel 
corporation of consequence in 1937 and, thus, the data is incomplete. The 
tables do give, however, some idea as to the extent of mine property and 
coke property ownership in the steel industry. 
The coal mines owned by the steel companies were known as the 
"captive" mines. The following brief review of the United Mine Workers' 
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experience in maintaining a strong union foothold in the bituminous mines 
reveals why Lewis felt it of utmost importance to organize the steel indus­
try. 
The UMW had a relatively stable union organization in the bituminous 
coal fields at the turn of the century. There was one important bituminous 
area that the union had failed to penetrate by 1901, however, and that was 
the very rich bituminous field in West Virginia, Mine operators who owned 
non-union mines in West Virginia as well as owning union mines elsewhere, 
found themselves with a strong anti-union weapon. Whenever the demands of 
the union for whatever reason appeared undesirable to the operator, he 
could shift his operations to the non-union fields and close down the union 
mines. Additionally, those mine owners who owned properties exclusively in 
West Virginia had a strong competitive advantage over the rest of the bitu­
minous coal industry since, by being non-union, they paid lower wages, and 
could sell at lower prices (16, pp. 326, 327). 
The UMW attempted to organize the West Virginia fields in 1901, but 
had only limited success. By 1912, for example, the union could credit 
itself with having organized only the Cabin Creek area (16, p. 33). 
During World War I, the threat to the union posed by the non-union 
fields was eased temporarily by the war-time demand for coal. In 1917, 
1918, and 1919, workers in both the anthracite fields and the bituminous 
fields gained wage increases, although those granted in the bituminous 
fields fell short of those granted in anthracite. There was labor unrest 
in the bituminous fields in West Virginia and Kentucky from 1919 through 
1922 over wages and working conditions (16, pp. 469-488). 
Bituminous mining was a very "sick" industry in the 1920's. The post­
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war recessions in the industry, the introduction of machinery in the mines, 
the development of competing sources of power, and increased competition 
from the non-union coal fields resulted in a general decline in the 
strength of the UMW. It has been observed that, "throughout the twenties 
. . . the union was fighting for its very existence in the bituminous 
fields . . (16, p. 568). 
The non-union coal fields had a particularly adverse effect on the 
UMW. Wages were reduced in the non-union fields in Alabama, Kentucky, and 
West Virginia. In 1925, even the union operators in the West Virginia 
mines reduced wages to their 1917 levels. Mine operations were shifted to 
the non-union fields to such an extent that by 1925, 50 percent of the 
total coal output was from non-union mines (16, pp. 562, 563). The net re­
sult was that the UMW was greatly weakened in the bituminous fields. 
The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 resulted in the collapse of 
the coal industry and further undermined the already debilitated UMW posi­
tion in the mines. 
Since labor constituted about two thirds of mine costs, the 
operator passed on his falling prices in lower wages. Sur­
vival depended upon wiping out union wage scales and with 
them the union itself. (34, p. 360). 
The UMW organization collapsed along with the coal industry in the depres­
sion. It has been stated that, "in fact, the international union had 
virtually no history during the Great Depression." (34). 
It is apparent, however, that one very important lesson was well 
learned by Lewis during these years. That is, he was made increasingly 
aware of the need to organize the entire coal industry so that the damage 
to the union that had resulted from the competition of the non-union fields 
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in the past would not happen again. 
Tables 4 through 15 reveal something of the extent of coal mine owner­
ship by the steel companies. The steel companies had taken advantage of 
the generally weak position of the UMW in the bituminous fields and, by the 
late 1920's, had established an open shop policy in their mine holdings 
(19, p. 177; 21, p. 21). There was little that the UMW could do about that 
policy until the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 
and, later, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. The NIRA and the 
Coal Conservation Act restated the right of employees to form unions, and 
established a mechanism via their cooperative "code" provisions for adding 
some stability to the bituminous coal industry by permitting the various 
coal companies to enter into cooperative agreements. 
Not until he was elected President of the United Mine Workers 
of America in 1920 did Lewis realize fully how many mine work­
ers were employed in the so-called captive mines owned and 
operated by the steel companies. In Harlan County, Ky., for 
instance, the United States Steel Corporation owned a big coal 
mine at Lynch from where it furnished anti-union leadership. 
In the negotiations leading to the approval of the Code of Fair 
Competition for the bituminous industry, the various steel com­
panies operating coal mines refrained from associating them­
selves with the commercial operators of the coal industry. 
They hoped thereby to continue immune from the coal code, and 
at the same time be free from the code for the iron and steel 
industry. However, the National Recovery Administration (NRA) 
ruled that captive mines came under the provisions of the NRA 
to the same degree as the commercial operations. Some of the 
steel company subsidiaries strongly opposed their miners be­
coming members of the United Mine Workers of America. The 
UMWA insisted that the captive mines be brought under the same 
agreement as that covering the commercial operations in the 
districts where they were located. Of course, what the com­
panies were really afraid of was unionism spreading to their 
steel workers. (35, p. 14). 
Between 1932 and 1935, the UMW conducted what has been called "... 
one of the most rapid and successful organizing campaigns in American labor 
history." (1, p. 194), Lewis turned the UMW organization into a powerful 
labor union. The passage of the NIRA and the Bituminous Coal Conservation 
Act provided the union with the needed legal protection for organizing the 
coal industry, and the workers' response to the union's appeals was very 
impressive. By early 1935, most of the coal industry, including most of 
the captive mines, had been organized by the UMW (1), 
There were, however, some mines that remained unorganized by the UMW. 
In Illinois, for example, the rival Progressive Miners of America union 
still had jurisdiction over the miners. The Harlan, Kentucky mines, the 
West Kentucky Coal Company mines, the mines owned by the Phelps-Dodge 
Company at Dawson, New Mexico, and the miners of the Alabama Fuel and Iron 
Company were also unorganized. In addition, the captive mines of the U, S, 
Steel Corporation located in West Virginia and Kentucky were unorganized 
(1, pp. 194, 195), 
While the UMW had thus been successful in its organization efforts in 
the early 1930's, stability and security for the union was not yet com­
pletely assured. The captive mines in the steel industry presented the 
union with two serious problems. That is to say, until steel was organ­
ized, Lewis could not be sure that the existing UMW penetration of the cap­
tive mines was secure, nor could he organize the remaining captive mines 
with any assurance that such an effort would be of lasting success. One 
problem was that competition from the unorganized captive mines would pro­
vide the same sort of competitive advantage that the southern Appalachian 
mines enjoyed in the 1920's. This could lead to a repetition of the gener­
al weakening of the UMW that had previously occurred. The second problem 
was that as long as the steel industry remained unorganized, the anti-union 
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sentiment in the industry would continually threaten the UMW penetration of 
the mines. 
These problems became even more apparent to Lewis when 
. . . there were distinct indications in 1936 that the steel 
interests might lead a counter-attack on the union early in 
1937 when the time came for a new contract. (19, p. 179). 
The steel industry had followed an open shop policy. It had to be organ­
ized to protect the UMW. 
The Capitulation of the United States Steel Corporation 
Robert R. R. Brooks notes that "it is almost impossible to overesti­
mate the symbolic importance of the U. S. Steel agreement to the SWOC cam­
paign." (3, p. 120). The agreement represents a peaceful submission to 
the union demands by the largest corporation in the steel industry. It 
would presumably have had the greatest financial resources at its command 
to resist the SWOC had it chosen to do so. The agreement added impetus to 
the organizing campaign in the industry since many other steel firms soon 
recognized the SWOC too. The agreement also divided the steel industry 
into two hostile camps as Little Steel prepared for conflict. 
The historical record is not complete at the present time as to all 
the reasons why U. S. Steel decided to recognize the SWOC.^ The available 
evidence strongly suggests that U. S. Steel decided not to resist the or-
2 
ganization effort because to do so would have been uneconomic. That is, 
^The totality of the reasons may never be known for, as Galenson 
notes, the executive minutes and policy papers of U. S. Steel during the 
relevant time period have never been made public (1, p. 93). 
2 
Support for this view is found in (1, pp. 93-95; 26, pp. 180-182; 21j 
pp. 199, 200; and 18, pp. 224, 225). 
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U. S. Steel appears to have recognized that to have willingly submitted to 
a strike would have been too financially costly and that, ultimately, some 
union would have successfully organized their workers anyway. By recogniz­
ing the SWOC as the bargaining agent for its members, the Corporation 
avoided financial losses and was able to deal with just one industrial 
union. The factors that led to recognition are made clear when examined in 
terms of those that were external to the firm and those that were internal. 
External factors affecting the decision making process of a firm or 
institution are those that at the time the decision is made are exogenous 
to the decision maker, and/or are factors over which the firm or institu­
tion has no direct control. Examples of such factors are, past economic 
conditions that influence the firm, the legal structure of the society, and 
the political climate. Internal factors are those elements or structures 
within the firm or institution itself that affect the decision process. 
Such factors are endogenous to the firm or institution, and/or are elements 
over which, at the time of the decision making, are subject to at least 
some control. Examples of such internal factors are, the evaluation of 
current and prospective economic data that affect the firm and the behavior 
of various components that make up the firm, such as employee associations. 
Economic conditions confronting U. S. Steel a^ the time of the SWOC 
effort were encouraging for the first time since 1931. The following table 
presents income and loss data for the firm from 1929 through 1936. 
The table shows that U. S. Steel had experienced losses during the 
fiscal years 1932, 1933, and 1934. The income for 1935 and 1936 was cer­
tainly not as impressive as it had been in 1929 and 1930, but at least the 
firm was not experiencing losses. 
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Table 16. Income and loss data for the United States Steel Corporation, 
1929-19361 
Year of operation Income or loss 
(In millions of dollars) 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
$197.5 
104.4 
13.0 
-71.2 
-36.5 
-21.7 
1 .1  
50.5 
^Source: (36, p. 225). 
The existing legal structure during the period also was an external 
factor leading U. S. Steel to recognize the SWOC. Two federal statutes 
were prominent during the effort; the National Industrial Recovery Act of 
1933 and the Wagner Act of 1935. The National Industrial Recovery Act was 
representative of many economic recovery proposals advanced during the 
early 1930's. The NIRA and its administrative body, the National Recovery 
Administration, was designed to permit cooperation among firms within an 
industry in place of "ruinous" price competition. Anti-trust laws were 
suspended in order to permit the firms to establish cooperative "codes" for 
the conduct of business. In addition, the NIRA had provisions that applied 
specifically to labor unions. Sections 7 (a), (b), and (c) granted workers 
the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing. Furthermore, the President was given the power to es­
tablish such things as the maximum hours of work, minimum rates of pay, and 
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the general responsibility of encouraging collective bargaining. 
Organized labor was consulted in the drafting of the NIRA. Green 
. . wanted a provision inserted dealing with collective bargaining, and 
Section 7 (a) was then inserted." (37, p. 205). John L. Lewis was also 
instrumental in obtaining approval of the NIRA, although he did not person­
ally appear before the House Ways and Means Committee who held hearings on 
the bill. Lewis had come to the conclusion that industrial stabilization 
was important to the general economic recovery of the country from the 
depression. He proposed to the Senate that; 
. . . Congress declare a national emergency and call for a 
reorganization of industrial and financial activities; that 
an emergency board, composed of industry, labor, agriculture, 
and finance, acting under the President, be set up and given 
plenary powers; that the board be instructed to reduce the 
hours of labor to the point where the unemployed would be 
absorbed; that labor be accorded the right to organize and 
bargain collectively; that the board fix prices of commodities 
to assure a reasonable return to labor; and that the board 
further undertake fundamental economic planning, as Congress 
might decide was wise. Through various further conferences, 
the Lewis plan became the basis for the National Industrial 
Recovery Act. The labor proposals became the famous Section 
7A and the less famous Section 7B of the act. (21, p. 51), 
(Emphasis mine.) 
The NIRA was not as satisfactory to organized labor as it might have 
been. It was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935, since 
it was viewed as an undue delegation of governmental powers to private par­
ties (38). Management soon found that they could establish company unions 
under the NIRA without incurring the wrath of the NRA. These "independent 
employee representation plans" presumably gave the employees those rights 
promised by the law and still provided a bulwark against organized labor. 
Furthermore, the industry codes adopted by the NRA gave the employers the 
right to evaluate employees on the basis of merit. The adoption of a merit 
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system 
. . . is just as effective as a declaration that 'anyone join­
ing a union will be discharged' since it leaves 'merit' to the 
determination of the employer. The employer who is hostile to 
unionism may discover without difficulty that good union men 
are always dropping tools or arriving late in the morning, 
(19, p. 75). 
Even Lewis did not "... deceive himself into the belief that he had 
made capital and labor lie down together." (21, p. 51). On the other 
hand, Lewis did use the labor provisions of the Act to encourage workers to 
join unions. Union organizers were able to tell the workers that "the 
President wants you to join." Industry was to discover that the establish­
ment of company unions merely provided a pre-existing organization which 
the SWOC could penetrate and convert to the C. I, 0. The NIRA also was an 
indication that official Washington was sympathetic to organized labor. As 
Edelman has noted: 
So far as labor was concerned, the first administration Brain 
Trusters saw it as a key economic sector whose purchasing 
power and living standards needed to be improved, both for 
humanitarian reasons and to stimulate economic recovery. 
(39, p. 177). 
When the NIRA was declared unconstitutional on May 27, 1935, Congress 
responded with the Walsh-Healey Act that specified that the federal govern­
ment could establish minimum labor standards in federal contracts for 
$10,000 and more, and the Wagner Act. The Wagner Act was a pro-labor law. 
It was ultimately declared constitutional by the Supreme Court by a vote of 
5 to 4 on April 12, 1937, in NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation 
(40). The Wagner Act represented a strong pro-labor sentiment by Congress. 
Congress reflected a growing public sentiment in favor of , 
giving workers 'equal bargaining power' with management. In 
addition, the management objections to the bill were weakened 
in the eyes of many congressmen as a result of the instances 
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of management defiance of the labor boards and the apparent 
widespread use of such anti-union tactics as espionage, 
blacklisting, and the storage of weapons. (41, p. 290). 
The total tone of the statutory law during this period was pro-labor. 
Irrespective of those efforts that the steel industry took to stave off 
unions by establishing company unions, it was evident that Congress was 
willing to permit and encourage organized labor's efforts. 
The general political climate was also significant as an external 
factor encouraging U, S. Steel to recognize the SWOC. John L. Lewis and 
the CIO had supported Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 and his reelection ". . . 
was widely hailed as a victory for trade unionism." (1, p. 95). In 
Pennsylvania the political climate was particularly pro-labor. The 
lieutenant-governor of that state, Thomas Kennedy, was the secretary-
treasurer of the United Mine Workers. Governor George H. Ear le of Pennsyl­
vania was elected along with Kennedy by the support of the liberal middle 
class and organized labor. 
Earle had pledged that if a strike came, the steel workers 
would enjoy complete freedom of picketing and assemblage, 
and, while striking, might expect aid from governmental re­
lief funds. (21; p. 199). 
In addition Congress had been presented with 
. . .  a  r e s o l u t i o n  b y  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  H a r r y  E l l e n b o g e n  o f  
Pittsburgh, calling for an investigation of the profits and 
price-fixing methods of the steel industry. (21, p. 200). 
The sum of all these circumstances made clear that the political sen­
timent of the time was on the side of organized labor. It would appear 
that the more astute members of U. S. Steel management recognized that 
such feelings would eventually result in the organization of their workers. 
There were four internal factors that caused U. S, Steel to recognize 
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the SWOC. These were the income prospects for the company for 1937 and be­
yond; the increasing militancy of the company unions and the successful 
SWOC penetration of these structures; the corporation's preference for 
dealing with a single union; and what might be called the professional 
management attitude of U. S. Steel as reflected in Myron Taylor's approach 
to management problems. 
By early 1937, U. S. Steel had good reason to believe that their in­
come figure might become even more respectable than it had been in 1936. 
Great Britain was rearming and was investigating the possibility of order­
ing steel from the United States. In February of 1937, the president of 
the British Board of Trade, Lord Runciman, was in the United States to ex­
plore the availability of steel here, and . . it was rumored that he was 
insisting upon a guarantee of uninterrupted production before he would let 
contracts." (1, p. 94). The evidence suggests, then, that U. S. Steel 
was in part motivated to recognize the SWOC because of good income pros­
pects provided industrial peace could be insured. A strike would have hurt 
the company's potential bargaining position with Great Britain and would 
have weakened its income position. 
The increasing militancy of the company unions combined with the suc­
cessful SWOC penetration of those structures also influenced U. S. Steel 
in its decision to recognize the union. The NIRA immediately resulted in 
the establishment of company unions throughout the steel industry. By the 
close of 1934, "... almost all of the major firms established company 
unions, with an estimated 90 percent of the steel workers covered." (41, 
p. 301). Prior to the passage of the NIRA there were only seven employee 
representation plans in existence in steel (3, pp. 75, 75). Bethlehem 
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Steel had one of the oldest and strongest such organizations, but most of 
the industry had traditionally used the "front office" system of personnel 
relations. This system meant that a worker was dealt with individually by 
division executives who might or might not decide the issue fairly. The 
steel industry was anxious to avoid "outside" interference in labor rela­
tions, however, and with the passage of the NIRA, they began company 
unions. 
The organization and structure of the company unions in steel was as 
follows. Each department in the plant elected a representative annually 
by secret ballot. The companies generally did not interfere with the elec­
tion procedure, although they did encourage the workers to vote. 
Since participation in an election, especially in the first 
year of the plans, was interpreted as a sign of approval of 
the system as a whole, the motive for such pressure was the 
companies' anxiety to demonstrate to the government and the 
public that their employees overwhelmingly preferred employee 
representation to outside unionism. (3, p. 80). 
Once the representatives were selected, they met and elected a secretary-
treasurer and a chairman. The chairman appointed the various committees 
such as those on Rules and the General Committee which dealt with wages and 
hours. Generally the structure of the company unions did not permit regu­
lar meetings of the rank and file. The structures also permitted frequent 
meetings between the representatives and management. The grievance proce­
dure was not unlike those existing with organized labor except that . . 
the companies retained the unabridged right of discharge." (3, p. 81). 
The employees themselves recognized certain shortcomings in such a 
plan. They were anxious for greater independence in such things as the 
selection of representatives, the recall of representatives, and the 
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ability to terminate contracts unilaterally. There were other problems 
with the plans as well. These included the following: generally no provi­
sion for the payment of dues; little contact with other company unions in 
the industry; no signed contract between labor and management; no provision 
for meetings of the rank and file; and little sophistication in the bar­
gaining process since the representatives did not have professional assis­
tance, In fact, no real collective bargaining took place between manage­
ment and the company union representatives. As a rule, management granted 
whatever management wanted to grant and the company unions accepted it (3, 
pp. 82, 83). 
The company unions became increasingly disenchanted with the bargain­
ing process as they were repeatedly beaten in their demands for higher pay 
and other benefits. This was particularly true in U. S. Steel. In 1935 
and 1936, the company unions of U. S. Steel became even more independent. 
They began to form district councils for the interchange of information and 
to consolidate backing for their respective goals. Some of the councils 
are shown in the following table. 
The Associated Employees was an outgrowth of a convention of employee 
representatives at New Castle, Pennsylvania in September, 1935. The em­
ployees' representatives at the convention emphasized their unhappiness 
with the existing bargaining procedure by demanding higher pay and other 
fringe benefits, the appointment of a labor arbitrator to settle industrial 
disputes, and management's surrender of the unilateral discharge. Manage­
ment of U. S. Steel refused to grant these concessions and by April, 1936, 
the company unions were very unhappy. 
Even the passage of the Wagner Act with its seemingly specific proviso 
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Table 17. U. S. Steel company unions' district councils^ 
Name Date of origin Representing 
(1) The Associated Employees 
(2) Rubicon Lodge 
(3) Calumet Council 
(4) Pittsburgh Council 
September, 1935 
January 1 2 ,  1936 
Not known 
March 7, 1936 
Not known 
Carnegie - Illinois. 
(U. S. Steel Subsidiary). 
Same as above. Gary, 
Indiana 
Chicago, Illinois 
Carnegie - Illinois 
Carnegie - Illinois, 
Inland Steel, and Calumet 
Steel 
(5) Associated Iron and Steel 
Employee Representatives 
^Source; (3, pp. 87-89). 
against company unions did not materially alter management's attempt to 
establish such organizations. 
Carefully worded suggestions how company unions may be trans­
formed into 'independent' unions without running afoul of the 
Wagner Act were periodically transmitted by the National 
Association of Manufacturers to its 80,000 employer members. 
A bulletin mailed by the association in August, 1937, sug­
gested a complete set of procedures, including the wording of 
membership appeals, application blanks, and a constitution 
and by-laws which fixed dues at fifty cents a month. (21, 
p. 222). 
The machine that steel had created in an effort to avoid organized 
labor was to be turned against them. The structure of the company union 
provided a means for SWOC infiltration, "One of the first moves planned in 
the campaign of SWOC was to 'capture' company-unions." (42, p. 22). The 
SWOC was successful in its efforts to accomplish this. One of the main 
features of the organizing effort was the "... frequency with which whole 
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company unions rebelled against company control and joined SWOC in a body," 
(20, p. 267). 
The strategy employed by the SWOC in winning over the company unions 
consisted of several steps. First, the SWOC did not attempt to "label" the 
employee representatives as company "stooges." Instead it wisely recog­
nized that these men generally were sincere in their efforts to establish 
true collective bargaining agreements. Second, the SWOC convinced the 
leadership of the company unions that they should associate themselves with 
the SWOC. Third, the company union representatives were encouraged to 
press hard for the settlement of pending grievances. In this way, if the 
union won, the SWOC could claim, partial credit for its own influence and if 
the union lost, the SWOC could use this fact to demonstrate the weakness of 
the company union arrangement. Fourth, the SWOC urged its employee repre­
sentatives to insist on a "verbatim" reporting of council and committee 
minutes to destroy any illusion on the part of the rank and file that rela­
tions between management and labor were harmonious. Fifth, the SWOC 
caused the number of committees in the company unions to be increased. 
This not only involved more workers in a union movement, but it also in­
creased the cost of the company union plan to the firms since they paid 
employees for time spent on union activity. Sixth, the company union men 
were encouraged to extend "patronage" activity and, thus, involve more 
workers in union activity. Seventh, the company unions were stimulated to 
greatly increase their demands on wages and hours (3, pp. 75-109; 1, pp. 
88-89). 
As a result of this activity, the company unions became more inde­
pendent and began to affiliate with the SWOC. By July, 1936, a group of 
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3,000 men joined the SWOC at the South Chicago works of U. S. Steel. 
Inland Steel employees numbering 300 men dissolved their company union 
shortly thereafter. On August 19, 1936, company union leaders from U. S. 
Steel plants in the middle-west met in Gary, Indiana and endorsed the SWOC 
organizing campaign. On August 25, 1936, 18 members of company unions in 
U. S, Steel in the Pittsburgh region met and expressed sympathy with the 
SWOC effort. Officials of the company union of Jones and Laughlin at 
Aliquippa met and endorsed the SWOC, The revolt of the company unions had 
begun (42, pp. 22, 23). 
U. S. Steel management tried to counter the loss of the company unions 
by agreeing to the SWOC and the company union demands. They even went so 
far as to agree to sign a written contract which would provide the workers 
with a "cost of living" increase in pay (3, p. 99). The SWOC was able to 
give the public the impression that the contract would forever tie wage in­
creases to the cost of living and that workers could never gain from in­
creases in productivity. As a result, the company union groups generally 
refused to sign the contract because of the cost of living feature. Fur­
thermore, the individual plants soon found that they would receive the in­
crease in pay without signing the agreement. When this was discovered, 
disillusioned "loyal" company men also joined the SWOC (3, pp. 75-109), 
The end result was that the SWOC won over the vast majority of the 
company unions of U. S. Steel. With this gain in worker sympathy by the 
SWOC, "there was the growing possibility of a strike by the S, W, 0, C, for 
recognition." (3, p. 108). 
At the same time that the SWOC was aiding the company unions to become 
more independent, it also filed charges with the NLRB saying that the com­
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pany unions were unlawfully dominated by management interests. Hearings 
were held from December, 1936, to February, 1937, by the NLRB with respect 
to company domination of the unions (1, p. 91). It finally became evident 
that the SWOC had successfully penetrated the workers of U. S, Steel. The 
SWOC was able to convince U. S. Steel that it had sufficient strength to 
win a representation election and that the cost of resisting the organizing 
effort would be high. 
A third internal reason for the recognition of the SWOC by U, S. Steel 
was the company's own preference for dealing with a single union if it must 
deal with one at all. The only meaningful alternative to the recognition 
of the SWOC was the ultimate possibility of dealing with a series of craft 
unions under the AFL. Since outside unionism was apparently in the indus­
try to stay, it appears that U. S, Steel preferred to deal with one indus­
trial union. In addition, Lewis 
. . . was a known quantity, and the corporation had learned 
to negotiate with him for its captive mines. Tom Moses, 
president of the H. C. Frick Coal Company, a U. S. Steel sub­
sidiary, played an important role in advising Taylor on the 
more technical aspects of relations with the union based 
upon his coal experience, and he enjoyed a rather friendly 
relationship with Lewis. (1, p. 95). 
Finally, Myron Taylor's power over the Corporation and his management 
attitude appear to have played an important role in the Corporation's deci­
sion to recognize the SWOC. As chairman of the board of directors of U. S. 
Steel, Taylor was in a position to impose his decisions on the entire cor­
poration. Taylor appears to have been very concerned about the public 
image of the Corporation, and wanted to avoid having public attention 
called to the power of the firm. 
When Myron Taylor took the chairman's chair, he inherited 
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not only a far-flung empire of semi-autonomous units, but 
much of the Gary policy of anxiety over public protect and 
a desire to disguise any appearance of monopoly that might 
come to the surface and hence to the public view. (43, 
p. 164). 
By refusing to recognize the SWOC and thus running the risk of a strike, 
Taylor would have subjected the corporation to considerable public atten­
tion, much of which would have probably been unfavorable. Additionally, as 
a professional manager, Taylor appears to have been concerned with what he 
saw as his obligation to the stockholders of the Corporation, That is, he 
felt it would adversely affect the profits of the firm (1, p. 92). 
In sum, the external and internal factors affecting U. S. Steel were 
such that the company decided to recognize the SWOC. To do otherwise would 
have resulted in a severe strike. Such a strike would have caused the com­
pany to experience additional losses. Of course, the fact that the SWOC 
was recognized did not prevent the company from losing money again in 1938. 
But it is with the advantage of hindsight that this observation is made. 
At the time, it is clear that the SWOC was recognized because U. S. Steel 
felt that this was the most financially profitable thing to do. 
Fundamentally, U. S. Steel signed with the C. I. 0. because 
the Committee had enrolled a substantial majority of 
Carnegie - Illinois employees as well as those of other 
corporation units. The company union had been wrecked, 
U. S. Steel had the choice of a costly strike --which, 
because of the political situation nationally and in 
Pennsylvania, would most likely have ended in a C, I. 0. 
victory; or of signing with the union, granting wage 
demands which were inevitable anyway, and enjoying an 
uninterrupted production season which promised,, after 
comparatively lean years, to be highly profitable. (21, 
p. 199). 
The effect of the capitulation of U. S. Steel was immediately seen in 
the SWOC's membership. Great impetus was added to the organizing campaign 
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as workers rushed to join the new union. Table 18 on the following page 
shows the growth of the SWOC membership that occurred shortly after the 
agreement between Taylor and Lewis on March 2, 1937. 
A number of the companies that signed with the SWOC as a result of 
U. S. Steel's having done so were important ones in the industry. Such 
independents as Jones and Laughlin, Crucible Steel, Sharon Steel, Wheeling 
Steel, Timken Roller Bearing, Caterpiller Tractor, McKeesport Tin-Plate, 
and Pittsburgh Steel were among those that had agreed to contracts with the 
SWOC by the end of 1937. 
The Conflict in Little Steel 
The capitulation of U. S. Steel and the subsequent recognition of the 
SWOC by many other firms divided the steel industry into two hostile camps. 
Anti-union sentiment in Little Steel was strengthened by the events of 
early 1937. The Little Steel group prepared to resist the organization ef­
fort with all the resources at its command. Again the causal forces lead­
ing to this conflict are clarified by examing them from the standpoint of 
those that were external and those that were internal. 
The external factors were similar to those influencing U. S. Steel. 
That is, past economic data for Little Steel indicated depressed economic 
conditions with some indication of recovery by 1935; the existing laws were 
obviously the same; and the political atmosphere was pro-labor. 
The steel industry had experienced depressed economic conditions in 
the early 1930's. This was reflected in the income data for U. S. Steel in 
Table 16 above. Tom Girdler noted that Republic Steel was similarly af­
fected. 
We lost $3,500,000 in 1930; we lost $9,000,000 in 1931; we 
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Table 18. SWOC membership growth in 1937^ 
Date Number of companies Claimed Lodges 
claimed under contract membership established 
April 1, 1937 59 200,000 429 
April 30, 1937 88 280,000 -
May 1-7, 1937 90 325,000 600 
May 7-14, 1937 110 
-
-
June 1, 1937 142 375,000 
-
August, 1937 260 -
-
December, 1937 445 500,000 1,080 
Data for the table was obtained by putting together information in 
several sources. Among the most valuable were (1, pp. 96-99; 21, p. 200; 
19, p. 174; and 42, pp. 29, 31). The membership data also contains Cana­
dian members. 
The reported membership figures are frequently viewed with skepticism. 
The accuracy of such data is, in the early days of a campaign, entirely a 
function of the union. The union may choose to vastly over-state the data 
so as to impress opponents with their strength. This skepticism is, per­
haps, justified. However, the membership claims of the SWOC may not have 
been so exaggerated. The extent of SWOC membership could not be made a 
matter of public record in many instances until representation elections 
were held. Elections were not held in Republic, Inland, and Ydungstown 
Steel until the middle of 1941. In addition, Lloyd Ulman (30, p. 6) notes 
that between 1937 and 1942, the SWOC "... was able to claim victory in 
220 out of the 393 National Labor Relations Boards elections," It is pro­
bable that many of the workers involved in the plants mentioned and in 
those elections had been considered as members of the SWOC long before the 
elections were held. It may well be, therefore, that the claimed member­
ship of the SWOC as reported in the table is reasonably accurate." 
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lost $11,200,000 in 1932; we lost $4,000,000 in 1933; we lost 
$3,500,000 in 1934. We made $4,500,000 in 1935; we made 
$9,500,000 in 1936 .... (44, p. 223). 
So while economic conditions had been bad, there was some improvement be­
ginning in 1935. 
The statutory laws affecting labor relations were the same as those 
confronting U. S. Steel. The laws had not, however, effectively eliminated 
the use of company unions by the steel industry. Even the passage of the 
Wagner Act did not appreciably alter the use of company unions. The firms 
responded to the law by having employee elections at which time the workers 
themselves made their company unions "independent" of the firms (21, pp, 
220-222) .  
Finally, while the political climate was pro-labor, it was not without 
exception and qualification. Management was able to find local authorities 
who at least were indirectly willing to support the anti-union forces in 
Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. The use of martial law, 
militia, and the state and local police forces was generally to the advan­
tage of management. 
Civil government in Johnstown, Pa., in Youngstown. Warren, 
Niles, Massillon, Canton, and Cleveland, Ohio, and in Chicago 
was sympathetic, if not thoroughly subservient, to the steel 
corporations. In Johnstown, Youngstown, and Chicago, key 
strike centers, the cooperation was open. (21, p. 203). 
Political sentiment was not sufficiently pro-labor throughout the Little 
Steel empire to be overly significant in aiding the SWOC. Little Steel was 
able to use local pockets of anti-union sentiment to its advantage during 
the conflict. 
In sum, the external factors affecting the decision process in Little 
Steel were much like those affecting U. S. Steel. There is the noted ex-
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caption that the local politicians were not universally pro-labor, but it 
is equally true that the local authorities with whom U. S. Steel might have 
worked were not necessarily pro-labor either. It is thus, immediately 
curious as to why Little Steel chose to resist the SWOC organization drive. 
There were two internal factors that played a causal role in Little 
Steel's decision to resist the SWOC campaign. There was a strong, almost 
violent, anti-union attitude on the part of some of the leaders of Little 
Steel firms. In addition, the company unions in Little Steel in fact may 
have been harder for the SWOC to penetrate than those existing in U. S. 
Steel. With respect to the latter factor, not the least of the reasons for 
the difficulty the SWOC had in penetrating the company unions was the use 
of violent anti-union tactics by Little Steel whenever the SWOC attempted 
infiltration. 
It is of value to note that, unlike U. S. Steel, Little Steel was 
apparently not particularly concerned with current economic conditions con­
fronting the firms. That is. Little Steel was experiencing improved income 
and sales in 1936 and 1937 as was U. S. Steel, but Little Steel apparently 
did not give this improvement very much consideration. This observation is 
strictly conjecture, however, since there is no recorded evidence to sup­
port it, nor is there evidence to refute it. It is apparently true that by 
mid-1937, the volume of new orders was down and, 
while there was no immediate decline in production, the business 
outlook was somewhat less favorable than it had been at the 
beginning of the year, when the U. S. Steel negotiations were 
taking place. (1, p. 100). 
It is still true, however, that economic conditions confronting Little 
Steel at the time of their decision to resist the SWOC were favorable for 
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the first time in several years. 
The anti-union attitude on the part of the Little Steel leaders ap­
pears to have been the most important internal factor influencing their 
decision to resist the SWOC. Little Steel was led by Tom Girdler of 
Republic Steel, and his anti-union sentiments are virtually legendary. 
Just as Lewis' convictions regarding the need for industrial unions in­
spired the SWOC effort, Girdler's strong anti-union sentiments were instru­
mental in the decision to resist the organization drive. 
Girdler had been with the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company prior to 
assuming his position with Republic Steel. This firm was very anti-union 
and was involved in violent strikes in 1914. Girdler had also been asso­
ciated with Jones and Laughlin Steel. He was with the firm when it created 
the company town at Aliquippa. Pennsylvania. The anti-union atmosphere at 
Aliquippa was notorious. The company completely dominated the lives of the 
workers through the use of spies, company police, and the inevitable eco­
nomic control over the workers. Union organizers did not dare to attempt 
to work in Aliquippa (21, pp. 201, 202). 
When Girdler went to Republic Steel, his anti-union sentiments were 
equally evident. The following quotes from his autobiography reveal the 
depth of his anti-SWOC-CIO convictions. 
An employer or a manager of a business can hire or fire, just­
ly or unjustly. All of us would welcome the invention of an 
arrangement that would eliminate injustice from the relation­
ship. However, even a tyrannical businessman's tyranny is 
limited to the enterprise he runs. But if the C.I.O. embraces 
all workers -- and John L. Lewis was openly striving for that 
goal -- then no American could work except by permission of 
this pompous ruler. (44, p. 317). 
A terribly disorganizing influence is at work at the base of 
all industry in America. The boss is no longer the boss. 
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Because organization is my forte this aspect of the intrusion 
of an outside influence horrifies me, as a physician is horri­
fied when he finds a cancer has developed in the person of 
someone he loves. Not greed but some perception of this must 
have been the thing that made so many employers the bitter 
opponents of the labor union movement in the old days. They 
foresaw what now eats at us. (44, pp. 449, 450). 
In commenting on the strike and violence that took place during the SWOC 
drive at Republic Steel, Girdler observed, 
I do not want to give the impression that I was fighting the 
nation's battle. In this fight I was trying to do my duty as 
chairman of the board of the corporation; so were my associates 
doing their duty to Republic Steel. But I am an American citi­
zen and I know that I was doing the best thing possible for my 
country when I fulfilled my obligation to the corporation. 
(44, p. 305). 
Girdler truly believed that he and a few other men were protecting the 
basic freedoms of the United States by resisting the outside union inter­
ests . 
Ernest T. Weir, the head of National Steel, was also instrumental in 
holding off the SWOC effort. He shared the anti-union convictions of Tom 
Girdler. Weir had one mill at Weirton, West Virginia that was particularly 
invulnerable to the SWOC. Union organizers were definitely not welcome in 
Weirton and the SWOC did not make a concerted organizing effort there dur­
ing 1937 (21, pp. 203, 212, 213). 
Eugene Grace of Bethlehem Steel also shared the sentiments of the 
other Little Steel leaders. He assumed a position of leadership in the 
anti-union drive (3, p. 134). Bethlehem's company unions proved to be 
particularly difficult for the SWOC to penetrate. The remaining leaders of 
Little Steel apparently held similar anti-union convictions. 
It would be difficult to overestimate the determination of these men 
to stop the SWOC organizing effort. They regarded Taylor and others who 
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gave in to the union as traitors. They were convinced that organized labor 
must not be permitted to penetrate the industry. Their collective attitude 
". . . appears to have been a major factor in the determination of Little 
Steel to fight." (1, p. 100). Such strongly held anti-union sentiments 
may explain why there was so little importance attached to current economic 
data by the Little Steel leaders. That is, they appear to have been so 
totally dedicated to keeping the union out of their firms that dollar cost 
and revenue considerations simply did not play an important role or were 
ignored in their decision to resist. To the extent that such economic in­
formation was ignored in their decision making, the leaders of Little Steel 
were not behaving rationally. 
A second internal factor possibly influencing the decision of Little 
Steel to resist the SWOC was a certain lack of success that the SWOC had in 
penetrating the company unions in Little Steel. It has already been noted 
that one important tactic used by the SWOC in the organizing drive was to 
infiltrate the company union structure and win it over for the union. This 
tactic was not as successful in Little Steel as it had been in U. S. Steel. 
This does not mean that no progress was made by the SWOC. For example, in 
Bethlehem Steel ". . . a block of company union representatives had come 
over to the S. W. 0. C " (3, p. 135). The SWOC had also success­
fully penetrated the company unions in Youngstown Sheet and Tube and Inland 
Steel. In Republic Steel, National Steel, American Rolling Mills, and 
Bethlehem, however, the progress of the SWOC was spotty and slow (3; 1, p. 
97). 
There are two reasons that explain the difficulty that the SWOC had in 
winning over the company unions in Little Steel. First, Little Steel re­
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sisted the efforts of the SWOC to penetrate their company unions with 
direct action. For example, Republic and Youngstown Steel had countered 
the SWOC infiltration tactic by harrassing union organizers; discriminating 
against union members; threatening the workers if they entertained ideas 
about joining the SWOC; and by outright discharge of union members (3). 
National Steel prevented much SWOC infiltration by using the Weirton 
Hatchet Gang, . . so called by union supporters because of its physical 
assaults upon union men . . (3). In Bethlehem Steel, the company 
union was an older well established organization and was difficult to pene­
trate (1). 
The second reason for the difficulty the SWOC had was because of what 
appears to have been some genuine anti-SWOC-CIO sentiment on the part of 
some workers in the industry. The growth of "independent" unions shortly 
after the AFL-CIO split may have reflected such convictions. 
The ordinary workman's fear and dislike of strikes have con­
tributed also to the growth of unaffiliated unions. The 
series of walkouts and sitdowns which marked the bitter re­
lations between the AFL, the CIO, and employers in the early 
days of the AFL-CIO split was regarded with fear by unorgan­
ized workers. They believed they would be coerced into mem­
bership and forced to participate in a quarrel in which they 
had no real stake. Thus many independents, especially in 
the smaller plants and towns, were set up to head off an AFL 
or CIO drive which, if successful, would have involved the 
newly-organized workers in interunion strikes and would have 
made them parties to a dispute which, in its earlier stages 
at least, was a real one only among leaders at the very top 
of the labor movement. Especially was the radicalism of the 
CIO feared by workers in small communities. (45, p. 79). 
Of the two internal factors, the anti-union conviction of the leaders 
of Little Steel was the most important one influencing their decision mak­
ing. While the company unions did apparently prove somewhat difficult for 
the SWOC to penetrate, there is dispute as to the degree to which this was 
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true (1). Additionally, to the extent that the company unions thwarted the 
SWOC drive, it was in part but a reflection of the anti-union sentiment of 
the Little Steel leaders. They were after all the ones who generally had 
to finance the anti-union activity. 
Once the decision was made to resist the SWOC, Little Steel's atten­
tion was then turned to the establishment of an effective anti-union wea­
pon. The weapon selected was the Mohawk Valley Formula presented in 
Chapter II. This strategy proved to be very effective in fighting the 
union. 
When full consideration is given to the effect of both the external 
and internal factors influencing Little Steel's decision process, their 
decision to resist the SWOC still seems to have been dominated by the anti­
union beliefs of the Little Steel leaders. The external factors were simi­
lar to those affecting U. S. Steel. The internal factors, however, were at 
best two-fold, as has been shown. There is little to indicate that the 
internal factor of current economic data was of any importance in their 
decision process. The anti-union convictions were further reflected in 
Little Steel's choice of an anti-union weapon. The Mohawk Valley Formula 
is expensive and violent. Its application resulted in death, injuries, and 
property damage. 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that Lewis felt it to be absolutely necessary to or­
ganize the steel industry in order to protect the revitalized UMW. The UMW 
had organized most of the coal industry, including the captive mines, by 
1935, but it appeared that the steel companies might attempt to use the un­
organized captive mines in such a way that the union mines would be threat­
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ened. The anti-union tradition within the steel industry also posed a 
threat to those captive mines that had been organized. To Lewis, the best 
way to mitigate this threat was to institute unionism throughout the steel 
industry. In that way, the captive mines would be protected by an 
"umbrella" of unions farther up the vertically integrated structure of 
steel. 
The steel industry reacted to the SWOC organizing drive in two entire­
ly different ways. Big Steel, as represented by U. S, Steel, recognized 
the union quickly. The external and internal factors influencing this de­
cision have been examined. It appears that economic cost and revenue data 
played a prominent role in the decision by U. S. Steel to recognize the 
union. To the extent that there was a conscious quantitative evaluation 
of economic data, and an intent to maximize profit, sales, or revenue, or 
to minimize loss or dollar cost, the decision was dominated by rational 
behavior. 
Little Steel decided to resist the union. The external and internal 
factors influencing their decision have also been examined. It has been 
seen that their decision was greatly influenced by anti-union feelings. To 
the extent that these sentiments resulted in a lack of a conscious quanti­
tative evaluation of economic data, or a lack of intent to maximize profit, 
sales, or revenue or to minimize loss or dollar cost, the decision to re­
sist was dominated by irrational or non-rational behavior. The application 
of the Mohawk Valley Formula by Little Steel further reflected the lack of 
consideration given to expense. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE COST OF THE ORGANIZATION EFFORT 
The writer has long been interested in the extent to which behavior in 
a union organization drive is affected by dollar cost and revenue data. 
Efforts were made by the writer in 1962 and 1963 to explore this aspect of 
union-management relations in the contemporary labor union movement. These 
attempts left the writer with the distinct impression that it would be dif­
ficult for such cost and revenue data to be fully determined. Two examples 
of the writer's experiences reveal something of the difficulty. In an ex­
tensive interview with an officer of the Iowa Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO) 
in 1963, it was learned that cost and revenue estimates of a union organi­
zation effort are done at the national union headquarters in nearly all 
cases, and that such information is simply not generally available even to 
state officers in the labor union.^ In another effort to gain information, 
the writer interviewed a person who had been employed in the office of an 
electronics firm in Iowa during a union organization drive. This individ-
2 
ual was in a unique position to know the tactics used by both sides. He 
had kept a rather complete record of the activities of both union and man­
agement during the drive. This record was examined at length, and it did 
not provide sufficient information for cost and revenue estimates to be 
^Confidential interview. Des Moines, Iowa. August 16, 1963. 
^Confidential interview. Ames, Iowa. July 30, 1963. 
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made. 
Upon reflection, it is not overly difficult to understand why such 
cost and revenue data is not readily available. First of all, in the tur­
moil generated by a union organization drive, it is probable that detailed 
records as to the expense incurred and revenues received by the partici­
pants are simply not maintained. Second, it is reasonable to conclude that 
in many organization drives the union would not want records of its costs 
and revenues to be available. To reveal such data would provide management 
with information that would be useful in resisting the effort. It is 
equally true that management would not want to disclose such information 
because of the potential usefulness of such data to the union. Finally, it 
is likely that both parties might well have expenditures that at best would 
involve activities of questionable legality, and at worst would support 
definitely illegal activities. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that calculating or even estimating 
the cost and revenue data of a union organization drive is a difficult 
task. Even when the magnitude of the drive is small and data exists, there 
is likely to be some inaccuracy in cost and revenue calculations based on 
such records as union finances, membership figures, company expenditures, 
and the like. Thus, calculating or estimating the cost of a mammoth organ-
^For example, it was possible to determine that the union had carried 
on its organization efforts for about 11 months. In that time, the respon­
dent's records showed that four organizers were involved at one time or 
another, seven other men had infrequently distributed union literature, 16 
meetings had been conducted by the union for prospective members, and nu­
merous gifts such as pocket calendars, rain hats, and the like had been 
given to the employees. The problem was that there was no way of determin­
ing the union's cost and/or revenue position. No data existed. In addi­
tion, there was no cost information available for the firm. 
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ization effort like the one conducted by the SWOC is necessarily more dif­
ficult and uncertain. It is conceded at the outset that inaccuracies, 
errors, and gaps exist in the relevant data. There is merit in presenting 
such data as is available if we are aware of its limitations. The data 
does provide an important clue as to the extent to which cost and revenue 
considerations played a dominant role in the decision process of the parti­
cipants. 
The Cost of the Organization Effort to the SWOC 
Several problems confront the researcher in attempting to estimate the 
cost of the organization effort to the SWOC. In the first place, the CIO 
provided a great amount of assistance to the SWOC and, 
the CIO published no financial statements in its early years. 
Moreover, when John L. Lewis was chairman, all the finances 
were handled by his brother-in-law, who was responsible only 
to him, and maintained what was apparently a complicated set 
of books. (1, p. 598). 
Too, the financial management of the CIO was informal during the organiza­
tion drive. John Brophy notes that, "if a need for money arose, I would 
call Lewis and he would send over a check." (20, p. 258). Financial analy­
sis is further complicated by the difficulty of differentiating between 
those revenues received and expenditures made by the CIO on behalf of the 
SWOC and financial operations being carried on for other purposes. The CIO 
was overseeing organization drives in other industries as well as steel at 
the same time. 
CIO revenue 
The CIO had three sources of revenue in the early years; (1) gifts 
and loans from affiliated unions; (2) a portion of the dues monies; and (3) 
a portion of the initiation fees. In these early years, the first revenue 
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source appears to have been the most important. 
The largest financial contribution to the CIO was made by the United 
Mine Workers. By the end of 1941, the UMW had provided a total of 
$7,249,304 to the CIO. This amount was tendered in the following ways: 
direct loans -- $1,665,000; services to the CIO paid for by the UMW --
$3,904,304; and per capita tax collections of $1,680,000 (1, p. 599). 
There were only two other CIO affiliates who are characterized as 
having given significant financial support to the CIO. They were Sidney 
Hillman's Amalgamated Clothing Workers and David Dubinsky's International 
Ladies Garment Workers. By the end of 1941, Hillman's group had given 
$2,500,000 to the CIO and the ILGWU provided $345,000 (1). The other af­
filiates did not contribute significant amounts. 
CIO expenditures 
The total expenditures of the CIO appear to have been equal to the 
$10,094,304 total received from the above three affiliates. Indeed, it is 
probable that the expenditures were even greater than this amount. When 
Philip Murray became president of the CIO in the fall of 1940, he reported 
that 
. . . there was no money in the treasury, and that it had been 
necessary to borrow $30,000 from the United Mine Workers and 
$20,000 from the Steel Workers to finance the 1940 convention. 
(1) .  
SWOC finaneia1 data 
Financial data for the SWOC as such is also difficult to assess- Most 
of the financial information for the SWOC was kept secret. 
During the SWOC period, the union did not publish detailed 
financial statements. This policy was alleged to have been 
adopted on advice of legal counsel because of pending law 
suits against the union. (30, p. 16). 
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SWOC revenue 
The SWOC had three sources of revenue: (1) gifts and loans; (2) ini­
tiation fees; and (3) monthly dues. It was very dependent on gifts and 
loans in the early days of the organization effort in steel. The SWOC had 
a provision for the payment of initiation fees of $3 per member and monthly 
dues of $1 per member of which 5 cents was a per capita tax payable to the 
CIO. On the other hand, the SWOC recognized that the financial hardship of 
the steel workers would not generally permit the collection of dues and 
initiation fees at first. Thus, the SWOC did not charge 
. . any fees or dues at all until after the first U. S. 
Steel settlement; and the treaty with the Amalgamated em­
powered the SWOC 'to grant dispensation from the payment of 
initiation fees to all persons joining the Amalgamated 
Association during such time as it deems advisable.'" (30). 
Gifts and loans received by the SWOC were substantial. Lewis had 
estimated that a successful organization drive in the steel industry would 
require funds of $1,500,000.^ The initial commitment by the CIO to the 
SWOC was for $500,000 which was one-third the estimated cost at that time. 
Those records that do exist show that the financial assistance coming from 
the CIO during the organization period was from $1,018,613 (1, p. 600) to 
$1,561,000 (30, p. 15) to $1,619,613.2 
All of these figures may well constitute an underestimate. Brooks, in 
his analysis of the revenues and expenditures of the effort, notes that "it 
would be surprising, therefore, if the S. W. 0. C. received less than 
^See Chapter II, p. 29. 
2 
This figure includes a direct loan from the UMW of $601,000 (1, p. 
110). 
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$2,500,000 from outside the industry." (3, p. 160). 
Some of the financial assistance included in the above figures were 
loans and were recognized as such by the SWOC. The UMW was a major lender 
to the SWOC. One loan of $601,000 was ultimately repaid to the UMW by 
1942 (30). 
In addition to the direct financial aid, assistance of an "in-kind" 
nature was provided to the SWOC. The UMW, for example, provided the serv­
ices of many experienced organizers and made legal aid available for the 
effort. This aid defies financial measurement. 
SWOC expenditures 
Just as SWOC revenues are hazy, so is the record of their expendi­
tures. Some inferences can be drawn, however. The SWOC had divided the 
steel industry into three major geographic areas: the Northeastern which 
included Pittsburgh; the Great Lakes and Western which included Chicago and 
Youngstown; and the Southern. These three regions were broken down in 64 
subregions or districts. Each region and district had a director and full 
and part-time field workers. The number of SWOC staff varied as both the 
need and the finances changed. The pay received by the staff also was sub­
ject to change as were the number of work days per month for which pay 
could be expected. The following table presents a number of various esti­
mates as to the size and remuneration of the SWOC staff. The only salary 
about which there is unanimous agreement is the $10 per day maximum that 
full-time field workers received. The lack of agreement on other data is 
no tewor thy. 
The SWOC also used funds for the rental of halls for meetings, the 
rental of loudspeakers, the printing of handbills, newspapers, and the 
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Table 19. Reimbursement of SWOC staff 
Title Pay rate Expenses Drawing 
fund 
Number 
Regional director 
Sub-regional 
director 
Full-time field 
worker 
Part-time field 
worker 
Clerical and 
stenographic 
$500 mo. 
$260 mo.® 
$8-$10 day* 
$4-$10 day® 
$6-$10 day* 
$3 day& ^  ^  
$10 week 
$20-$37.50 
week® 
"Legitimate"^ , 
$1.50-$3 $200 
per day 
3 
64 
150" , 
213 -437C 
-C&d 
®Based on 1936 estimates by Brooks (3, p. 159). 
^The drawing fund was used by the "head" organizer to pay for inciden­
tal expenses (28, p. 148). 
^^Staff estimates reported by Galenson (1, p. 110). The 437 full-time 
workers was a July, 1937 high while the figure of 213 represents a Decem­
ber, 1937 reduction due to depressed conditions in the industry and low 
finances. 
^These figures are for November, 1937 (30, p. 15). Galenson (1) re­
ports that expenses were not paid throughout the latter part of 1937, while 
Ulman says that the union did pay "legitimate" expenses. 
like. Incidental expenditures like these are impossible to estimate al­
though the costs of two regularly purchased items have been established. 
The handbills used by the SWOC cost approximately $25 for 5,000 copies 
". . . and sometimes the S. W. 0. C. has twenty-five or thirty different 
leaflets to issue in different parts of the U. S." (28). The SWOC news­
paper, Steel Labor, was also used as an organizing instrument. It was 
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issued about every two weeks and cost around $600 for a 150,000 copy issue. 
The paper was "... distributed free, though it has a price marked on it 
in order to circumvent the municipal ordinances against the distribution of 
literature." (28). 
The SWOC also incurred expenses as a result of the strikes that oc­
curred during the organization effort. Union funds were used to aid the 
strikers. Brooks estimates; 
The expenses of the strike to the national office were at 
least $50,000 a week. The main body of the strike lasted 
five weeks. In several localities, however, it dragged on 
for about six months. (3, p. 160). 
If Brooks' estimates are correct, then the strikes alone cost the SWOC at 
least $250,000. 
Per-member cost 
Estimates of the average per-member cost of the organization effort in 
the steel industry can be made. Such estimates, however, do not reflect 
the "in-kind" aid which represented expenditures by other CIO affiliates. 
The estimate that follows assumes that the SWOC spent all the monies it 
received in gifts and loans. This would appear to be a safe assumption. 
If Galenson's estimate as to the total gifts and loans received by the SWOC 
by May, 1942 is used, then the SWOC spent $1,619,613 on the organization 
drive. There is a problem in deciding which SWOC membership figure to use, 
but it seems reasonable to use an estimate of 500,000 since the SWOC did 
appear to have that many members on one or two occasions during the drive.^ 
Thus, the estimated per-member cost would be $1,619,613 ? 500,000 or $3.24. 
^See Table 18, Chapter III and Galenson (1, p. 113). 
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If Brooks' estimate of a total cost of $2,500,000 is used along with the 
membership figure of 500,000, the per-member cost of the drive rises to 
$5.00. 
It is most interesting to note that if these estimates could reason­
ably be viewed as valid, the organization effort might well have paid its 
own way, and maybe even returned a premium to the union. For example, the 
$3.00 initiation fee would have taken care of a very large part of the cost 
of the effort, and the monthly dues of $1.00 per member might well have 
provided revenues in excess of the remaining cost. To the extent that the 
union leaders did envision the effort as a loss minimizing or profit maxi­
mizing venture, the decision to organize the steel industry could be viewed 
as "rational" as used here for firm behavior. 
Such a conclusion appears to be unwarranted for several reasons. 
First, the data does not reflect the "in-kind" aid that was provided to the 
SWOC. Second, there is a variance of at least $880,387 in the estimated 
dollar cost of the drive. Additionally, the membership figures simply 
cannot be regarded as precise. For example, shortly after the figure of 
500,000 members was announced, a lower figure of 350,000 members was re­
ported and of that number only 250,000 paid dues regularly (1). Finally, 
there are no available data as to the amount of dues and initiation fees 
collected by the SWOC during the organization drive. It has already been 
observed that such collections were not made at all in the early days of 
the effort. So, while it may be speculated that the organization drive was 
theoretically profitable or at least self-supporting, it is impossible to 
prove. 
It appears, therefore, that there is no accurate way by which a finan­
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cial analysis of the SWOC effort can be made. The extent to which dollar 
cost and revenue considerations dominated the behavior of the union cannot 
be established with a satisfactory degree of precision. The issue remains 
moot. 
The Cost of the Organization Effort to Big Steel 
The cost of the organization effort to Big Steel is measured in three 
ways: (1) the cost of maintaining company unions; (2) the cost of antici­
pated strike preparations; and (3) the cost of settlement with the SWOC. 
Unfortunately, the data concerning these three items is incomplete. The 
available data is for U. S. Steel and the financial analysis below is for 
that company. To the extent that this data is representative of all Big 
Steel, the conclusions drawn for U. S. Steel will apply to the remaining 
firms as well. 
The cost of the company unions 
As was shown in Chapter III, company unions were instituted in the 
greater part of the steel industry after the passage of the NIRA. One im­
portant reason for starting company unions was the desire of management to 
thwart any organization efforts by "outside" unions (3, p. 78; 1, p. 89; 
and 46, pp. 980, 989, 990). At least part of the cost of maintaining com­
pany unions was, therefore, directly related to the cost the steel industry 
incurred as a result of the SWOC organization drive. It is, of course, not 
possible to determine the exact amount of this expenditure. 
In one way or another, the financing of the company unions was gener­
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ally done by the steel companies.^ Workers who had to be absent from their 
jobs on "union" affairs were paid by the company, and the company aided in 
providing necessary services during union elections (3, p. 105). 
In defraying the expenses of the plan and maintaining a 
'machine' of loyal representatives, the company had exposed 
itself to a variety of grafts the total costs of which must 
have been considerable. (3). 
The actual amount of the costs of maintaining the company unions is not 
known. In Big Steel, Sweeney estimates that the cost of maintaining the 
company union to U. S. Steel around 1937 was about $500,000 per year (42, 
p. 30). Jones and Laughlin is estimated to have been spending about 
$75,000 per year on their company unions (42), These two estimates con­
stitute the only available cost data for company union maintenance in Big 
Steel. 
Strike preparation costs 
The data for this category of cost is very meager. It is known that 
U, S. Steel did make some preliminary strike preparations that involved the 
expenditure of funds. It may be that other companies in Big Steel had sim­
ilar costs, but this could not be determined with any precision. Sweeney 
^It is interesting to note that the financing of a company union by 
the company itself had not changed substantially even in more recent times. 
In a series of depth interviews conducted by the writer in July, 1953, it 
was determined that a recently defunct company union had been to a large 
extent financed by the company. For example, the company paid most of the 
union president's salary. Management domination of the union was evident 
in other ways as well. For example, the president of the company retained 
the unilateral right of discharge. Some office personnel recalled that the 
president would frequently,fire men for no discernible reason. It was 
alleged that discharge was particularly frequent just before Christmas in 
order that the president might avoid paying the Christmas bonus. Notifica­
tion to the worker that he was fired was said to take the form of a card in 
his pay envelope which said, "You're fired - Merry Christmas." Confiden­
tial interviews, Maquoketa, Iowa, July 8-12, 1963. 
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reports that U. S. Steel spent $62,028.12 on gas munitions (42, p. 21). 
Presumably these munitions would have been used against the SWOC in the 
event of a strike. While the purchase of gas munitions may not have been 
the only type of expense made in the anticipation of a strike, this expen­
diture is the only one that could be determined. 
It is not surprising that the data on this cost category is sparse. 
It is reasonable to assume that the expenses made by a company in preparing 
for a strike would not be readily available for at least two reasons. 
First, some of the expenses might reflect intentions or activities of ques­
tionable legality. Second, the disclosure of such expenses would reveal 
something of the company's strategy to the union. 
Settlement costs 
The cost of settlement with the SWOC was a major expense that Big 
Steel experienced as a result of the organization drive. This cost is pri­
marily reflected in the increases in wages won by the SWOC for the steel 
workers. Data is again sparse for this cost category, but some estimates 
can be made for U. S. Steel. To the extent that the rest of Big Steel 
experienced similar costs, these estimates could apply to them. 
The wage increases won by the SWOC have been appraised as follows; 
The basic rate stood at a minimum of five dollars a day, which 
meant at least a raise of $1.25 a day for some, and as high as 
$3.20 for others, over the rates in 1936. The wage for common 
labor had been brought up to 62% cents an hour. In April, 
1937, the average hourly wage for all steel workers stood at 
85 cents and only three manufacturing industries (rubber tires, 
automobile, and petroleum refining) paid more. The average 
weekly wage in steel was $36.20 -- which was $10 above the 
next highest weekly average in any other industry. The wage 
bill of the steel industry was 34 percent greater than in 
1929; and at least half of the increase was the result of the 
campaign and agreements of the S. W. 0. C. All steel workers 
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enjoyed a forty-hour week. (21, p. 272). 
If it is correct that half of the 34 percent increase in the average weekly 
wage since 1929 was due to the SWOC contracts, the following estimates ap­
pear reasonable. The total increase in the average weekly wage would have 
been 0.34 x $36.20, or $12.31. Half of that increase would amount to about 
$6.15, and this would be the amount attributable to the SWOC. U. S. 
Steel's employment for fiscal year 1937 was 261,293 (36, p. 224). This 
figure probably does include some workers in jobs not covered by the agree­
ment, but it is the best data available. On the basis of the above data, 
the total weekly cost of the wage increase obtained by the SWOC would be 
$6,15 X 261,293, or $1,606,951.95. The total yearly cost attributable to 
the SWOC would thus be $83,561,501.40. 
Total cost of drive and comparisons 
By making use of the bits of available data, the total cost of the 
SWOC effort can be estimated. Additionally, it is possible to compare the 
cost of settlement with the cost of resistance up to the time of settle­
ment. 
The total cost calculation is based on the above three categories of 
costs incurred by U. S. Steel. It was shown that the estimated cost of the 
company union to U. S. Steel was $500,000 per year. Most of the U. S. 
Steel subsidiaries adopted company unions around 1933 as did most of the 
remainder of the industry. Thus, assuming that this one cost category ran 
for a total of about three years, (1933 through 1936), the total cost of 
company union maintenance to U. S. Steel would be $1,500,000. The total 
estimated cost of the SWOC organization drive would be: 
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Company union cost $ 1,500,000.00 
Gas munitions cost 62,028.12 
Contract costs - 1st year 
Total cost 
83,561.501.40 
$85,123,529.52 
On the basis of an employment of 261,293, the average total cost per-worker 
to U. S. Steel of the organization drive would be $85,123,529.52 t 261,293, 
or about $325.78. This represents costs incurred from 1933 through the 
early months of 1938. 
When the financial data is reported so that the cost of resisting or 
preparing to resist the union is made distinct from the cost of the con­
tract, the results are interesting. The available data provides the fol­
lowing estimate as to the cost of resistance: the company union cost for 
three years was $1,500,000; the expenditure on gas munitions was 
$62,028.12; and the two combined equal $1,562,028.12. Again using an em­
ployment figure of 261,293, the average total resistance cost per-worker 
for the three year period would be about $5.98. The contract cost for the 
first year was estimated to have been $83,561,501.40. Thus, the average 
total cost per-worker of the contract would be $83,561,501.40 J 261,293, or 
about $319.80. 
The estimated cost of settlement is clearly much higher than the cost 
of the company unions and gas munitions had been. On a dollar cost basis, 
the estimated average total cost per employee of resistance was only $5.98 
for the three year period prior to the contract. On the other hand, the 
estimated average total cost per employee of just the first year's contract 
was $319.80. While it would thus appear that the decision to recognize the 
SWOC was not dominated by dollar cost considerations, such a conclusion is 
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not warranted for several reasons. It has been seen in Chapter III that 
U. S. Steel's decision was in fact greatly influenced by economic data. 
While it is impossible to measure the actual dollar costs of continued 
resistance by U. S. Steel, it is equally apparent that they would have been 
much higher than those incurred by the end of 1936. For one thing, it has 
already been shown that U. S. Steel's company unions were continually grow­
ing more independent of the company. The expenses associated with bringing 
them back under control might well have increased costs incalculably. 
Additionally, the company unions themselves were pressing for higher wages 
similar to those later won by the SWOC (1, pp. 89-91). 
By recognizing the SWOC, U. S. Steel also avoided the expenses asso­
ciated with a strike. Galenson observes that the cost to U. S. Steel of 
breaking a strike would have been high (1, pp. 94, 95). A strike would 
have meant a loss of production at a time when the profit outlook was good, 
and when at least one important prospective customer. Lord Runciman, wanted 
a promise of uninterrupted production. 
It appears, therefore, that despite the wide discrepancy between re­
sistance cost and settlement cost, U. S. Steel was very much aware of cost 
and revenue data when it recognized the union. Continued resistance would 
have been far more expensive and probably to no avail (1, pp. 93-95). 
The Cost of the Organization Effort to Little Steel 
Little Steel's expenses as a result of the SWOC organization drive 
were of four general types: (1) the cost of the company unions; (2) strike 
costs and the cost of implementing the Mohawk Valley Formula; (3) the cost 
of wage settlements; and (4) the cost of NLRB awards and lawsuits against 
the companies. Unfortunately, the data for Little Steel is even more 
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meager and unreliable than that for the other groups involved. 
The cost of the company unions 
It has already been seen that one important reason for instituting 
company unions in the steel industry was to avoid "outside unionism". Es­
timates of the cost of the company unions to Little Steel are not avail­
able, and it may only be speculated as to their magnitude. 
An argument can be made in support of the view that such costs were 
high. Some members of the Little Steel group had company unions that were 
formed around 1919, and had thus incurred expenses of some sort on them for 
quite some time.^ Other companies in Little Steel had not adopted this in­
stitution until the NIRA period. Since Little Steel was so violently op­
posed to "outside unionism", it may be presumed that considerable funds 
were used by the companies to develop and strengthen the company union 
structure. The complete lack of cost data does make the reliability of 
such an argument questionable, however. 
Strike and associated costs 
As a result of the SWOC organization drive. Little Steel was involved 
in union organization strikes, and incurred costs that were generally of 
two types. One type was the loss in production that resulted from the work 
stoppage, and the other was the cost of breaking the strike by the use of 
the Mohawk Valley Formula. Limited estimates of these expenses can be 
made. 
It was noted above that the "main body" of the strikes lasted approx-
^The companies were Bethlehem, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and Inland 
Steel (26, p. 83). 
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imately five weeks, although in some firms they continued for a longer 
period. It is debatable as to how effective the strikes were in terms of 
stopping production. Walter Galenson has made an effort to examine the 
strike costs to certain firms in Little Steel by comparing their net in­
come changes from 1936 through 1937, with such changes in firms not on 
strike (1, p. 108). The assumption is that the effect of the work stoppage 
would in part be reflected by such income changes. He concludes that, 
. . . except for Bethlehem Steel, at which the stoppage was 
shorter and relatively less effective than in the remaining 
companies, the strike was a costly affair. Republic Steel 
seems to have been the hardest hit. If it is compared, for 
example, with National Steel, a company of comparable size, 
its 1937 net income was some eight million dollars below the 
expected level. (1). 
While National Steel was part of the Little Steel group, it was not struck 
by the SWOC, and experienced no work stoppage. Galenson notes of the re­
maining Little Steel firms for which similar comparisons were made Youngs-
town Sheet and Tube and Inland Steel, that both "... did worse than the 
large steel companies unaffected by the strike, although not as badly as 
Republic, on this basis." (1, p. 109). It is evident from this data, that 
the strike costs were considerable to Little Steel, but the exact figure is 
not known. 
An expense incurred by Little Steel as a result of the SWOC organiza­
tion drive was the cost of the Mohawk Valley Formula used to break the 
strike and resist the union. There are serious problems involved in esti­
mating the direct cost of this tactic to Little Steel. Many of these prob­
lems are made evident when consideration is given to the diverse features 
of the Formula. As was seen in Chapter II, the Mohawk Valley Formula made 
use of citizens' committees, back-to-work groups, weapons purchases. 
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bribes, vigilantes, private police agencies, state and local police agen­
cies, newspaper publicity, and the like. Certainly Little Steel paid many 
of the expenses involved in the use of the Formula, but groups outside the 
industry also contributed to the expense funds (23, pp. 8687-8690). Addi­
tionally, no estimates are available as to the portion of these expenses 
paid out of public funds when public agencies were involved. 
One prominent form of expense to Little Steel in the application of 
the Formula was the cost of munitions. From 1933 through June, 1937, the 
following purchases of gas munitions were made (42, p. 21): 
Republic Steel $ 79,712.42 
Bethlehem Steel 36,173.69 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube 28,385.39 
National Steel 12,085.37 
Total $156,356.87 
In addition to gas munitions, the Little Steel group purchased quantities 
of other armament. The following list gives some examples (42, pp. 33, 
34); 
Republic Steel 
Revolvers 552 
Rifles 64 
Rifle ammunition 1,325 rounds 
Shotguns 245 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Youngstown District Only 
Revolvers 453 
Rifles 369 
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Shotguns 190 
Machine guns 8 
Machine gun ammunition 40,000 rounds 
Rifle ammunition 8,000 rounds of .45-70 
caliber 
2,000 rounds of .30 caliber 
Revolver ammunition 20,000 rounds of .38 caliber 
A part of the more general costs of the Mohawk Valley Formula was a 
newspaper advertisement that was run in some 375 newspapers at the begin­
ning of the SWOC campaign. The advertisement announced the general opposi­
tion of the steel industry to Lewis and the union. The estimated cost of 
this tactic was $500,000 (21, p. 190). The cost of the advertisement was 
apparently not borne solely by Little Steel since it was sponsored by the 
American Iron and Steel Institute which included Big Steel in its member­
ship. It is interesting to note, however, that the Institute was headed by 
Tom Girdler of Republic Steel. 
No additional estimates of the cost of the strikes and the use of the 
Mohawk Valley Formula can be made from the available data. It may only be 
conjectured that the total expense to Little Steel of this phase of the or­
ganization drive was considerable. 
Wage settlement costs 
There is conflict in the record over the extent to which Little Steel 
granted wage increases similar to those won by the SWOC in Big Steel. There 
is evidence to support the view that the wage increases granted by Big 
Steel were also granted by Little Steel (21, p. 272; 3, pp. 120, 121). If 
this is indeed correct, then such wage increases could be considered as 
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part of the cost to Little Steel of the organization drive. There is, how­
ever, some evidence to indicate that two large employers in Little Steel 
may not have granted such wage increases. Lloyd Ulman observes that after 
its 1937 defeat in Little Steel, the SWOC had to make use of the Walsh-
Healey Act in a long court battle to force Republic and Bethlehem Steel to 
raise wages on work done under government contract (30). This suggests 
that they had not granted similar wage increases. Therefore, the estima­
tion of any wage adjustments made by Little Steel in response to the 
union's gains in Big Steel is difficult. 
If it is assumed that Republic and Bethlehem Steel were the only two 
firms in the industry that did not grant wage increases similar to those in 
Big Steel, the following estimate of the wage settlement cost can be made. 
It has been noted in Chapter II that of the 186,000 employees in Little 
Steel, Republic employed 46,000 and Bethlehem employed 80,000. The number 
of employees remaining to the other firms in Little Steel would be only 
40,000. Since the wage increase reported to have been granted was similar 
to that in Big Steel, it is reasonable to use the wage increase that was 
attributable to the SWOC in that sector. It was shown above that this 
amounted to an average weekly wage increase of about $6.15. This would 
mean that the average total weekly wage increase granted in Little Steel 
would have been $6.15 x 40,000, or $246,000. The first year's average wage 
increase would have been $12,792,000. Such estimates would constitute 
another part of the cost of the SWOC organization drive to Little Steel 
since the wage increases were a result of SWOC activity. 
If it is assumed that all of Little Steel granted the wage increase, 
the cost rises considerably. The average total weekly wage increase would 
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have been $6.15 x 186,000, or about $1,143,900. The first year's average 
wage increase in Little Steel would have been $59,482,800. Again, this 
would reflect part of the cost to Little Steel of the SWOC organization 
drive. 
Award costs and lawsuits 
As a result of their anti-union activities, some firms in Little Steel 
experienced costs that resulted from NLRB awards and lawsuits made in be­
half of those killed and injured as a result of the strike violence. Some 
of these costs are known. For example, Youngstown Sheet and Tube had to 
reinstate strikers who had been discriminated against, and had to pay some 
$170,000 in back pay as a result of NLRB proceedings. Republic Steel was 
also forced to rehire 7,000 employees and pay back wages of $2,000,000 as a 
result of NLRB awards after the strike (1, p. 109). 
Lawsuits were filed against Republic Steel for damages resulting from 
the killing and wounding of strikers. In 1945, Republic was forced to pay 
$350,000 as a result of these lawsuits (1). 
Little Steel, as represented by the above two firms, could not have 
known what such costs as these would have actually been at the time they 
made their decision to resist the SWOC drive. These costs are, however, 
still another part of the total cost of the organization drive to Little 
Steel. 
Evaluation 
The lack of important estimates such as the cost of maintaining com­
pany unions, greatly hinders efforts to assess the total cost of the SWOC 
drive to Little Steel, There is evidence to suggest, however, that the 
cost of resistance was not of any great concern to the group. First of 
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all, most of the expenditures examined were made with the intent of resist­
ing the union organizing drive. Since the evidence presented suggests that 
at least part of Little Steel granted wage increases similar to those won 
by the SWOC anyway, the expenditure pattern of Little Steel is curious. 
If the Little Steel group was concerned about cost and revenue data in 
formulating their decision concerning union recognition, it appears reason­
able to assume that they would not have gone to all the trouble and expense 
associated with putting barriers in front of the union and then have 
granted similar wage increases. To do so would simply not be rational. 
The expense of the company unions, the strike, the Mohawk Valley Formula, 
the NLRB awards, and the lawsuits could have easily been avoided by simply 
recognizing the union in the first place. 
Conclusion 
The examination of the available cost data reinforces the conclusions 
made in the institutional analysis of the organization campaign. That is, 
the union's decision to organize the steel industry was due to Lewis' 
determination to protect the UMW, and cost considerations appear to have 
been of secondary importance. U. S. Steel's decision to recognize the 
union was greatly influenced by cost and revenue considerations, and to the 
extent that U. S. Steel was representative of the rest of Big Steel, a 
similar conclusion is warranted for them. Little Steel's decision to re­
sist the union organization effort was not significantly influenced by cost 
and revenue data. 
It was demonstrated that theoretically the union could have received 
sufficient revenue from dues and initiation fees to cover the known costs 
of the effort and perhaps receive an excess of funds from the drive. In 
123 
this fashion, the union might thus be viewed as a profit maximizing organi­
zation. It was also shown, however, that dues and revenue collections were 
not made in the beginning of the campaign when many members joined. It is 
likely that the organization didn't become even self-supporting until 
around 1941 or 1942, when it was finally able to pay back a loan from the 
UMW. Therefore, the evidence presented throughout this study strongly sug­
gests that cost and revenue considerations were not a dominant factor in 
the union's decision to organize the steel industry. 
It is likely that cost and revenue considerations generally do play a 
secondary role in a union's decision to conduct an organizing drive. It 
.has been observed: 
Unions will organize workers because they are sometimes 
attracted by the potential income from dues and initiation 
fees. Union leaders moved by this interest will, on occa­
sion, appraise a proposed organizing drive on the basis of 
whether it will bring in more than it will cost. More 
typically, however, financial strength of unions is derived 
not from organizing workers but from holding on to the 
workers once they are brought into the union -- which is a 
task of a different order. In short-run terms at least, 
most organizing campaigns cost substantially more money 
than is realized by dues and initiation fees. (47, p. 18). 
(Emphasis mine.) 
It is not surprising, therefore, that dollar cost and revenue data did not 
appear to dominate the decision process of the SWOC. 
Big Steel's decision to recognize the union, as reflected by the data 
for U. S. Steel, does appear to have been greatly influenced by cost and 
revenue considerations. It is true that the estimates presented above show 
the cost of settlement to have been higher than the accumulated costs of 
resistance. This data, however, reflects only one side of the ledger. The 
evidence presented in Chapters II and III strongly demonstrates that 
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economic data was of prime importance in the decision process. While costs 
not actually incurred may only be speculated upon, the evidence presented 
suggests that had U. S. Steel not recognized the union, costs would have 
greatly increased. In addition, the prospective revenue position of U. S. 
Steel at the time the decision to recognize the union was made was better 
than it had been in years, provided labor trouble could be avoided. There­
fore, in spite of the difference between settlement costs and the incurred 
resistance costs, U. S. Steel's decision process was apparently greatly 
dominated by economic data considerations. 
The cost estimates for Little Steel support the conclusions made 
about that sector in Chapter III. That is, the available data supports the 
contention that Little Steel's decision to resist the union was dominated 
by irrational or non-rational behavior. It has been shown above that the 
cost of resisting the union was high. When this is considered along with 
the apparent fact that at least some of the firms in Little Steel, (and 
possibly all the firms), granted wage increases similar to those won in Big 
Steel, it is apparent that dollar cost and revenue considerations were 
simply not important in Little Steel's decision process. Significant costs 
could have easily been avoided by recognizing the union. Clearly, the 
decision to resist the union was prompted by elements other than a con­
scious quantitative evaluation of economic data. 
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CHAPTER V. A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ORGANIZATION EFFORT 
It is always difficult to make theoretical economic generalizations as 
to the determinants of union-management behavior. It is particularly so in 
regard to the union organizing phase of the relationship since several 
problems, all somewhat equally profound, confront the researcher. Many of 
these problems have been alluded to elsewhere in this study, but it is of 
value to restate the major ones here. 
First, there is the fundamental inadequacy of the data. This problem 
has been frequently encountered in the above review and analysis. One must 
rely upon an historical record that is incomplete and, in part, biased in a 
case study like the one conducted here. The writer's experience in examin­
ing other union organizing campaigns in 1962 and 1953 has served to sub­
stantiate the continued existence of this problem. The lack of data hin­
ders the development of theory. 
Furthermore, the economist, acting as an economist, is not in the best 
of positions to make analyses of union-management behavior with models that 
use maxima and/or minima techniques. Unions and business firms do not 
necessarily act solely as profit maximizing or loss minimizing economic 
units. Support for this view is found in the following representative 
statements. Arthur M. Ross observed of the union many years ago that: 
The trade union is a political institution which participates 
in the establishment of wage rates. To conceive of the union 
as a seller of labor attempting to maximize some measurable 
object (such as the wage bill) is a highly misleading formula­
tion. Although comparable with a business firm in some re­
spects, it is so dissimilar in other respects that the analogy 
is of questionable value. 
The formal rationale of the union is to augment the economic 
welfare of its members; but a more vital institutional objec-
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tive -- survival and growth of the organization -- will take 
precedence whenever it comes into conflict with the formal 
purpose. (48, p. 587). 
In commenting on the extent to which business firms are exclusively con­
cerned with profit maximization, R. A. Gordon observed some time ago that; 
It is increasingly being admitted that businessmen may be 
guided by non-pecuniary motives as well as by the criterion 
of maximum profits. (49, p. 269). 
He further noted that: 
We know relatively little about these personal non-pecuniary 
motives, however, and even less about how they interact with 
the profit criterion to affect price and other business be­
havior. (49). 
Fritz Machlup has also indicated that he would not deny: 
. . . that a goodly portion of all business behavior may be 
non-rational, thoughtless, blindly repetitive, deliberately 
traditional, or motivated by extra-economic objectives. 
(50, p. 520). 
To the extent that unions and business firms are in fact influenced by fac­
tors that are extra-economic, it is clear that a thoroughly meaningful 
study of union-management behavior must be interdisciplinary in nature. 
There is another hazard that confronts the researcher as attempts are 
made to develop a generalization about the behavior of the participants in 
a union organization campaign that is directly related to the above. This 
is the problem presented by the distinct possibility of irrational or non-
rational behavior of leading participants. Such behavior has been defined 
for purposes of this study as a lack of conscious quantitative evalua­
tion of econcric data, or a lack of intent to maximize profit, sales, or 
revenue *or to minimize loss or dollar cost. The analyses presented in 
Chapters III and IV strongly suggest that irrational or non-rational be­
havior was at least to an extent thus demonstrated by Little Steel and by 
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the SWOC. Any theoretical statement must allow for such behavior. 
A fourth problem concerns the need for a theoretical formulation that 
can cope with disequilibria. When the firm recognizes the union, there is 
a behavioral equilibrium. That is, the participants have been able to 
agree on this one aspect of their relationship even though the decision by 
the union to organize, and the decision by the firm to recognize the union 
may well be, and probably is, due to different reasons. When the firm re­
fuses to recognize the union, there exists a behavioral disequilibrium. 
The union is not satisfied with such an outcome and will attempt to estab­
lish an equilibrium. The firm, consequently, must cope with the union's 
efforts in an attempt to thwart the organization campaign. An adequate 
theoretical framework must be able to deal with either situation. 
Another hindrance to the development of a theoretical analysis of the 
organization campaign is posed by the problem of measurement. It was seen 
in Chapter III that both internal and external factors affect the decision 
process of union and management. Some of these factors are at least par­
tially quantifiable and measurable, but others are not. For example, past 
and current cost and revenue data provide one means for measuring the per­
formance of the firm or institution and such information is seen as affect­
ing the decision process. However, many of the factors are not so easily 
quantifiable and measurable. For instance, the political climate and the 
legal structure would defy cardinal measurement even though the implica­
tions of these factors might be apparent to the decision maker. The sig­
nificance of the personality of the decision maker is also beyond meaning­
ful quantification. Cost and revenue predictions would prove troublesome 
to measure accurately too. Finally, the participants in the organization 
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drive may well be concerned with, and have their decisions affected by, 
such immeasurables as institutional security and concern for their public 
image. 
The Significance of the Prior Analysis 
The review and analysis of the SWOC organizing campaign in the steel 
industry has confirmed the existence of the problems examined above. The 
following recapitulation of the analysis underlines the elements that an 
adequate theory of union-management behavior in an organizing effort must 
incorporate. 
When examining the union, it is seen that the external and internal 
factors influencing the decision process are greatly intertwined and not 
readily separated. Some of the factors can be partially categorized, but 
it is hazardous to do so since internal and external influences overlap 
considerably. 
It has been shown throughout this study that the motivating force be­
hind the union was the internal influence of John L. Lewis. It was repeat­
edly demonstrated that he believed the organization of the steel industry 
to be an absolute necessity. The historical record reviewed in Chapter II 
indicated that the goal of bringing the union to the steel workers dom­
inated virtually all other considerations. Lewis was willing to run the 
risk of splitting the labor union movement in order to achieve his goal. 
When the split occurred, he apparently "torpedoed" any reunification ef­
forts since he seemed to feel that unity would adversely affect the goal. 
The cost and revenue analysis presented in Chapter IV indicated that 
the organizing effort could have theoretically been at least self-support­
ing and perhaps financially profitable for the union. The fact was, how­
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ever, that dues and initiation fees were suspended in the early months of 
the campaign. The union's financial planning records are not available. 
Thus, the degree of influence that this partially internal factor of cost 
and revenue expectations had on the decision process cannot be precisely 
determined. While one could not safely conclude that cost and revenue data 
were of no importance at all to the union, the suspension of revenue col­
lections suggests that this factor played a secondary role. 
The evidence submitted in Chapters II and III support the view that 
Lewis was concerned about the organization of the steel industry because of 
the threat that those unorganized firms posed to the UMW. It was shown in 
Chapter III that the steel firms owned many coal mines and had followed an 
open shop policy in those mines. This generally external factor along with 
Lewis' experience with the union problems in the bituminous coal fields 
appears to have emphasized the need to organize all the bituminous mines. 
In order to accomplish this, the anti-union sentiment in the steel industry 
had to be thwarted to protect the existing union penetration of the captive 
mines, and to extend the union into the remaining unorganized captive 
mines. The anti-union attitude of the steel industry was, in part, re­
flected in the weak position of the old Amalgamated Association of Iron, 
Steel and Tin Workers. Thus, a new and viable steel workers' union had to 
be instituted. 
The legal structure at the time of the organizing drive was also con­
ducive to union organization efforts. This factor appears to have influ­
enced the union's decision process. The factor is neither totally external 
nor totally internal, however, for it was seen in Chapter III that the law 
was influenced by the appeals of organized labor. The prevailing pro-labor 
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political climate was also a factor that may have affected the union's de­
cision process. This factor may not be classified as totally external or 
internal either. It has been shown what Lewis and the CIO may have 
assisted in the development of this pro-labor sentiment through their own 
political efforts. 
The growing independence of some of the company unions in the steel 
industry was another factor influencing the SWOC. This factor is particu­
larly difficult to categorize as external or internal. The company unions 
were becoming disenchanted with their relationship to management at the 
time the SWOC was being formed. In a way this development may be regarded 
as a factor that confronted the union leaders at the time the decision was 
made to organize the industry. It has been demonstrated, however, that the 
SWOC did exercise some control over this factor. The SWOC encouraged the 
company unions to become even more independent, and it was shown in 
Chapters II and III that the SWOC infiltrated the unions in order to win 
them over. 
Big Steel, as reflected by the analysis of U. S. Steel, was seen as 
being affected by a number of internal and external elements in their de­
cision to recognize the SWOC. Internally, the income prospects for U. S. 
Steel were very favorable provided production could be maintained. How­
ever, the growing independence and militancy of the company unions indi­
cated that labor trouble might develop that would adversely affect these 
revenue expectations. It was also shown that the company may well have 
preferred to deal with a single union rather than a group of craft unions. 
Furthermore, Myron Taylor was apparently concerned about the public image 
of the company. He appeared anxious to avoid any unnecessary public dis-
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play of the power of the firm that might become visible during a period of 
serious labor unrest. Taylor was also evidently interested in fulfilling 
his obligation to the stockholders of the company by avoiding anything that 
would diminish the profits of the firm. 
External factors were also influential in U. S. Steel's decision pro­
cess. It was demonstrated that the company had recently experienced en­
couraging economic conditions for the first time in years when the decision 
was made to recognize the SWOC. The legal structure and the political 
climate also affected the decision. It has been seen that these latter two 
factors were generally pro-labor. 
The analysis presented in Chapter IV of the cost of resisting the 
union as compared to the cost of recognition and settlement revealed that 
the latter cost was the larger of the two. However, it was repeatedly 
demonstrated that when all of the factors are considered, U. S. Steel ap­
pears to have regarded union recognition to be no more expensive, and pos­
sibly far less so, than the potential costs associated with a refusal to 
recognize. It is thus evident that U. S. Steel was very much aware of cost 
and revenue data when the decision to recognize the SWOC was made. 
The decision to resist the SWOC effort by Little Steel has been shown 
to be the result of internal and external influences affecting the decision 
process. The evidence submitted in Chapters II, III and IV indicate that 
the intense anti-union attitudes of the Little Steel leaders constituted a 
vitally important internal factor affecting their decision process. Fur­
thermore, the company unions in Little Steel may well have been a bit more 
difficult for the SWOC to penetrate. It was shown, however, that this was 
in part but a reflection of the anti-union sentiments of the Little Steel 
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leaders as they dominated the control of the company unions. It is possi­
ble that some of the workers in the company unions were genuinely opposed 
to the SWOC as was indicated, but it appears clear that any and all anti­
union traits inherent in the company union structure were exploited by the 
leaders of Little Steel. 
The external factors affecting Little Steel were similar to those af­
fecting Big Steel. That is, past economic conditions were'bad, but improv­
ing, the laws affecting labor relations were the same, and the political 
climate was pro-labor. It is apparent that local political sentiments 
might have been, in part, anti-union. It was seen that this was exploited 
by Little Steel, and was a latent characteristic that Big Steel might have 
made use of had it chosen to do so. 
The analysis presented in Chapter IV demonstrated that the cost to 
Little Steel in resisting the SWOC was considerable. The cost of main­
taining the company unions, while not known precisely, may well have been 
high. The strike costs measured in terms of income effects were also 
sizeable, as was the known cost of implementing the Mohawk Valley Formula. 
While there is apparent doubt as to the number of firms making wage adjust­
ments, at least some of the firms in Little Steel evidently granted their 
workers wage increases similar to those won by the SWOC in Big Steel. This 
was seen to be an additional cost to Little Steel of resisting the union. 
Finally, the NLRB award costs and the costs of lawsuits also represented 
expenses that were incurred by Little Steel as a result of the organization 
drive. The magnitude of these costs along with the other evidence exam­
ined, strongly suggests that Little Steel was not particularly concerned 
with cost and revenue data when they decided to resist the SWOC organiza­
133 
tion campaign. 
There are several prominent features revealed by the above analysis 
that serve to reinforce the initial observations made in this chapter. 
First, it is seen that all the participants were strongly goal oriented. 
The means selected to achieve the respective goals were a result not only 
of the goals themselves, but also of the internal and external factors af­
fecting the decision process. It is also clear that, while cost and reve­
nue data were given varying degrees of consideration by union and manage­
ment, such considerations were not dominant in all cases. Therefore, there 
is reason to be very suspicious as to the extent to which parties in a 
union organization effort are interested in maximizing profits, sales, or 
revenue, and/or minimizing loss or dollar cost. That is, there arises a 
serious question about the degree of rational behavior that is present in a 
union organizing drive. Furthermore, it is evident that the complexity, 
diversity, and subjectivity of the factors that affect such behavior would 
generally defy quantitative measurement. It is apparent, therefore, that a 
meaningful theoretical framework must be able to cope with all the above 
elements if a thorough understanding of the participants' behavior is to be 
achieved. 
It is apparent, however, that the relationship between the above ele­
ments and the participants themselves is fund amen tally of an economic 
nature. For example, two central features of the SWOC effort, and of any 
union organization effort, are power and the threat of conflict. In a 
sense, the institutions thus involved are subject to economic analysis to 
the extent that the power and conflict are of an economic nature. Economic 
power is subject to certain qualifications, however. The clarification of 
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these qualifications is indicated in the following: 
Economics is the science of scarcity; scarcity gives rise to 
the dependence of the subject on certain quantities of goods. 
If these goods are in the hands of a seller who cannot be 
perfectly substituted by another seller, the buyer becomes 
dependent on the seller. The seller can exercise economic 
power by threatening to withhold the goods, that is to say, 
he is able to make the subject do things he would not have 
done otherwise. So economic power is controlled by two con­
ditions; first, the dependence of the buyer who is to be 
subordinated to the seller; and second, a possibility for 
the supplier to withhold his offer or, more precisely, the 
buyer's belief, right or wrong, that this possibility exists. 
(51, p. 30) .  
In other words, the two parties involved must be in some way economically 
interdependent and interact in an imperfect market. One or both of the 
parties must also have the ability to withhold their goods or services or 
to instill the belief in their opponent that such can be done. 
The power exercised or capable of being exercised by union and manage­
ment in an organization effort is, by the above standards, basically eco­
nomic, The union possesses economic power in that as it organizes the 
workers, management becomes increasingly dependent upon the union for labor 
and the union becomes increasingly able to threaten the withholding of that 
labor via a strike. Management similarly has such power in that the work­
ers, whom the union is attempting to organize, are dependent upon manage­
ment for employment and management may withhold employment via a lockout. 
In addition, it has been observed that 
. . . goals, whatever their nature, are relevant to the eco­
nomic problem whenever they involved the allocation of scarce 
resources. • ., (52, p. 8). (Emphasis mine.) 
Clearly, the goal of a union to organize a firm, and the goal of a firm to 
either grant or refuse recognition of the union involves the allocation of 
scarce resources. Similarly, the means selected to attain these goals are 
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relevant to the economic problem since they too involve the allocation of 
scarce resources. 
Thus, it is apparent that economic analysis may make a meaningful con­
tribution to an understanding of behavior during a union organization 
effort. 
The Theoretical Analysis 
The examination of means, goals, and external and internal factors 
presented so far suggest a framework useful for examination and generaliza­
tion. This framework permits the incorporation of the above four elements 
in such a fashion that clarity is added to an understanding of the SWOC 
effort. To the extent that other union organization efforts involve simi­
lar elements, the framework provides a vehicle for understanding the be­
havior demonstrated. 
The suggested analytical treatment of a union organization effort is 
as follows. Each of the principal parties involved in a union organization 
effort is seen as being a separate decision unit or system. The decision 
system is affected by internal and external forces, the selection of means, 
the relative rationality or irrationality of those means, and the goals of 
the system. Figure 1 on the following page is a diagram of a general sym­
metric decision system. It represents the decision system for one of the 
parties such as the union or management. The basic structure is similar to 
a set of parallelograms. The X gradient in the parallelogram Alpha refers 
to those external forces affecting the decision-maker's means and goal 
selection. To an extent, these external forces play a causal role in the 
ultimate goal selection as well as the means used to attain that goal. The 
I gradient in the system refers to the internal factors influencing the 
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decision-maker. The internal forces also play a causal role in the means 
and goal selection. The two resolution gradients in the system refer to 
the way the external and internal forces interact with one another in 
bringing about a means and goal selection. 
Parallelogram Beta similarly related the relative rationality or ir­
rationality of the means choice. The relative strength with which these 
two forces interact play a causal role in the goal selection. They do not, 
however, play the only such role. The larger parallelogram. Gamma, indi­
cates that a causal connection also exists between the fundamental external 
and internal factors and the goal selection made by the decision-maker. 
The general direction of causality in the system is right to left. How­
ever, such a relationship is not absolute. It is conceivable that goal and 
means selection may also affect the relative strength of the I gradient. 
The central axis to the system is seen as running through opposite 
corners of the big parallelogram Gamma and, similarly, through the opposite 
corners of the smaller parallelograms. Alpha and Beta. This axis is con­
ceived of as being spatially finite. That is, it may be viewed not only as 
defining the general area of the framework in some finite fashion, but also 
may be used to denote the time horizon confronting the decision system. 
The goal and means sets are symmetric about the central axis. That 
is. Means Set A and Goal A are positioned directly on the axis. Means Sets 
B and C, as well as Goals B, C, and D appear both above and below the axis. 
Thus, Means Set B lying above the axis is just like Means Set B lying below 
the axis; the same is true of Means Set C and for the Goals. In this 
fashion, it is irrelevant which side of the parallelogram Alpha is said to 
represent internal and external forces. It is equally irrelevant which 
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side of parallelogram Beta is said to represent rational or irrational 
means. This removes some of the arbitrariness of the system. 
In such a framework a deterministic solution in terms of means and 
goal selection appears to be implied. This is misleading. The measurabil-
ity of the I and X gradients' relative strength cannot be done in a quanti­
tatively meaningful fashion. It may be concluded, however, that one 
gradient may have been, or is likely to be, more influential than the 
others. Thus, the selection of one means set becomes more probable^ than 
the selection of another. The I and X gradients' effect on the goal selec­
tion is also probabilistic in the above sense, although in a more indirect 
fashion. That is, the effect of the internal and external factors on goal 
selection is modified by the means chosen to reach that goal as is shox-rii in 
parallelogram Beta. 
Similarly, parallelogram Beta is misleading. It appears to indicate a 
The statement that the selection of one means set becomes more "prob­
able" must be qualified. It is not intended that the term "probable" refer 
to statistical probability. The problems of making such quantitative meas­
urements have already been discussed. What is meant is that one means set 
becomes more likely, reasonable, presumable, or understandable. Indeed, 
the means set may on occasion merely be more attractive or appealing. The 
same qualifications apply when the discussion centers on "probable" or 
"probabilistic" goals. 
It may be that, given sufficient data about the past behavior of the 
decision system, some estimates of statistical probabilities might be in­
corporated into the theoretical framework. At the present time, however, 
a thorough search of the available literature indicates that there are no 
other existing analyses of behavior in a union organization drive suffi­
ciently similar to the current one that would permit meaningful frequency 
estimates of the forms of behavior in such campaigns. 
The term "probable" is used in lieu of the other alternatives because 
the writer feels that, despite its possible implications, it more clearly 
denotes the meaning of the analysis. 
139 
deterministic outcome. The relative strength of rational and irrational 
means cannot be measured with such precision. Again, an estimation of 
their relative strength may lead to a probable goal. That is, once an ap­
praisal of the relative strength of the rationality and irrationality of 
the means set chosen is estimated, one goal becomes more likely than anoth­
er. The direction of causality here is also from right to left. There is 
good reason to believe, however, that causality influences here are also 
occurring in the opposite direction as well. That is, the goal choice does 
play a role in determining the relative strength of the rational and irra­
tional means selected. The effect of this interaction is not of great 
consequence until it is juxtaposed against another such framework con^ 
strueted by an opponent. 
It can thus be seen that the framework implies deterministic solutions 
which are not, in fact, the case. The system is capable of merely suggest­
ing probable means set selections and probable goal selections. The direc­
tion of causality in the system is from right to left, but such causality 
is subject to the modifications discussed. 
Manipulation of the general framework demonstrates the probabilistic 
nature of the model and its flexibility. Two examples are given here. 
Others may be conceived. 
A skewed decision system with internal and irrational dominance is 
shown in Figure 2 on the following page. In this system, the internal fac­
tors are dominant over the external ones in parallelogram Alpha. This sug­
gests that the Means Set B is a more likely result of the external and in­
ternal factor interaction. The Means Set B is, however, dominated by irra­
tional activity or factors. In the current context, this would be taken to 
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Figure 2. A skewed decision system with internal and irrational dominance 
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mean that the system is dominated by a lack of conscious and/or quantita­
tive evaluation of economic data, and/or a lack of intent to maximize 
profit, sales, or revenue, and/or minimize loss or dollar cost. The Goal 
that becomes more probable is, thus. Goal C. Additionally, due to the 
suggested dominance, the more indirect influence of the internal factor is 
seen to reinforce the Goal selection. That is, the system is dominated as 
to Goal selection by the I gradient as well as the irrational means. The 
result is that parallelogram Gamma is greatly skewed. Goal C lies away 
from the center of the system. 
Another possible manipulation also results in a skewed system. Figure 
3 on the following page portrays a system with external and irrational 
dominance. In this system, the external factors are dominant over the in­
ternal ones in parallelogram Alpha. The result is the probable selection 
of Means Set B. The probable Means Set is dominated by irrational consid­
erations. Due to this interaction and the interaction between the goal 
array and the means set. Goal B becomes more probable than the other pos­
sible outcomes. The probability of Goal B is reinforced indirectly by the 
external factors' dominance too. The goal selection indicated here is dif­
ferent than the one indicated by the previous system. In this current 
system, the external factors and irrational means are dominant such that 
the overall parallelogram Gamma is not as skewed as it was in the previous 
case. The result is a Goal selection only slightly removed from center. 
Manipulation of the system can result in decision systems with exter­
nal and rational dominance and with internal and rational dominance. Each 
of these systems would most likely result in goals somewhat removed from 
the center. 
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The achievement of Goal A in the system is most probable when the sys­
tem is not excessively dominated by any one set of factors. In fact. Goal 
A is seen as implying a definite symmetry in the system. That is, when the 
external and internal factors are about equal in influence, and when the 
means chosen represent, roughly, an equal amount of rationality and irra­
tionality, Goal A becomes the most probable one. Parallelogram Gamma would 
be symmetric in this case as would parallelograms Alpha and Beta. Alpha 
and Beta could also be equal. 
j 
The Application of the Decision System 
The means and goals selected by the parties in union-management rela­
tions are a result of the forces shown in the decision system presented 
above. Each participant in such a relationship has his own particular de­
cision system with its own set of internal and external factors, means that 
are rational and irrational, and goals. Industrial peace or industrial 
conflict is a question of the relative similarity of the goals of the 
parties. 
An organization effort is, however, unique to other union-management 
relations in that one of the parties has only one meaningful goal. The 
union, attempting to organize the industry, has the founding of a union as 
that primary goal. There may be other outcomes, but they are to be avoided 
as far as the union is concerned. Management is in a different position. 
There are a number of goals that may appear to it as possible and, perhaps, 
equally acceptable. For example, management envisions the recognition of a 
union as one possibility, maintaining or creating a company union as anoth­
er possibility, and no union at all as still another possibility. 
Until the union presents an organizational threat to management, there 
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is no need for these two decision systems to interact overtly. When the 
union does threaten organization, however, the two decision systems con­
front one another and interact in such a way as to bring about industrial 
peace or conflict. 
Industrial peace requires that the union and management have influ­
ences acting upon them in a similar fashion. In terms of the framework 
presented, the two decision units must arrive at an essentially similar 
goal selection. Since the union has only one relevant goal, the forces 
acting on management must make that goal more attractive than any of the 
other possible ones. 
For the sake of simplicity, let Goal A in the goal array represent 
union recognition. It has been seen that for Goal A to be likely, a defi­
nite symmetry is implied in the system. That is, the system is not exces­
sively dominated by any one set of factors. A peaceful resolution of the 
organization attempt is seen to require that parallelogram Gamma for man­
agement be similar to parallelogram Gamma for the union. Such a situation 
is depicted in Figure 4 on the following page. 
Since the goal is the same in the systems depicted, conflict does not 
result as the two decision units interact. There is a behavioral equili­
brium. The equilibrium that results is a lasting one as long as nothing 
disturbs the symmetry of the two systems. Should management later appraise 
the situation differently, such that other goals become more attractive, 
then conflict will result. It is feasible, theoretically anyway, that the 
same sort of reappraisal could lead the union to a different goal selection 
too. 
It is emphasized that the basic requirement for industrial peace and a 
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behavioral equilibrium is that both the union and management decision sys­
tems are so affected that they agree on the same goal. The above specifi­
cation of Goal A as representing union recognition was an arbitrary one. 
Union recognition might just as well be represented by Goal B, C, or D. 
Thus, even if the internal parallelograms Alpha and Beta were not syiuaetric 
within the decision systems or between them so that the respective Gamma 
parallelograms for union and management were skewed, this would not neces­
sarily affect the outcome. Each decision system could be dominated by in­
ternal or external factors and/or by rational or irrational means choices 
and there could still be a common goal indicated and an equilibrium. Such 
skewed systems have been portrayed in Figures 2 and 3. What important 
insofar as agreement on the same goal is concerned is that the degree of 
skewedness be roughly similar or equally offsetting between the two deci­
sion systems. 
For example, assume that the union's decision system Gamma is skewed 
like the one in Figure 3 because of external factor dominance and irration­
al means dominance. Further assume that Goal B represents union recogni­
tion. Equilibrium between union and management could still result if the 
management decision system Gamma was skewed in either of the following two 
ways. First, equilibrium between the two decision systems would result if 
the management Gamma was similarly skewed due to external factor dominance 
and irrational means dominance so that Goal B resulted. Equilibrium be­
tween the two decision systems would also result if the management Gamma 
was equally skewed in the opposite direction so that Goal B above the axis 
resulted. This could happen, for example, if the management system was 
sufficiently dominated by internal factors and rational means choices. It 
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is evident then that any number of combinations of internal and external 
dominance and/or rational and irrational means dominance could exist in the 
decision systems and still result in equilibrium between the two systems. 
The analysis of the union organizing drive in Big Steel, partilcularly 
U. S. Steel, suggests that a basic symmetry or offsetting skewedness did 
exist between the decision systems of union and management. It appears 
reasonable to assume that the decision systems interacted in a fashion sim­
ilar to that depicted in Figure 4. It has been seen, however, thatt it is 
not necessary that the units appear exactly like those in Figure 4-
It has been observed that separating the internal and externalL factors 
affecting the union is a difficult task in this instance. Yet, a areason-
able degree of equality in the factors affecting the union's decision sys­
tem may well have existed. There was, of course, the very strong commit­
ment by John L. Lewis to organize the steel industry that internalHy af­
fected the decision system. However, there were a number of factoirs that 
were at least partially identifiable as external that may well havee equally 
influenced the decision process. While the decision may have refleected 
only secondary attention to cost and revenue data, it has been denmoastrated 
that the effort could have been self-supporting or even profitable. Thus, 
irrational behavior within the system may have been equally offset by 
rational behavior when the decision was made. 
The internal and external factors affecting U. S. Steel may a Iso have 
affected the decision system in an equal fashion. It has been sho-roi that 
the company was internally influenced by income prospects, a company union 
rebellion, the possible preference for dealing with a single union., and the 
concern about the public image of the firm. Externally the compaiuy was 
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affected by past revenue data, the existing legal structure, and the poli­
tical climate. Furthermore, though the cost of settlement was higher than 
the cost of resistance up to that time, it has been shown that there was 
considerable concern about cost and revenue data. 
Irrespective of the exact weight of these factors, it is apparent that 
some sort of fundamental symmetry existed between the two decision systems. 
It is possible that the systems were skewed, but they still were suffi­
ciently affected by internal and external factors and/or rational or irra= 
tional means choices that the resulting goal was the same. 
Industrial conflict results when the goals of the participating deci­
sion units are different. This is a result of a distinct difference be­
tween the probable goals of the parties involved. In terms of the frame­
work, the cause of conflict is a result of a lack of symmetry or offsetting 
skewedness between the two decision units or between their respective Gamma 
parallelograms. This lack of symmetry, suggesting different probable goals, 
results in a behavioral disequilibrium. Such a situation is depicted by 
Figure 5 on the following page. 
The situation depicted again shows a basically symmetric Gamma paral­
lelogram for the union. That is, all causal elements are directed toward 
Goal A which again is assumed to represent union organization of the indus­
try. 
Management has a different goal indicated as most probable. That is, 
the causal forces represented by parallelograms Alpha and Beta are such 
that the Gamma parallelogram is skewed. In this case, a different goal 
selection is indicated. 
Since symmetry or offsetting skewedness is absent between the two de-
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cision systems, conflict results. There is no behavioral equilibrium. In 
the system portrayed, management's decision system is such that the inter­
nal forces outweigh the external and irrational means are dominant over the 
rational means. The result is a disequilibrium. The resulting goal for 
management is unlike that of the union. There is a refusal to recognize 
the union. 
Again, it is of no significance that the union is said to be attracted 
to Goal A and that management is caused to pursue Goal C. The respective 
goals could well be depicted by some other goal on the scale. What is im­
portant is that the respective Gamma parallelograms are neither symmetrical 
nor of offsetting skewedness. 
The behavioral disequilibrium means that the respective systems will 
be in a constant state of change. The unique element of a union organiza­
tion effort is, however, that the goal selection of the union will most 
probably remain constant. That is, organization of the industry will still 
be their goal. The union's strategy in such a situation will be focused on 
changing the Alpha and Beta parallelograms of management. By trying to in­
fluence the external and internal factors, the union will try to change the 
overall skewedness of management's parallelogram Gamma. The union may also 
try to influence the strength of the Beta system of management as well by 
adding to or weakening the relative strength of management's rational or 
irrational means. All of this manipulation would hopefully remove the 
skewedness of management's decision system or make it of corresponding 
offsetting skewedness so that ultimately there will be symmetry or off­
setting skewedness between the two systems. With such an accomplishment, 
management's probable goal will be equal to the union's goal of recognition 
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and the behavioral disequilibrium will be removed. 
Some tactics or means that the union might adopt to alter the Alpha 
and Beta parallelograms of the management system are immediately evident. 
The unions might attempt to affect the external factors influencing manage­
ment by trying to make the legal structure more pro-labor. The union might 
also attempt to make the political climate more sympathetic to organized 
labor. Internally, the union may endeavor to make the revenue prospects of 
the firm diminish if the company refuses recognition, or they may adopt an 
I 
educational program designed to make the union more attractive to both man­
agement and the worker. The union may also try to convince management that 
additional efforts to resist the union would be extraordinarily expensive. 
The behavioral disequilibrium in a situation of conflict will also be 
acted upon by management. Management may try to influence the Alpha and 
Beta parallelograms in the union's decision system. Symmetry or offsetting 
skewedness between the systems is the hoped for result. Management faces 
the task, however, of making alternative goals such as a company union or 
no union at all, acceptable to the union. While this is not a theoretical 
impossibility, it is not probable. 
Tactics that management might adopt are equally evident. There may 
well be an effort to change the legal structure, political climate, and/or 
the image of the union so that those external influences to the union be­
come discouraging. The firm may also attempt to impress the union with the 
idea that continued organization efforts would be enormously expensive. 
Additionally, the company may attempt to elevate its own image and/or lower 
that of the union through some system of community education or indoctrina­
tion. 
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The outcome of such behavioral conflict where the decision systems 
are in disequilibrium is fundamentally a function of each system's ability 
to effectively employ economic power. That is, the ability of either sys­
tem to make the opponents decision system symmetric or of offsetting 
skewedness depends ultimately on the effectiveness of the union's ability 
to withhold labor via a strike or the company's ability to conduct a pro­
longed lockout. The use of such economic power does then affect the rela­
tive magnitude or weight of each decision system's Alpha and Beta parallel­
ograms • 
The analysis presented in the case study of the SWOC-Little Steel ef­
fort supports the conclusion that a lack of symmetry or offsetting skewed­
ness existed in the decision systems. If we assume that the union's deci­
sion system was similar to that depicted in Figures 4 and 5, then the man­
agement decision system portrayed in Figure 5 is revealing. It has been 
shown that Little Steel was greatly influenced by the internal factor of a 
strong anti-union sentiment on the part of the leaders of Little Steel. 
This internal influence was reinforced, in part, by the resistance of the 
company unions in Little Steel to the SWOC efforts. This does not mean 
that Little Steel was completely unaffected by external factors. It has 
been shown, however, that Little Steel was dominated by internal considera­
tions because the external factors of a pro-labor legal structure and 
political climate appear to have been largely ignored by Little Steel. In 
addition, the decision by Little Steel to resist the SWOC effort has been 
shown as being made without any particular consideration of cost and reve­
nue data. For example, the adoption of the Mohawk Valley Formula as a 
means to thwart the union organization drive indicates that the firms were 
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not concerned about such data. To the extent that Little Steel granted 
wage increases similar to those won by the SWOC in Big Steel, the means 
chosen to resist the union also reflect irrational behavior since cost and 
revenue data must have played a subordinate role. 
Irrespective of any debate over the exact position of the management 
and union parallelograms, one characteristic is obvious; there was no 
fundamental symmetry or offsetting skewedness between the systems. Hence, 
conflict was inevitable. 
Conclusion 
The traditional test of the merit of a theoretical statement is that 
of its capacity to make predictions. The framework presented is largely 
untested in this respect. It may be that, given a sufficient number of 
studies of union-management behavior in an organization campaign similar to 
the one conducted here, meaningful estimates of the probability of a parti­
cular outcome could be made. At the present time, however, such measure­
ments of the factors playing a significant role in the dynamic behavior in­
volved in union-management behavior in an organizing campaign are not 
available nor do they appear possible within the current state of the be­
havioral and social sciences. This is not the fault of the decision sys­
tem, however. 
The questionable predictive capability of the model and the lack of 
meaningful measurement capacities should not detract overly from the frame­
work's merits. It does provide a means for the analysis of events within 
the proper sphere of economics. It permits the many factors affecting be­
havior to be categorized and placed in their proper perspective. It 
demonstrates the interrelationship among all the factors influencing eco­
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nomic behavior. It allows for irrational behavior. It demonstrates the 
need for a fundamental symmetry or offsetting skewedness between overall 
decision units if a peaceful settlement is to result. The framework demon­
strates that a lack of such similarity between the decision units will re­
sult in conflict. The conflict is seen to continue until such symmetry or 
offsetting skewedness is restored between the systems. The framework does, 
therefore, aid in clarifying the situation confronting institutional units 
engaged in the exercise of economic power. 
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION 
Summary and Findings 
It was observed at the beginning that a study of union-management be­
havior during a union organization drive raises a fundamental question re­
garding the extent to which rational behavior tends to dominate the deci­
sions made. In order to investigate behavior in this phase of union-
management relations, the SWOC effort to organize the steel industry was 
reviewed and analyzed. It was demonstrated that the SWOC campaign was a 
particularly valuable case to examine because it was of considerable im­
portance in the history of the labor movement ; the effort involved powerful 
opponents; there was a distinct difference in the ways the firms in the in­
dustry reacted to the union; and, there appeared to be evidence that irra­
tional behavior was present during the drive. The case selected thus per­
mitted an analysis to be made that might better reveal those forces that 
influence union-management behavior in such an encounter. 
After reviewing the principal events in the SWOC drive, a methodical 
institutional examination was presented as a first step in the economic 
analysis. The object of the institutional analysis was to delineate all 
the important influences affecting the participants in the union organizing 
effort. Once the important factors were isolated, an effort was made to 
categorize them for the firms involved in the drive, and later, to the 
extent possible, for the union. It was shown that there are many factors 
affecting union-management behavior in an organization effort that to an 
extent are exogenous to the decision process, and/or are factors over which 
the firm or institution has no direct control. Additionally, it was demon-
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strated that there are internal elements that affect behavior that are en­
dogenous, and/or are elements over which the firm or institution may exert 
some control. 
The cost of the organization drive was examined separately in an ef­
fort to determine the degree to which the participants in a union organiz­
ing drive appear to be influenced by such data. This was the second step 
in the economic analysis. It was demonstrated that estimating or calculat­
ing dollar cost and revenue data is an extremely difficult task. The rea­
sons for that difficulty were presented and were seen to be reinforced by 
the writer's more recent experience in attempting to make similar esti­
mates. There is merit in making such estimates provided that we are aware 
of the inadequacies of the data. The estimates can provide a clue about 
the attention given to cost and revenue data by the participants in the 
organizing drive. It was thus shown that the cost and revenue analysis 
tended to lend additional support to the findings of the institutional 
analysis. That is, there emerged evidence to support the contention that 
irrational behavior was to some extent present in the behavior of some of 
the participants in the drive. 
Finally, a new theoretical framework that is useful for examining 
union-management behavior during an organization campaign was developed. 
It was demonstrated that several very profound problems confront the re­
searcher in the development of such a model. The analysis of the SWOC 
effort confirmed the existence of those problems. It was also shown that 
the relationship that exists between the participants in a union organizing 
campaign remains fundamentally economic in nature, and that economic analy­
sis may thus contribute to an understanding of that behavior. 
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The theoretical framework that was developed as a result of this study 
is unique. It is possible for external and internal factors that affect 
the decision process in a union organization drive to be incorporated with­
in the model. Quantitative measurement of the exact magnitude of the in­
ternal and external factors remains a problem at the present time, but the 
model permits them to be included as they must be if a meaningful framework 
is to result. It is also possible to estimate their respective influences 
on the decision process. The model permits irrational as well as rational 
behavior to affect the decision system, but again quantitative measurement 
is a problem. The model can cope with disequilibria, and since it demon­
strates the interrelationship among all the factors that influence economic 
behavior, it has been shown that it provides a device for understanding how 
equilibrium may come about. This new framework thus provides the scholar 
with a valuable tool for understanding union-management behavior in an or­
ganization drive. 
Recommendations for Further Studies 
It has been noted that the theoretical framework developed in this 
study is untested in its predictive capacity. Until more data becomes 
available about the behavior of unions and management during an organizing 
drive, this feature of the model cannot be tested. 
It has been shown that the nature of union-management relations during 
the organizing phase of their relationship is such that meaningful analyses 
require interdisciplinary efforts. The data needed for a thorough under­
standing of such behavior would thus have to be accumulated through the 
close cooperation of a number of the disciplines in the behavioral and 
social sciences. 
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The following suggestions represent a few of those areas where the 
writer concludes that additional study needs to be done. There is a need 
for more meaningful financial data concerning union organizing campaigns 
so that a more precise determination of the degree of influence of cost and 
revenue data on the decision systems can be made. There is also a need for 
improved historical record keeping so that factors influencing behavior may 
be more precisely delineated. Finally, there is a need for better data on 
the personality characteristics of leading figures in organized labor and 
management. These suggestions, while not exhaustive, demonstrate chat each 
related discipline has an important contribution to make toward a better 
understanding of behavior in union-management relations. 
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